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ABSTRACT
THE CHP, THE U.S., AND  ULUS:  THE PORTRAYAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES IN ULUS GAZETESİ 
DURING WWII  
Adam B. McConnel
History Department, M.A. Thesis, 2008
Supervisor:  Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak
Key Words:  CHP, U.S., media, WWII, culture, information, press, Ulus, Reader's Digest
Traditional accounts of Turkish-American relations point to the 1945-1947 period as the point
at which political ties between the two countries became "important."  However, when one
looks at the information about the United States published by Ulus Gazetesi, the semi-official
newspaper of the CHP, during that period, one sees a fully-developed pro-U.S. perspective,
complete with many articles directly translated from U.S. sources.  From this situation, we can
infer that the Turkish-American alliance cemented after WWII had deeper roots than just the
international situation following the war.  
In an effort to determine exactly when the pro-U.S. outlook displayed in Ulus during WWII
developed, this thesis identifies, traces, and assesses the information about the U.S. that the
newspaper published during the war years.  This thesis also evaluates Turkish-American
relations during the 1930s and finds that the 1930s saw an advance in the relations between
the two countries, and prepared the way for a more comprehensive political, economic, and
cultural relationship. The role of Ulus in Turkish society, and the role of Reader's Digest, the
primary source of Ulus' U.S.-sourced information, in American society and the U.S.
government's WWII information efforts, are also examined.
iv
The thesis concludes that U.S.-sourced information played an important role in Ulus' wartime
publishing practices and that relations between the Turkish and U.S. governments during the
1930s and WWII need to be re-evaluated in order to explain Ulus' pro-U.S. attitude and the
prevalence of pro-U.S. and U.S.-sourced information in the newspaper during WWII.
v
ÖZET
C.H.P., A.B.D. VE ULUS:  A.B.D.'NİN ULUS GAZETESİ'NDE  
İKİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞ BOYUNCA 
 YANSITILMASI 
 
Adam B. McConnel
Tarih Yüksek Lisans Programı
Tez Yöneticisi:  Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak
Anahtar Kelimeleri:  CHP, A.B.D., medya, İkinci Dünya Savaşı, kültür, bilgi, basın, Ulus, 
Reader's Digest
Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri konusundaki geleneksel çalışmalar, iki ülke arasındaki politik 
bağların önem kazanmaya başladığı periyodun 1945-1947 senelerine rastlayan dönem
olduğuna işaret eder.  Oysa ki, o dönem Ulus Gazetesi'nde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne
ilişkin olarak yayınlanan makalelere bakıldığında, ki Ulus gazetesi CHP'nin gayri resmi yayın 
organı niteliğini taşımaktaydı, tam anlamıyla olgunlaşmış Amerikancı bir bakış açısının 
halihazırda varolduğu ve hatta kimi makalelerin gazeteye doğrudan doğruya Amerikan 
kaynaklarından çevrilerek aktarıldığı görülür.  Bu husus, 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında 
perçinlenen Türk-Amerikan ittifakının köklerinin tek başına savaş sonrasında oluşan 
uluslararası konjönktürle, bir başka deyişle 1945-1947 yılları arasındaki döneme özgü 
siyasi ve iktisadi koşullarla, açıklanamayacak kadar derinlere uzandığını işaret eder.
Tezimin amacı, 2. Dünya Savaşı süreci boyunca Ulus gazetesinde sergilenen Amerikancı 
bakış açısının tam olarak ne zaman ortaya çıktığını tespit etmek amacıyla, anılan süreçte 
Ulus gazetesinde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne ilişkin olarak yayınlanmış bulunan 
bilgilerin izini sürerek, bunları göstermek ve değerlendirmektir.  Bunun yanında, tezim, 
vi
1930'lardaki Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini de değerlendirme kapsamına almaktadır.  Tezimde, 
1930'larda iki ülke arasında görülen münasebetlerin ivme kazanarak daha kapsamlı siyasal, 
iktisadi ve kültürel ilişkiler için yol gösterici niteliğe büründüğü tespit edilmektedir. 
Tezim, ayrıca, Ulus gazetesininTürk toplumu içindeki rolünün yanı sıra, adı geçen 
gazetenin temel Amerikan bilgi kaynağı olma özelliği taşıyan Reader's Digest'in de 
Amerikan toplumu içindeki rolünü ve bu yayın organının 2. Dünya Savaşı esnasında
Amerikan hükümetinin propaganda faaliyetlerindeki işlevini de masaya yatırmaktadır.
Tezimin görüşü, Amerikan kaynaklı bilgilerin Ulus gazetesinin savaş sürecinde 
gerçekleştirdiği yayın faaliyetlerinde çok önemli bir rol oynadığı yönündedir.  Buna ek 
olarak, Ulus'un Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne karşı sergilediği olumlu bakış açısı ile 
gazetede yer alan Amerikancı ve Amerikan kaynaklı yayınların yaygınlığını açıklayabilmek 
için Türk ve Amerikan yönetimleri arasında 1930'larda ve 2. Dünya Savaşı sırasında 
yaşanan ilişkilerin yeniden tahlil edilmesi ve değerlendirilmesi gerektiği sonucuna 
ulaşılmaktadır.
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1.0  INTRODUCTION
Originally, this thesis was intended to examine Turkish press reaction to the Marshall Plan.
When  I  began  to  read  Ulus Gazetesi (The  Nation)  issues  from  early  1947,  though,  I
encountered  something that  I had not  expected  at  all:   dozens  of  articles from American
sources like Reader's Digest and Life, translated into Turkish and presented to the readers of
Ulus as information about the United States or the World.  I had expected to see articles from
those  magazines  in  Turkish  publications  later,  in  the  1950s,  after  the  Turkish-American
alliance had taken on much more serious dimensions through the Marshall  Plan,  Turkey's
accession to NATO, and the full advent of the Cold War.  However, I found myself looking at
issues of Ulus from January 1947, before Truman had even given his famous speech before
Congress, filled with American articles.  “When did this begin, and how?,” I wondered.
In order to satisfy my curiosity, I went back first to  Ulus' issues from 1946, then 1945, and
eventually 1944, in order to determine what kind of American-sourced articles were published
in the paper during those years.  I was surprised to find that, even in 1945, there were many
more articles than I had expected.  According to the historiography that I knew, there was no
way to justify the appearance of these articles based on the contemporary political relationship
between the Turkish and U.S. governments.  All the accounts that I had read indicated that the
Turkish-U.S.  relationship  did  not  really  blossom  until  Truman's  Congressional  speech  in
March 1947, and even then, the U.S. government was reluctant to have closer ties with the
Turkish government, something that would mandate more aid and commitments to an ally
they knew little about.1 
Turkish-American relations began as the result of specific political and economic conditions
that existed in the late 18th century.  At that time, British and French attentions were focused
1  See, for example:  Kuniholm, Bruce R.  The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East.
Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University Press:  1994.  pp. 65-68, 211-213.  Lewis, Bernard.  The
Emergence of Modern Turkey, 3rd ed.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2002. 237-319.
Zürcher, Erik Jan.  Turkey:  A Modern History.  London:  I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2001. pp.
184-228.
1
on the Eastern Mediterranean,2 allowing the infant United States an opportunity to sell its
manufactures in regions outside of great power interest.3  Subsequently, U.S. merchants, with
governmental  support,  were able  to  make their  first  international  economic  forays on the
Barbary Coast (today's Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) in the face of only weak resistance from
the Ottoman authorities.4  Later U.S. involvement in the Ottoman empire generally involved
trade  in  opium,  tobacco,  some  foodstuffs  and  weapons,  and  educational/missionary
endeavors.5  This situation continued until the end of WWI. 
Following WWI, Woodrow Wilson's “Fourteen Points” gave courage to Turkish nationalists
who desired to remain free of foreign subjugation.6  Correspondingly, the U.S. began to attract
more  attention  from Ankara  as  the  İstiklal  Harbi turned  into  the  struggle  to  develop  an
industrial nation-state in place of the former agriculturally-based imperial regime.7
The Turkish-American partnership which developed in the years after WWII was the result of
at  least  some long-term,  rarely changeable  factors  such  as  geography and distribution  of
natural resources.  Turkey's position on the Straits, near the Soviet Union, and between the
Soviet Union and the oil fields of the Eastern Mediterranean and Southwest Asia, made it
2  See, for example:  Owen, Roger.  The Middle East in the World Economy:  1800-1914. New
York:  I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. Publishers, 1993.  pp. 6-10, 50-56.
3  Erhan, op. cit., p. 38.
4  Ibid. pp. 33-34, 35-37.
 
5  Ibid.  pp. 72-77, 83-92, 163-164, 171-179, 190-204.  The U.S. protestant missionary schools
in the Ottoman empire, by the end of the Nineteenth Century, were quite extensive, involved
dozens of schools spread over all of Anatolia and the Levant, and were influential.  A number
of these schools continued their operations into the Republican era. 
 
6  Mango, Andrew.  Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey. New York:
Overlook Press: Woodstock, 1999.  pp. 246-248.  Zürcher, op. cit.,  p. 152.
7  Keyder, Cağlar.  State and Class in Turkey:  A Study in Capitalist Development.  London:
Verso Books, 1987.  pp. 71- 110.  Trask, op. cit., pp. 94-146.
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strategically vital  for the U.S.' anti-Soviet strategy.8  Turkey also overshadows the Eastern
Mediterranean shipping lanes leading to and from the Suez Canal.  
All the same, long-term historical factors such as geography do not fully explain why Turkish-
American relations took such a sudden turn.  If geography were the only factor, then the U.S.
would have been trying to convince Turkey to become an ally, especially in the last months of
WWII and 1945, not the other way around.  Instead, actors inside of the Turkish and U.S.
governments, the opinions they held, and the decisions they made, played a vital role in the
development of the Turkish-American post-WWII alliance; the result of those decisions was
that, in a brief span of time, the Turkish and U.S. governments metamorphized from distant
acquaintances to close political cooperatives, even dostlar (“best friends”), as one would say
in Turkish.  Thus, in order to understand how and why the participants made the decisions that
they  did,  the  key  period  between  1927  and  1947,  in  which  Turkish-American  relations
developed  from  low-level  trade9 to  a  comprehensive  political  strategic  alliance,  must  be
examined more closely.  
The only text I encountered which presented concrete indications that the post-WWII Turkish-
American alliance had its roots in pre-WWII developments is Roger Trask's The United States
Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939.  Trask's study reveals that, if one
looks closer, the first faint signs of interest in an alliance based on mutual needs, especially on
the Turkish side,  can be traced to the 1930s (even if the author tended to enthusiastically
overemphasize the depth of Turkish-U.S. interwar relations).10  Recent books compiled by
Rıfat Bali from U.S. government archives also point to interwar U.S. interest in Turkey, since
the U.S. State Department commissioned several in-depth studies on 1930s Turkish society.11
8  See, for example:  Lenczowski, George, ed.  United States Interests in the Middle East.
American Enterprise Institute:  Washington D.C., 1968, passim.  Kuniholm, op. cit., pp. 66-
72.
 
9  Discussed in more detail below, in Section 2.2.
10  Trask, Roger R.  The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-
1939.  Minneapolis, Minnesota:  The University of Minnesota Press, 1971.  pp. 65-146, 238-
247.
11  See:  U.S. Diplomatic Documents on Turkey, Volume II:  The Turkish Cinema in the Early
Republican Years.  Istanbul:  The Isis Press, 2007, and U.S. Diplomatic Documents on
Turkey, Volume III:  Family Life in the Turkish Republic of the 1930's.  Istanbul:  The Isis
3
Exactly what reason those studies were performed for is not clear, although quotes such as
Wilbur  J.  Carr's12 imply a larger information-gathering purpose.   1930s Turkish-American
ties, however, paled in comparison to those which developed after Turkey was included in the
Marshall Plan aid intended primarily for Greece. 
1.1.  The Literature
The vast majority of the works available that touch on Turkish-U.S. relations indicate that
1947,  or  at  the  earliest,  1945 was  the  point  at  which  the present  Turkish-U.S.  “strategic
partnership” began to form, a result of aggressive Soviet posturing in Eastern Europe and the
Black Sea/Caucasus regions. If one looks only at formal political relations between Turkey
and the U.S. in the 1945-1947 juncture, the emphasis most certainly seems accurate.   
The basis  for this opinion may stretch back to Thomas and Frye's  The United States and
Turkey and Iran,  Kemal Karpat's  Turkey's Politics, and to Bernard Lewis' now-dated text,
originally published in 1961.  The first book was the contemporary political guidebook for
Americans who wanted to understand the U.S.'  new political  responsibilities in Southwest
Asia.13  Part of the book's appeal came from its editor, former Undersecretary of State and
close advisor to FDR, Sumner Welles.  The Turkish half of the book was penned by Lewis V.
Thomas,  but  he essentially leaps  over  the  interwar period.   Fortunately,  he does  mention
FDR's December 1941 declaration that Turkey  was essential to U.S. security and interests.14 
Press, 2007.
 
12  “This study has contributed materially to the department's understanding of Turkish
mentality and institutions during the present period of transition and the department would be
pleased to receive further reports of this nature.  It is suggested in this connection that an
interesting and valuable subject for report would be the position of religion in present-day
Turkey.”  Rıfat Bali, ed.  U.S. Diplomatic Documents on Turkey, Volume III (op.cit.).  p. 9.
13  Thomas, Lewis V. and Richard N. Frye.  The United States and Turkey and Iran.  Sumner
Welles, ed.  Harvard University Press:  Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951.  pp. 5-170. 
 
14  Ibid.  pp. 139-152.  For FDR's December 1941 declaration, see pp. 143-144.
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Kemal Karpat devoted a large amount of space to events and developments in Turkey between
the wars, but mentions America only in relation to the 1928 Bursa prosyletizing incident.15
Throughout Karpat's text, the U.S. is mentioned almost exclusively in postwar terms.  Bernard
Lewis  linked  the  emergence  of  Turkish  democracy  directly  to  the  critical  1945-1950
crossroads,  when Turkey passed from a one-party state  to  a multi-party democracy while
cementing partnerships with the democratic opposition to the Soviet Union, led by the United
States.16  In his account, Lewis makes no mention of pre-war, or even wartime, developments
in  Turkish-U.S.  relations,  so  he  seems  to  suggest  that  Turkish-U.S.  relations  suddenly
materialized in 1945-1947.  
One text that remains important for its observations of Turkish development between the wars
is Donald Webster's  The Turkey of Atatürk.17  Although Webster was an American, his text
focuses exclusively on the processes of social change initiated by the Kemalist state in the
1920s  and  1930s  (Webster  was  a  sociologist).   The  only moment  in  which  he  mentions
“American influence” is in reference to John Dewey, Columbia University's Teachers College,
and Turkish elementary schools.18
Another work that has remained influential is George Lenczowski's United States Interests in
the Middle East.  Lenczowski's text discusses interwar U.S. interests almost entirely in terms
of oil, and contains the following canonical assessment:  “The events of WWII finally brought
the United States into major involvements in the Middle East that have continued until today.”
The author also makes no note of interwar developments in Turkish-U.S. relations.19  
15  Karpat, Kemal. Turkey's Politics:  The Transition to a Multi-Party System.  Princeton, New
Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1959.  pp. 32-76.  The Bursa incident is mentioned on pp.
60-61, and in footnote 82. 
 
16  Lewis, op. cit., pp. 313-315.
17  Webster, Donald Everett.  The Turkey of Atatürk:  Social Process in the Turkish
Reformation.  New York: AMS Press Inc., 1973.  This work was originally published in 1939;
the same year Webster published an article which contained similar information.  See:
Webster, Donald E.  “State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey.”  American
Sociological Review.  Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1939.  pp. 247-256.      
18  Webster, The Turkey of Atatürk. . ., p. 234.
19  Lenczowski, George.  United States Interests in the Middle East.  American Enterprise
Institute:  Washington D.C., 1968.  The quote is taken from p. 12; discussion of the Turkish
5
A number  of  important  early articles  also  stressed  the  “new”  nature  of  the  Turkish-U.S.
relationship.  As an example, George C. McGhee authored an article titled “Turkey Joins the
West,” the title of which refers to postwar, not interwar, developments, shortly after the end of
his tenure as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey; the article takes it importance from its author and
where it was published, in the influential journal Foreign Affairs.  McGhee did discuss some
of Turkey' domestic developments in the 1920s and 1930s, but none of the narrative touches
on  Turkish-U.S.  relations  during  that  period,  so  the  reader  receives  the  impression  that
Turkish-U.S. relations are a postwar phenomenon.20
The  earliest  academic  texts  to  focus  on  Turkish-American  relations  were  predominantly
Turkish and began to appear by the early 1960s.  A. Haluk Ülman, Türkkaya Ataöv, Oral
Sander,  Mehmet  Gönlübol,  and  Fahir  Armaoğlu  are  the  foremost  names  of  this  first
generation of  Turkish scholars  working on Turkish-U.S.  relations, and without  exception,
these scholars focused on Turkish-U.S. relations as a wartime or postwar matter.  A. Haluk
Ülman, for example, published official documents on Turkish-U.S. relations encompassing
the  1939-1947  period  in  1961.21  In  his  foreword,  he  states  that  the  “ilk  temelleri”
(“first/original  foundations”)  of  Turkish-American  relations  were  laid  in  the  1945-1947
period.22  In  the  text  itself,  the  interwar  period  discussion  focuses  on  the  Lausanne  and
Montreux negotiations and includes extremely few details about other aspects of Turkish-U.S:
ties during those two decades.23
Türkkaya Ataöv released a text titled Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye which takes as its starting
point the postwar global situation.24  Türkkaya did devote six pages to interwar (and non-
Republic appears primarily on pp. 8, 11-16, and 59-60.
  
20  McGhee, George C.  “Turkey Joins the West.”  Foreign Affairs.  Vol. 32, no. 3, 1954.  pp.
617-630.
21  Ülman, Haluk.  Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri, 1939-1947.  Ankara:  Sevinç
Matbaası, 1961.
22  Ibid.  p. vii.
 
23  Ibid.  pp. 9-20. 
24  Türkkaya, Ataöv.  Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye.  Ankara:  Aydınlık Yayınevi, 1969.
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Lausanne) Turkish-U.S. affairs, but none of the discussion involves the years between 1927,
when diplomatic contacts were restored, and the beginning of WWII. 25
Oral  Sander's  study,  Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri:   1947-1964,  is  the first  major Turkish full-
length work to focus specifically on Turkish-U.S. relations.26  However, as is obvious from the
title, Sander also thought that Turkish-U.S. relations began with the postwar era; accordingly,
he  devoted  essentially  no  space  to  describing  Turkish-American  interwar  relations  and
summarizes the 1923-1939 years in two paragraphs.27 
Mehmet Gönlübol published a 1971 article which stated that “. . .  relations between Turkey
and the U.S.A., which originally took the form of foreign aid extended under the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. . .”.28  In other words, he also attributes Turkish-American
relations to the postwar situation.  Gönlübol and Ülman also published a joint analysis of
Turkey's  foreign policy during  the  two  decades  from 1946-1966.   In that  essay Turkish-
American relations were again understood as a postwar development, but at least one mention
is made of the Turkish government's prewar tilt towards the Western European democracies.29
Fahir  Armaoğlu,  besides  publishing works  concerning Turkish-U.S.  diplomatic  relations,30
25  Ibid. pp. 168-174.
26  Sander, Oral.  Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri:  1947-1964.  Ankara:  Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal
Bilgileri Fakültesi Yayınları, 1979.
27  Ibid.  pp. 4, 7-10.
28  Gönlübol, Mehmet.  "NATO and Turkey:  An Overall Appraisal."  The Turkish Yearbook.
Vol. XI, 1971.  pp. 1-38.
  
29  Gönlübol, Mehmet ve Haluk Ülman.  "Türk Dış Politikasının Yirmi Yılı, 1945-1965."
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi.  Mart 1966.  pp. 143-182.  The authors actually seem to
contradict themselves, as they state on p. 149 that the Turkish government, in the pre-WWII
years, had not preferred either of the sides that eventually went to war, but then on 156 they
aver that, during the same period, Turkish foreign policy had shown a tendency towards the
Western democracies.
  
30  See below, Footnote 45.
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published a  1966 article  titled “Turkey and the  United States:   A  New Alliance.”31  This
analysis looked at Turkish-U.S. relations solely within the 1946-1966 framework.
By the 1980s American and other foreign academicians also began to look more closely at
Turkish-U.S. relations.  In 1973, the first major treatment of Turkish-American relations by an
American scholar, George Harris, was published.32  Harris, like the other authors mentioned
here,  is  content  to  pass  over  interwar  Turkish-American  relations  in  the  briefest  manner
possible, and even states that,  after 1923, “.  .  .   Turkish interest in an intimate American
connection rapidly evaporated.”33  Even though the author's focus, as evidenced by the study's
title,  purposefully focuses on the postwar alliance,  the reader receives the impression that
nothing of note happened in Turkish-American relations between the wars.
Bruce R. Kuniholm's well-known study, The Origins of the Cold War in the Middle East, is a
classic political science text on the Cold War.  This work is also important for its treatment of
postwar developments in Turkey, Iran, and Greece, and the contextualizing that the author
places those developments in.  For this reason, this study's neglect of interwar developments
in Turkish-U.S. relations has always attracted my attention.34
Conferences on Turkish-American relations also became more frequent by the 1980s.  The
Heritage Foundation and the Foreign Policy Institute of Ankara, for instance, sponsored an
October 1984 conference which saw papers presented on a wide variety of issues in Turkish-
31  Armaoğlu, Fahir.  "Turkey and the United States:  A New Alliance (1)."  The Turkish
Yearbook of International Relations.  Vol. VI, 1965.  pp. 1-15.
32  Harris, George S.  Troubled Alliance:  Turkish-American Problems in Historical
Perspective, 1945-1971.  Washington D.C.:  American Enterprise Institute, 1972.  Harris
worked as an employee of the U.S. State Department and was posted to the U.S. Embassy in
Ankara in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
33  For Harris' discussion, see pp. 9-12.  The quote is from p. 11.
34  Op. cit., pp. 12-20.
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American relations.35  Of the thirteen chapters put forward as the conference's proceedings,
five deal directly with Turkish-U.S. relations; none of the five touch on the interwar era.
Another text, appropriately titled Turkish-American Relations:  Forty Years of Continuity and
Change, documents the minutes and presentations of a 1986 conference.36  As is obvious from
the title, the conference itself treated Turkish-American relations as a post-war phenomenon.
Of  the  papers  presented  at  that  conference,  only one  mentions,  in  a  brief  way,  interwar
developments in Turkish-American relations.37     
More recent works have not dramatically changed the dominant interpretation that interwar
Turkish-American relations were inconsiderable.  Ekavi Athanassopoulou's excellent Turkey-
Anglo-American  Security  Interests  1945-1952 devotes  a  considerable  amount  of  space  to
interwar developments  in  Turkey's foreign policy.38  However,  because this  text  does  not
dwell  exclusively on  Turkish-U.S.  matters,  the  topic  does  not  receive  a  large  amount  of
attention.  On the other hand, Athanassopoulou uses, and points out the importance of, the
correspondence  of  the  U.S.  Ambassadors  to  Turkey during  the  1930s.39  William  Hale's
widely-read study of more than 200 years of Turkish foreign policy also devotes an entire
chapter to Turkey's interwar foreign relations.40  Of the more than 30 pages in that chapter,
only two contain even passing references to the U.S.41
35  Harris, George S., ed.  The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations.  Report by Heritage
Foundation of 3-4 October 1984 Conference.  Washington D.C.:  The Heritage Foundation:
1985.
36  Turkish-American Relations:  Forty Years of Continuity and Change.  Istanbul:  SİSAV,
1987. 
 
37  See:  Toker, Metin.  “Turkish/American Relations (A Personal View).”  Turkish-American
Relations:  Forty Years of Continuity and Change.  Istanbul:  SİSAV, 1987.  pp. 109-113.
38  Athanassopoulou, Ekavi.  Turkey:  Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952.
London:  Frank Cass, 1999.  pp. 1-34.
39  See, especially, pp. 12-13, 22-23, 24, 26.
40  Hale, William.  Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000.  London:  Frank Cass Publishers,
2000.  pp.44-78. 
41  Ibid.  pp. 63, 70.
9
Recent Turkish scholars have also begun to look in more detail at certain aspects of Turkish-
U.S. relations.  Gül İnanç Barkay published a study of Turkey's role in U.S. diplomacy during
the 1940-1943 period.42  Happily, this  study contains more than four pages that are given
solely to interwar Turkish-U.S. relations.  Much of the author's discussion is general, but she
did utilize U.S. government documents, and some interesting details about the early 1930s in
Turkish-American affairs were included.43
Probably the best-known recent Turkish scholarship on Turkish-U.S. relations is Nasuh Uslu's
Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri  (Turkish-American Relations).44  Despite the sweeping tone of the
title,  this  text,  like  several  others  discussed  above,  treats  Turkish-U.S.  relations  as  a
fundamentally postwar development since it makes no mention of interwar, or even wartime,
Turkish-U.S.  relations.   This  text  also  examines  its  topic  purely from the  perspective  of
political science.  
Two other recent works simply divide Turkish-American relations at the traditional, and now
out-of-favor, Ottoman Empire-Turkish Republic dividing line.45  A recent thesis written on
Turkish media representations of the U.S. after WWII treats 1946 as the starting point for both
42  Barkay, Gül İnanç.  ABD Diplomasisinde Türkiye, 1940-1943.  İstanbul:  Aydoğan
Matbaacılık, 2001.  pp. 10-21. 
43  Ibid.  pp. 16-21. 
44  Uslu, Nasuh.  Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri.  21. Yüzyıl Yayınları:  Ankara, 2000.  This text was
also published in English as a nearly-identical book called The Turkish-American
Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: the History of a Distinctive Alliance (Nova Science
Publishers, 2003). 
 
45  1)  Armaoğlu, Fahir.  Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri (Açiklamalı).  Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.  On p. ix the author states the opinion that Turkish-U.S.
relations could be divided into two, at either the Ottoman-Turkish Republic change or at the
post-WWII period.  2)  Erhan, Cağrı.  Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri. Ankara:
İmge Kitabevi, 2001.  This author, on pages 17-18, states that most works on Turkish-U.S.
relations take 1945 as their starting point, and asserts that the interwar era contained many
events that augured post-war developments.  However, he ends his study with WWI, which
seems to relegate interwar Turkish-American relations to non-relevance.  My opinion, for
reasons that will become clear in the coming pages, is that the interwar era in Turkish-U.S.
relations has qualities that separate it from both the Ottoman and the post-WWII periods.
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heightened Turkish-U.S.  relations and U.S. “information” in popular Turkish magazines.46
Another thesis, on representations of the U.S. and U.S. culture in satirical Turkish magazines
from 1945-1960, also places Turkish-American relations essentially in the postwar context.47
Finally,  the  other  classic  text  on  modern  Turkish  history,  Erik  Jan  Zürcher's  Turkey:   A
Modern History, also treats Turkish-U.S. relations as a purely postwar development.  In the
three pages that  the author devotes  to  Turkey's interwar foreign policy, the U.S.  is  never
mentioned.48  
The  appearance  of  the  previously  mentioned  Reader's  Digest,  et  al.,  articles,  however,
indicated that there was more to pre-1947 Turkish-U.S. relations than I had understood from
the studies that I had read.  How had Turkish officials learned of Reader's Digest and the other
publications?, I asked; how did they obtain those articles, and why?  Most importantly of all,
how did this happen at such an early date, long before the declaration of the Marshall Plan and
when Turkish-U.S. relations were still at such a low level of importance for the isolationist-
minded Americans?49  
Eventually I learned that no studies of U.S.  information in Turkish publications during or
immediately after WWII existed, so I decided that, in order to understand the Turkish political
situation, I would have to look more closely at Ulus.  Ulus was the mouthpiece of the ruling
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi  (CHP,  the Republican People's Party) and  Ulus'  writers generally
46  Yıldırım, Umut.  “The Representation and the Perception of the United States in Turkey
(1946-1961).”  Unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2002.  pp. 1-6, 8-13, 35-42, 67-
84, et al.
47  Erdem, Murat.  “Türk-Amerikan Kültürel İlişkileri:  1945-1960 Döneminde Türkiye'de
Yayınlanmış Siyasi Mizah Dergilerinde Amerika ve Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerininYansımaları.”
Unpublished MA Thesis, Ege Üniversitesi, 1999.  The author devotes less than one page to
Turkish-U.S. relations between 1923-1939 (pp. 17-18) and describes postwar developments
between the two governments as “. . .  çok çabuk gelişen ilişkiler kısa süre içinde müttefikliğe
dönüşmesiyle. . .” (“. . . suddenly developing relations which turned into an alliance. . .”) -- p.
i.  See also:  pp. 2-3.  
48  Op. cit., pp. 209-212.
49  Kuniholm, op. cit. p. 67, states that Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) “knew little about the
Near East” and “was not especially interested in the area.”  FDR's February 1945 agreement
with Saudi Arabia does seem to complicate this issue, however.
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reflected what İsmet İnönü wanted  Ulus'  readers to see.50   Thus, it  should be possible to
discern the  CHP government's,  and by extension  İsmet  İnönü's,  attitude towards the  U.S.
during the war years by examining what was published in Ulus. 
With that aim in mind, I examined all Ulus editions printed between January 1939 and August
1945, recording every mention of the U.S. or of issues related to the U.S.  Subjects as diverse
as advertisements and pictures were also noted, and special attention was given to information
taken directly from U.S. sources such as Reader's Digest and Life.   
My fundamental  interest  lies  in  the  interactions  between  decision-making  elites  and  the
people,51 and the structures that each create and are subject to.  Analysis of the information
published by  Ulus Gazetesi during WWII will  provide insight  into the ideas that  Turkish
officials, as well as U.S. officials, wanted Turkish people to absorb in relation to the United
States.  In other words, this is a partial history of a social, cultural, political, and informational
project through which the Turkish people were provided with certain information by Turkish
50  See:  Bakacak, Alper.  "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Dönemi'nde Ulus Gazetesi'nin İç ve Dış
Politika  Değerlendirmeleri."  Unpublished MA Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi, 2002.  pp.  15.
Gürkan, Nilgün.  Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın (1945-1950).  İstanbul: İletişim
Yayıncılık A.Ş., 1998.  p. 77.  Konyar, Hürriyet.  "Türkiye'de Tek Parti Döneminden Çok
Partili Hayata Geçişte (1945-1950) Kemalist İdeolojinin Değişimi ve Ulus Gazetesi."
Unpublished PhD Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1993.  pp. 2-8, 13-20.
51  Here, “elites” refers to the small number of men in the upper echelons of the Kemalist state
and U.S. government who made political decisions; “the people” refers to all those living
inside the borders of the Turkish republic or the United States, regardless of class, religion, or
ethnicity.
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and American elites.52  That is, this thesis focuses on a point in time at which two nations, on
their own long-term trajectories, became much more closely entwined.
Furthermore,  because  Ulus  Gazetesi was  the  newspaper  most  closely  linked  to  Turkey's
governing party, it contains the best material for analyzing exactly what the project mentioned
in the previous paragraph consisted of.  Subsequent Turkish cultural and social formations
were affected by this project, and Turkish citizens also reacted to this project in a variety of
ways.53  These effects and reactions should be the subject of further study, especially because
the  relationship  formed  between  Turkey  and  the  United  States  during  and  after  WWII
currently seems on the brink of becoming “un-entwined.”
This thesis will first describe the quality of Turkish-American relations in the 1930s.  Then,
the role of  Ulus Gazetesi in promoting the Kemalist project in Turkey will be explained, as
will  Reader's Digest's similar role in U.S. culture.  Subsequently, the material published by
Ulus concerning the U.S. during WWII will be presented in detail; special attention will be
given to tracing and demarcating the important shifts in Ulus' publishing practices in order
to determine what political causes may have triggered those changes. The American sources
52  Also relevant here is the idea of memes (coined in 1976 by Richard Dawkins), i.e. of
cultural ideas which, once formulated and propagated into the culture, continue to spread and
effect change; see, for example:  Lynch, Aaron.  Thought Contagion:  How Belief Spreads
Through Society.  New York:  Basic Books, 1996; or the first two chapters of Beck, Don
Edward and Christopher C. Cowan.  Spiral Dynamics:  Mastering Values, Leadership, and
Change (Exploring the New Science of Memetics). Oxford:  Blackwell Publishing, 2006.
Whereas the idea of memes would be extremely useful for this study, memes have proven
notoriously difficult to describe theoretically or to quantify in a  meaningful manner (the main
academic journal concerning memes, the Journal of Memetics, ceased publishing in 2005
because of this problem).  Consequently, an attempt to use meme theory in order to trace the
spread of certain ideas about the United States in Turkish society must remain outside of the
scope of this study.
53  See:  Burke, Peter.  “Overture.  The New History:  Its Past and its Future.”  New
Perspectives on Historical Writing, 2nd Ed.  Peter Burke, ed.  University Park, Pennsylvania:
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001.  p. 11; I have in mind the ways in which
political events, in this case the processes which led to the formation of the Turkish-American
alliance and the subsequent Cold War years, allowed the United States to influence Turkish
society through a variety of channels.  This is not to suggest that the Turkish people were
passive receptors of U.S. culture -- some were, but many were not and developed various
means of resistance in response -- but there is also little doubt that U.S. culture has had a
lasting impact on Turkish culture, life, and society.
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of that information will be examined for context, content, and intent.  Finally, conclusions
concerning why the CHP leadership chose to publish the kind of information that it did, and
what U.S. intentions in providing that information were, will be explored.
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2.0 TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE 1930s
“. . .  I confidently believe in the future of the Turkish Republic. . .” .54
Initially, Turkish-American relations in  the interwar period, continuing as they had in the
previous 150 years, gave little indication of the situation that would emerge after WWII.  In
the aftermath of WWI, no official relations existed between the Turkish nationalist forces in
Anatolia and the United States government.   Because the U.S. never declared war on the
Ottoman Empire (nor vice versa), the U.S. maintained a High Commissioner, Rear Admiral
Mark  Bristol, in Istanbul from 1919 until  1927, when  exchange of notes and ambassadors
finally  re-established  official  relations.55  Other  minor  diplomatic  questions  were  solved
through mutual agreements in 1929, 1931, and 1934.56 
2.1.  Interwar Turkish-American Political Relations
Immediately following WWI, the U.S. became a subject  of discussion among the Turkish
political  and  intellectual  elite,  largely because  of  U.S.  involvement  in  settling  post-WWI
issues.  During the post-WWI negotiations, the U.S. sent two commissions, the King-Crane
Commission and the Harbord Commission, to the Eastern Mediterranean.  The King-Crane
Commission examined the situation in Syria and Palestine in June-July 1919.  The Harbord
Commission  was  more  important  to  the  Turkish  nationalists  because  it  was  tasked  with
evaluating the potential for a U.S. mandate in Eastern Anatolia.    
54  Grew, Joseph C.  Turbulent Era:  A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945.  Vol. II.
Walter Johnson, ed., Nancy Harvison Hooker, assistant ed.  Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1952.
p. 917.
55  For a detailed account of the long process that accompanied the foundation of post-war
Turkish-U.S. diplomatic relations, see Trask, op. cit., pp. 21-64.
56  For the text of the 1929 Commerce and Navigation, see Armaoğlu, op. cit., pp. 113-116.
For the settlements of the residence, WWI and Independence War claims, and extradition
problems, see Trask, op. cit., pp. 194-216. 
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The Harbord Commission traveled to Eastern Anatolia in September 1919 and decided in
favor of a U.S. mandate for all of Anatolia.57  The Commission's affirmative answer sparked a
short-lived debate among Turkish nationalists and intellectuals concerning whether a mandate
should be pursued.  Some Istanbul-based intellectuals and liberal nationalists, such as Halide
Edip (Adıvar) and Rıza Nur, favored an American mandate; a Wilsonian League had been
founded in Istanbul in 1918, and some believed that an American mandate was the only way
to, at the same time, resist the Great Powers and develop Turkish society.58  The idea of a U.S.
mandate expired quickly, however, because the U.S. Senate rejected U.S. membership in the
League of Nations and the Turkish nationalists did not officially request the U.S. mandate.59   
Another issue which marred and stunted attempts to deepen Turkish-American ties during the
1920s was the efforts of Armenian activists in the U.S.  Starting almost immediately after
WWI,  some  segments  of  the  American-Armenian  community  began  intense  anti-Turkey
lobbying and press campaigns.60  This campaign, inspired by the Ottoman state's 1915-1916
deportation of Armenians from Eastern Anatolia, was carried to the point that when official
Turkish-U.S. ties were restored in 1927, the Turkish Ambassador to Turkey, Ahmed Mouhtar,
arrived in the U.S. under the threat of violence.61  However, with the June 1934 death of
Vahan Cardashian, the primary instigator of post-WWI anti-Turkish fervor in the U.S., a main
impediment to enhanced Turkish-American relations disappeared.62   
Throughout the 1930s, politicial relations between Turkey and the U.S. remained subdued.
Joseph C. Grew, the able diplomat charged with officially reviving Turkish-U.S. relations in
1927, stayed in his post for five years.  Grew's tenure in Turkey was an early high point in
Turkish-U.S.  relations  as  he  worked  tirelessly  for  the  betterment  and  interest  of  both
57  Trask, op. cit., pp. 26-27.  Zürcher, op. cit., p. 152.
58  Mango, op. cit., pp. 246-247.  Zürcher, op. cit., p. 152.
 
59  Mango, op. cit., p. 248.
60  Trask, op. cit., pp. 20-21, 37-39; see also below, section 2.4.
61  Ibid.  pp.  60-62.
 
62  Ibid.  pp. 210
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countries.63  Grew  was  succeeded,  however,  by  General  Charles  Hitchcock  Sherrill,  an
apparent political appointment who was more interested his own hobbies than Turkish-U.S.
affairs.64
Only two more U.S. Ambassadors were posted to Turkey before WWII.  Robert Peet Skinner
served from 1933 to 1936 and was, according to Trask, an excellent diplomat who worked to
further Turkish-U.S. relations.65  The last U.S. Ambassador posted to Turkey before the war,
and who stayed on through the negotiation of the Turkish-American Trade Agreement signed
in 1939, was John Van Antwerp MacMurray.  MacMurray evidently found the position in
Turkey agreeable despite difficulties concerning the embassy residence.66  MacMurray also
had to navigate through the problems caused by the approach and advent of WWII.
Interwar Turkish-U.S. relations involved major questions of international politics on several
occasions.  The first was Turkey's enthusiastic support for the U.S.' ill-fated Kellogg-Briand
Pact.67  Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) even made an arrangement with Grew
for a lightning notification of the Senate's ratification of this treaty, so that Turkey could be
the first nation to follow the U.S. in doing so.68  
63  See, for example: Grew, op. cit., pp. 709-919.  DeNovo, John A.  American Interests and
Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939.  Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 1963.
pp. 250-252.  Trask, op. cit., 73-74.
  
64  Trask, op. cit., p. 75.
65  Ibid., pp. 76-77.
 
66  Until MacMurray's term, the U.S. Embassy had essentially switched between Ankara and
Istanbul according to season.  During MacMurray's term the Ankara Embassy was made more
permanent, land for a new U.S. Embassy residence in Ankara was purchased in 1939, and the
Istanbul residence was converted into a Consulate General.  See:  Trask, op. cit., 80-82.
67  For the text of the Kellogg-Briand Pact's first two articles (there was a total of three, but the
first two were the essential articles of the Pact), see:  Paterson, Thomas G., ed.  Major
Problems in American Foreign Policy, Vol. 2 (since 1914).  3rd  Ed.  Lexington, Mass.:  D.C.
Heath and Company, 1989.  p. 125.
68  Trask, op. cit., 224-225.  Grew, op. cit, pp. 796-798.
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The negotiations over the 1936 Montreux Convention also brought Turkish and U.S. interests
together.  The U.S. was not involved in the talks surrounding the Montreux Convention, but it
was concerned with the rights of U.S. commerce in the Turkish Straits.  For that reason, the
U.S. followed developments closely and was pleased when the result not only safeguarded
Turkish security but also preserved American interests.69  Furthermore, the U.S. government
expressed  approval  of  the  1937  Saadabad  Pact70 and  concern  over  the  well-being  and
preservation  of  American  archaeological  expeditions  during  the  1938-1939  resolution  of
Hatay's status.71 
Joseph Grew, when he left his post as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey in 1932, was able to remark
on a “vast improvement” in Turkish-U.S. relations.72  He attributed this improvement to the
fact that the U.S. was “one of Turkey's most 'disinterested' friends.”73  Such disinterest, of
course,  has  both  positive  and negative  aspects.   Because the  U.S.  did  not  see Turkey as
important to its national interest, the U.S. government, as well as other U.S. institutions, was
reluctant to make any sort of commitments to Turkey.  Where Turkey needed commitment
most between the wars was in economy. 
2.2.  Interwar Turkish-American Economic Relations
Following WWI, the Turkish economy was in dire condition.  Little industrialization had been
accomplished under the Ottoman government, and Anatolia had been devastated by the war's
ravages; subsequently, the new nationalist government set about creating and/or encouraging a
national economy, industrialization, investment, and a Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie.74  Foreign
69  Trask, op. cit., pp. 227-233.
70  Ibid.  pp. 234.
71  Ibid.  pp. 234-236.
72  Trask, op. cit., p. 74.  See also:  Grew, op. cit., pp. 916-917.
73  Trask, op.cit., p. 74.  Grew, op. cit., p. 916-917.
74  See:  Keyder, Cağlar.  State and Class in Turkey:  A Study in Capitalist Development.
London:  Verso Books, 1987., op. cit., pp. 91- 110.  Owen, Roger and Şevket Pamuk. A
History of the Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century.  Harvard University Press:
Cambridge, Mass., 1998.  pp. 10-16. 
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investment  was also initially encouraged.75  After  the advent of the Great Depression, the
world-wide  economic  problems  forced  the  Kemalist  regime  to  develop  other  means  for
developing the economy.  These efforts included more government involvement in industrial
development, which was institutionalized as  Devletçilik (“etatism” or “statism”), one of the
CHP's six basic ideological tenets.76  These efforts did result in economic expansion during
the  1930s,  but  the  Turkish  economy still  remained  largely agricultural  at  the  end  of  the
1930s.77
Thus, throughout the interwar period, the Turkish government tried to find ways to encourage
domestic investment,  industrialization, and production without  leaving the economy in the
hands of foreigners, as it was during the Ottoman Empire's last decades.78  This meant that
foreign  trade  was  encouraged,  but  approached  cautiously.   Correspondingly,  the  Turkish
government  attempted  to  attract  foreign  technology that  would  benefit  Turkey's  domestic
industrialization process.  
The  U.S.  was  one  of  the  countries  which  had  technology and  products  that  the  Turkish
government  recognized  as  potentially  beneficial  for  Turkish  development.   However,  a
number of obstacles prevented Turkish-American economic relations from blossoming in the
1920s and 1930s.  A primary impediment was simply the lack of official U.S. attention to
Turkey.  Despite the efforts of U.S. Ambassadors, and despite the 1929 Turkish-American
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, trade with Turkey was not given emphasis by the U.S.
government.  
When the Turkish leadership began a rearmament program in the mid-1930s to counter the
growing Italian menace, for example, one of the nations they turned to was the U.S.  The U.S.
State Department, however, unpersuaded by entreaties from the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey,
75  Owen and Pamuk, op. cit., 14.
76  Ibid.  18-20.
77  Ibid. 21-22.
78   Ahmad, Feroz.  “The Political Economy of Kemalism.”  Atatürk:  The Founder of a
Modern State.  Kazancıgil and Özbudun, eds.  Hamden, Conn.:  Archon Books, 1981.  p. 150.
Owen and Pamuk, op. cit., p. 20. 
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from U.S. companies, and from Turkish representatives of U.S. business interests like Ahmet
Emin Yalman, refused to grant permission for the sale of U.S. military products to Turkey.79
The U.S. State Department was reluctant even to allow the U.S. Ambassador to promote U.S.
business opportunities in Turkey at all.80  Only at the end of the 1930s, when problems in
exchange payments cropped up, did U.S. officials begin to show more attention.81  A further
reason that the U.S. government did not make Turkish-American trade a priority was the fact
that the Turkish Straits issue, however important it may have been to European politics, was
not a major component of the U.S.' foreign policy or commerce.82 
On the  Turkish  side,  worries  about  trade  and exchange balances,  as  well  as  bureaucratic
hurdles,  obstructed  mutual  trade.83  Between  1929  and  1931,  the  Turkish  government
implemented a tariff system which caused some inconvenience to U.S. merchants.84  After
1931, a system of quotas on imported goods was instituted which also regulated the outflow
of exchange.85  Neither of the trade regimes that Turkey implemented during the 1930s caused
serious problems for U.S. merchants, but those regimes also did not encourage trade with the
U.S.  In actuality, though, Turkish-American trade was not vital to either country, even if it
was  more  important  to  Turkey.86  Although  Turkish-U.S.  trade  saw  a  gradual  increase
throughout  the 1930s,  by the outbreak of WWII it  still  had not  reached the levels of the
temporary “boom” that occurred in 1919-1922.87
79  Trask, op. cit. 100-101.  Trask explains that the State Department was under pressure at
that time because of investigations into the U.S. munitions industry.
80  Ibid. 98-100.
81  Ibid. 102-104.  Exchange shortages were also an issue in the negotiations over the 1939
Turkish-American Trade Agreement. 
82  See:  Howard, Harry N.  "The United States and the Problem of the Turkish Straits:  A
Reference Article."  Middle East Journal.  1, 1947.  pp. 59-60.
83  Trask, op. cit., 94-98.
84  Ibid. 96-97.
85  Ibid. 97-98.
86  See statistics presented by Trask, op. cit., pp. 105-107.
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An important feature of Turkey's Twentieth Century development process was the Turkish
need for investment and technology.  At the beginning of the 1930s, the Turkish leadership
had tried to attract American investment,88 but the amount of American finance in Turkey
remained, as it had been in the 1920s, miniscule.  Şükrü Saraçoğlu even spent two months in
the  U.S.  during late  1931 looking for  sources  of  investment  willing to  venture  capital  in
Turkey.89  
Much of the reason for this lack of U.S. investment is traceable to the questions surrounding
the Turkish government's  repayment of the  Ottoman debt  and to whether Turkey had the
ability to repay debt taken on to fund industrial or infrastructure projects.90  Although U.S.
loans  to  Turkey were  suggested  and  pursued  by both  sides,  only one  project  resulted  in
Turkish receipt of U.S. funds,91 and only a small number of U.S. firms founded operations in
Turkey.92  Turkish government  regulations concerning banking and labor  provided further
disincentives to American investment.93  
Significantly more successful was the knowledge provided by U.S. technicians and advisors
during the 1930s.  Turkish interest  in U.S.  technical  help extended back to 1923, but the
87  Ibid.  p. 104.  See also:  Tunçay, Mete.  Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetimi'nin
Kurulması 1923-1931. İstanbul:  Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005.  Page 206, note 35, of this
text mentions that the post-war boom in Turkish-American trade was possibly connected to
inflows of humanitarian aid and Europe's brief inability to meet Turkey's need for certain
products.  Once these situations normalized, trade between Turkey and the U.S. even dropped
below pre-war levels.
88  Tekeli, İlhan and Selim İlkin.  1929 Dünya Buhranında Türkiye'nin İktisadi Politika
Arayışları.  Ankara:  Saim Toraman Matabaası, 1983.  pp. 184-186.
89  İlkin, Selim.  “Birinci Sanayi Planı'nın Hazırlanışında Sovyet Uzmanlarının Rolü.”
Cumhuriyetin Harcı:  Köktenci Mödernitenin Ekonomil Politkasının Gelişimi.  İlhan Tekeli ve
Selim İlkin.  İstanbul:  İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004.  p. 204. 
  
90  Trask, op. cit., pp. 129-131.
91  Ibid. 132-137.  That loan, however, was not fully paid, and the Turkish government did not
completely repay the capital that it did receive.
 
92  Ibid. 137-139.
93  Ibid. pp. 131-132.
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number of U.S. advisors and technicians greatly expanded during the 1930s.94  U.S. advisors
were especially vital to the formulation of Turkey's first Five-Year Plan, and in the provision
of advice and technical know-how on other issues.95 
The Turkish leadership's pursuit  of  development  help led them to seek aid from multiple
governments.  In 1934, for example, Turkey received an eight million USD credit from the
USSR for a development project in Kayseri.96  Turkey's first Five-Year Plan was influenced by
both the U.S. and Soviet methods of development.97    
Turkey's main economic partner  between the two wars  was actually Nazi  Germany, until
Hitler's policies began to threaten Turkey's sovereignty.  At the beginning of the 1930s, the
U.S. and Germany held nearly equal shares of Turkey's foreign commerce.  However, between
1932-1934, the percentage of Turkey's imports and exports held by Germany, already on the
increase  since  the  late  1920s,  showed  a  massive  increase,  nearly  tripling  in  the  case  of
exports.98  The increase continued throughout the 1930s until, by 1938, Germany accounted
for more than 40 percent of Turkey's exports and nearly 50 percent of Turkey's imports.99
The Turkish leadership, however, was disconcerted by Germany's March 1938 Anschluss with
Austria,  Hitler's  annexation  of  the  Südetenland,  and  the  Nazi  Lebensraum ideology.
Additionally, Italy was Turkey's foremost security concern at that time, but Hitler gave tacit
approval to Italy's April 1939 invasion of Albania and then signed the May 1939 Steel Pact
94  Ibid. pp. 139-145.
95  Ibid. pp. 140-143, 144-145.
 
96  McGhee, George C.  “Turkey Joins the West.”  Foreign Affairs.  Vol. 32, no. 3, 1954.  p.
620.
97  Owen and Pamuk, op. cit., pp. 17, 18.  Trask, op. cit., 140-142. 
              
98  Oran, Baskın, ed.  Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt 1.  10. Baskı.  İstanbul:  İletişim Yayınları,
2004.  p. 250.  Tantzen, Theodor and Osman Tokumbet, Karl Trucksaess.  Alman-Türk
Sanayi ve Ticaret Kılavuzu : Türkçe Kısmı.  Berlin:  Orienthandelsverlag, 1935.  pp. 10, 22,
and 278-279.
99  Ibid.  See also:  Özgüldür, Yavuz.  Türk-Alman İlişkileri:  1923-1945.  Ankara:
Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993.  pp. 82-83.
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with Mussolini.  Thus, towards the end of the decade Ankara began to examine political and
economic alternatives to Germany.100  One result of this search was the Turkish-American
Trade Agreement, which followed the trilateral agreement signed betwen Turkey, Britain, and
France in October 1939. 
The 1939 Turkish-American Trade Agreement's roots actually extended back to 1936 when “a
Turkish official” suggested the possibility of replacing the 1929 Turkish-U.S. Commerce and
Navigation Agreement.101  In 1937, the U.S. State Department “. .  .   decided that a basis
existed  for trade negotiations wth Turkey,” and talks  concerning the new agreement  were
initialized in March 1938.102  The agreement itself was finalized on 1 April 1939. 
Two  points  concerning  this  agreement  are  worth  mentioning.   The  first  is  that  the
contemporary U.S. press saw this agreement as having political significance, i.e. U.S. trade
ideas had influence in Turkey in opposition to German practices.103  This meant that some in
the U.S. were interested in how much influence the Nazis had in Turkey, but this interest
seemed to be directed towards ideals rather than more practical questions of political influence
or military power.
The 1939 Turkish-American Trade Agreement's other important feature was that it did not
solve  the  obstacles  preventing  the  expansion  of  Turkish-U.S.  trade.   German  merchants
actually benefitted from this  agreement,  because  they were able  to  offer  better  prices  for
Turkish products, but the central difficulty continued to be exchange.  Since Turkish products
were mostly being sold to Germany, the expected amount of USD exchange did not enter into
the Turkish market.   As result,  the Turkish government had continual  difficulties making
100  Uzgel, İlhan.  “Almanya'yla İlişkiler” (1923-1939).  Türk Dış Politikası:  Kurtuluş
Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgerler, Yorumlar.  Baskın Oran, ed.  İstanbul:  İletişim
Yayınları, 2004.  p. 303.
 
101  Trask, op. cit., p. 115.
102  Ibid. 116-117.
103  Ibid. 122.
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exchange available for sales to U.S. importers.  Moreover, this problem remained unsolved
during the war years.104       
Therefore,  the  1939  Turkish-American  Trade  Agreement  produced  the  same  results  that
Turkish-U.S. trade during the interwar period produced in general:  some steps forward, but in
essence not the end that was envisioned by either side.  Turkish-U.S. trade between the wars
was marked by a desire on both sides to expand trade and exchange technology, but for a
variety of reasons those wishes were never fully realized.  Possibly the most important aspect
of the 1939 agreement was that it signified a mutual interest in expanded relations.  
2.3. Interwar Turkish-American Social and Cultural Exchanges
One  feature  of  Turkish-American  relations  that  has  been  important  since  the  Nineteenth
Century,  in  addition  to  trade,  is  social  and  cultural  interaction.   As  is  well-known,  U.S.
Protestant missionaries began to arrive in the first half of the Nineteenth Century with the aim
of founding schools and proselytizing the Ottoman Empire's Christian minorities.105  By the
beginning of WWI,  American schools  had been founded in  Istanbul  and many Anatolian
locations.106
In terms of social interaction, at the end of WWI the main source of Turkish-American contact
was still  the American missionary endeavors initiated in the previous century.  During the
following  two  decades,  American  technicians  and  advisors  would  broaden  this  contact
somewhat, but American schools remained the primary vehicle through which Turkish people
became familiar with the U.S.107  Furthermore, even though a number of U.S. schools were
104  Ibid. 122-125.
105  This process officially began in 1829-1831 with the foundation of the first U.S. Protestant
mission in Istanbul (see: Erhan, op. cit., pp. 90-92) and the signing of the 1830 Ottoman-
American Trade Agreement (see:  Armaoğlu, op. cit., pp. 1-6 for the text of the agreement;
see also:  Erhan, op. cit., pp. 120-128, and Trask, op. cit., p. 4-7).
     
106  See:  Erhan, op. cit., pp. 190-193.  Trask, op. cit., pp. 9-11.
  
107  A small number of students, such as Ahmet Emin Yalman and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer had
gone to schools in the U.S. before WWI, but until WWII, very few Turkish students had seen
education in the U.S.  Trask, op. cit., p. 168, states that “thousands of young Turks” received
education at U.S. schools in Turkey between the wars.  Another notable example of Turkish
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forced to close because of financial  difficulties caused by the Great Depression,  generally
American schools in Turkey were able to adapt to the new Turkey and continue educating
Turkish citizens in a secular manner.108 
One little-known event, which may have had a founding influence on the Turkish educational
system,  was  John  Dewey's  two-month  1924  sojourn  in  Turkey.   With  Mustafa  Kemal's
personal invitation, Dewey traveled to Turkey, studied and observed the Turkish education
system's  conditions,  and  prepared  an  extensive  report  on  reforms  needed,  which  was
subsequently submitted to the Turkish government.109  Even though the exact extent of the
influence of Dewey's reports (as well as the reports of other experts) on the nascent Turkish
Republic's education system has yet to be quantified, it is possible that the Village Institutes
established in  the 1930s may have reflected Dewey's concepts.110  Dewey's reflections on
Turkish society and its education system are also extremely informative.111
students who went to the U.S. for education was Kasım Gülek, who, like Esmer and Yalman,
studied at Columbia University; Gülek was invited to be a member of parliament by Mustafa
Kemal and went on to have a long career in the CHP.  For an example of Gülek's views, see:
Gülek, Kasim. “Democracy Takes Root in Turkey.”  Foreign Affairs.  Vol. 30, No. 1, October
1951.  pp. 135-144.  Gülek's views were pro-Western and pro-Modern.  
 
108  See:  Trask, op. cit., pp. 147-169.  Grew, op. cit., mentions the issue of U.S. schools
frequently; see, for example:  pp. 741, 746-747, 748-747, 754-795, et al. Only two incidents,
the Bursa proselytizing incident and the closure of the Izmir International School, marred the
relationship between American schools and the Turkish state in the 1920s and 1930s, but both
were caused by the personnel of the schools involved.  In general, if U.S. schools faced
difficulties, they were the same difficulties that other international schools faced in the new
Turkish Republic.
109  Anton, John P. and Pınar Canevi, eds.  Cumhuriyet, Eğitim Reformu ve Dewey/The
Republic, Educational Reform and Dewey.  İstanbul:  Forum İstanbul Enstitüsü Yayınları,
2007.  pp. 114-202.
110  See:  Carpenter-Kılınç, Sarah.  “The National Education Board Conferences and Political
Transition:  1939-1960 -- Changing Perceptions of Schooling and Dialogue of 
Negotiations.”  Unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2007.  pp. 27-28.  Carpenter-
Kılınç explains, citing Şevket Gedikoğlu, that Mustafa Kemal left the decisions regarding
what educational ideas or techniques would be utilized to “local advisors and researchers.”  
111  See:  Anton, John P.  “Dewey'in 1924 Türkiye Ziyareti ve Mevcut Arayışlar/Dewey's 1924
Visit to Turkey and the Present Quests.”  Cumhuriyet, Eğitim Reformu ve Dewey/The
Republic, Educational Reform and Dewey.  John P. Anton and Pınar Canevi, eds.  İstanbul:
Forum İstanbul Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2007.  pp. 77-92.
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Outside of educational efforts, there were a handful of social or cultural projects that brought
Americans to Turkey.  Trask lists  U.S. medical  programs, archaeological expeditions, and
relief programs as the most important social or cultural contacts between Turkey and America
between the wars.  Of those three, Trask states that medical facilities, especially hospitals,
were second in importance only to American educational projects in terms of the institutional
work  that  U.S.  citizens  performed  in  Turkey  during  this  period.112  The  archaeological
expeditions required the least effort from U.S. diplomats and U.S. relief efforts created much
Turkish goodwill towards the U.S.113 
2.4.  Interwar Turkish-American Relations:  A Paradigm
Interwar  Turkish-American  relations  can  be  characterized  by the  ill-fated,  and  infamous,
Chester  Project.   The  Chester  Project  was  a   railroad-construction  project  with  a  long,
winding, but little-known history.  The project's idea was dreamed up by U.S. Admiral Colby
M. Chester, whose attention was first brought to the Ottoman Empire when he traveled there
in 1900 as captain of the U.S.S.  Kentucky, on a mission to obtain reparations for claims
related to the Armenian massacres of 1894-1896.114  
Admiral  Chester,  with  the  help  of  several  backers,  created  the  Ottoman-American
Development Company in 1909 in order to pursue investment opportunities in Anatolia, and
subsequently attempted to gain approval from the Porte for the company's proposed projects.
In 1911, however, several backers withdrew support, causing embarassment for the U.S. State
Department.  Further attempts in 1912 and 1913 to secure State Department support for other
Chester projects thus proved fruitless.115  The Chester Project was resurrected after WWI and
112  Ibid. p. 171.  Grew composed  a speech concerning the American Hospital in Turkey, see:
pp. 856-857.
113  Ibid.  pp. 177-181, 183-186.  For a summary of U.S. interests in Turkey between the wars,
see:  DeNovo, op. cit., pp. 253-273.
  
114  This information is extracted from Trask, op. cit., p. 14.  See also:  Denovo, op. cit., pp.
58-87.
115  Trask, ibid.  Denovo, ibid.  DeNovo states on p. 58 that “[h]ad the ambitions of the
Chester syndicate materialized, they might well have altered the course of American relations
with the Middle East, and even the course of Turkish history,” but adds that the Project turned
out to be a “colossal and embarrassing failure.”
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accepted by the TBMM on 9 April  1923, but doomed to failure when the the companies
entrusted to carrying out the project could not maintain mutual cooperation.116  
For the U.S., the Chester Project is notable primarily because it was one of the first American
attempts to invest in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and also one of the first U.S. attempts
to  gain  access  to  oil  fields  in  northern  Mesopotamia.   On  the  Turkish  side,  the  Project
provided opportunities for the Turkish government to obtain investment and possibly political
support from a power outside of Europe, but later became the subject of argument during the
1930 election race between the CHP and the Serbest Fırkası (Free Party), and during debates
concerning foreign investment in Turkey that occurred in the late 1960s.117  
As  a  result,  a  U.S.  desire  to  invest  abroad,  and  an  Ottoman/Turkish  need  for  economic
investment and development, intersected both before and after WWI in the Chester Project.
The  project  met  with  ultimate  failure  because  of  Ottoman  bureaucracy and  Great  Power
politics before the war, and because of a lack of U.S. carry-through after the war.118  Similarly,
Turkish-American  relations  in  the  1930s  were  marked  by  Turkish  ambition  to  obtain
investment and technology from abroad, but the U.S. side did not find enough interest, despite
the efforts of several capable Ambassadors and pro-Turkish groups in the U.S., to help Turkey
in  a  truly meaningful  way.  During the 1930s America,  besides  a  traditional  tendency to
116  Armaoğlu, op. cit., p. 31; Armaoğlu also mentions that the failure of the partners to carry
out the concession resulted in the project's annullment by the TBMM in December 1923.
Mango, op. cit., p. 380, offers a slightly different reason for the project's failure.  Trask, op.
cit., p. 130, seems to agree more with Armaoğlu. Denovo, op. cit., 210-228.  Denovo, on p.
210, states that the reason that the Chester Project was taken up after WWI was the U.S. need
for petroleum.  On pp. 226-227, Denovo cites the delays caused by “internal wrangling”
amongst the Ottoman-American Development Company's partners as the cause for the
concession's cancellation by the TBMM.  Selim İlkin adds British and French reaction to the
Project's approval by the TBMM as a further obstacle to the Project's implementation; see:
“1922-1923 Yılları Türkiye'sinde Bir Yabancı Sermaye Girişimi:  Chester Demiryolu Projesi.”
Cumhuriyetin Harcı:  Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken.  İlhan Tekeli ve Selim İlkin.
İstanbul:  İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004.  op. cit., p. 265. 
   
117  İlkin, op. cit., pp. 233-234, 237-239, 240-241, 242-243, 267.
118  There was also some opposition from the Turkish side; see:  ibid. pp. 254-263.
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isolationism,  also  had  its  own  economic  problems  and  internal  opponents  of  improved
Turkish-American relations.119  
In parallel, the Turkish government,  because of previous experiences such as the Ottoman
capitulations,  shied away from aid involving excessive  conditions  or concessions.120  The
Chester  Project  fiasco,  and  the  “representatives”  of  foreign  businesses  that  flooded  into
Turkey after the Republic was proclaimed,121 deepened Turkish suspicion of foreign economic
entanglements.   Other  difficulties,  such  as  bureacracy and  problems  in  the  Turkish  legal
system,  deterred  U.S.  businesspeople  from  becoming  involved  in  the  Turkish  market.122
Apparently,  unilateral  rejection  of  signed  agreements  on  the  part  of  Turkish  institutions
created suspicion, warranted or not, of Turkish bureacratic and business practices and gave
ammunition  to Turkey's enemies in  the U.S.123  Together,  these factors  kept  Turkish-U.S.
contacts in a nascent state. 
2.5.  Interwar Turkish-American Relations:  Summary and Conclusions
One  important  point  that  has  always  captured  this  researcher's  attention  is  that  Mustafa
Kemal, at certain points in the interwar period, expressed admiration for the U.S. and even
held it up as an example for Turkey to follow. For instance, Mustafa Kemal, during a dinner
gathering that received note in official U.S. documents, told guests and representatives that he
119  See:  Trask, op. cit. passim.  Trask mentions especially the political and public opinion
problems caused by the U.S.' domestic Armenian lobby throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
120  See, for example, Owen and Pamuk, op. cit., p. 13.  Trask, op. cit., pp. 127-129, 130.
Zürcher, op. cit., pp. 203.  Grew, op. cit., p. 863 mentions Turkish state “chauvinism” towards
foreign loans.
121  See:  Tunçay, op. cit., p. 207.  These foreign businesspeople, who included Americans,
were apparently little better than carpetbaggers.
122  See:  Trask, op. cit., p. 95.
123  See quote by U.S. Senator William H. King in Trask, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
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preferred the American model of development.124  Mustafa Kemal had also, as early as 1923,
addressed messages directly to the U.S. and U.S. citizens.125
Several months after his meeting with Von der Osten, Mustafa Kemal apparently expressed
his preference for U.S. investment to an unofficial U.S. representative.126  In the well-known
documentary/film on Mustafa Kemal made by Fox Films, the Gazi expressed a highly positive
evaluation of America and the ties between the two countries.127  In July 1931, when two U.S.
pilots flew non-stop from New York to Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal sent a warm telegram to U.S.
President Hoover praising not only the aviators, but the U.S. as well.128  Mustafa Kemal met
U.S. General Douglas MacArthur in late Septemeber 1932 in Istanbul.129  On at  least  one
occasion, Mustafa Kemal sent a Turkish official to the U.S. in order to obtain agricultural
technology.130  Furthermore, Turkish schoolbooks published between 1921 and 1933, which
124  Bali, Rıfat N., ed.  U.S. Diplomatic Documents on Turkey Volume IV:  New Documents on
Atatürk -- Atatürk as Viewed through the Eyes of American Diplomats.  Istanbul:  The Isis
Press, 2007.  pp. 183.  The event was recorded by Dr. Hans Henning von der Osten, the head
of an American archaeological expedition working in Turkey.  The U.S. government official
who prepared the document mentioned specifically that “. . . the Chief of State [Mustafa
Kemal] prefers to emulate America rather than Europe” (p. 181). 
125  İlkin, op. cit., p. 247.
126  Tekeli and İlkin, op. cit., p. 184-186.
127  See:  Bali, Rıfat N., ed.  U.S. Diplomatic Documents on Turkey Volume II:  The Turkish
Cinema in the Early Republican Years.  Istanbul:  The Isis Press, 2007.  pp. 20-21.  Joseph
Grew appeared with Mustafa Kemal in the scene titled “Preliminary Speeches,” in which first
Grew, then Mustafa Kemal delivered scripted speeches about Turkish-American relations and
Turkish democracy.
128  Grew, op. cit., pp. 895-896.  Grew termed Mustafa Kemal's telegram as “unusually
expansive” and “long and cordial,” and in a telegram to Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik
Rüştü (Aras), Grew called Mustafa Kemal's telegram “absolutely unprecedented for [its]
warmth and cordiality” (ibid. p. 897).
129  For a discussion of the legends surrounding this event, see:  Akalın, Cüneyt.  Atatürk-
MacArthur Görüşmesinin İçyüzü:  Bir Soğuk Savaş Yalanı.  İstanbul:  Kaynak Yayınları,
2006.  The chat between Mustafa Kemal and General MacArthur took place at the initiative of
U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Sherrill (ibid. p. 39).
130  Tekeli, İlhan ve Selim İlkin.  Cumhuriyetin Harcı:  Köktenci Mödernitenin Ekonomil
Politkasının Gelişimi.  İstanbul:  İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004.  p. 297.
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must have had consent from Mustafa Kemal and the circle around him, devoted a surprising
amount of space to America, its history, and its important historical figures.131
On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal's professed admiration for the U.S. was not immediately
apparent from the projects that he carried out.  In other words, the projects pursued by the
Kemalist  government  during  the  1920s  and  1930s  are  not  obviously  identifiable  as
“American,”132 even if  İsmet  İnönü referred to the  Hines-Dorr-Kemmerer  Report  as  “very
valuable”  to  the  Turkish  government's  development  programs.133  Only in  the  1950s  did
Turkish government  projects,  and their  emphasis on agriculturally-based development  and
asphalt road projects instead of railroads clearly begin to carry a mark of U.S. influence.134  As
a result, historians have to guess whether the admiration Mustafa Kemal voiced for the U.S.
was genuine, or whether he was simply speaking politically or flattering foreign guests. 
131  See: Sınar, Alev.  “1921 ile 1933 Yıllar Arasında Yayınlanan İlkokul Okuma Kıtaplarında
Amerikan Tesiri.”  500. Yılında Amerika.  Recep Ertürk ve Hayati Tüfekçioğlu 
hazırlayanlar.  İstanbul:  Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1994.  pp. 55-60.  Alev Sınar's essay contains
several extremely interesting quotes; she notes, for instance, that one 1930 Turkish
schoolbook described the U.S. as “. . . dünyanın en kuvvetli, en medeni, en mamur, en
müterakki, en yüsek diyalardan biri, belki birincisi” (“one of, maybe the foremost, of the
world's most powerful, most civilized, most developed, and most progressive nations”) -- p.
57.  The schoolbooks contained not only predictable and positive information about American
figures like George Washington or Benjamin Franklin, but also about contemporary
industrialists like Ford and Rockefeller (p. 56).  Additionally, the author notes that the early
Republican-era's most pedagogically successful books were written by Sabiha Sertel (in
cooperation with Mim Sertel and Ercüment Ekrem), who had lived in America and who
generally expressed a positive assessment of American culture.
  
132  What is meant is that the development projects carried out by the Turkish government
during the 1930s bore the influence of many countries, because many countries contributed
their help and or support to Turkey during this decade, and especially were affected by the
Devletçilik ideology that even “New Deal”-supporting Americans would have found difficult
to endorse.  See Trask, op. cit., pp. 128-129, for a list of countries that gave aid to Turkey
during the 1930s.
 
133  Trask, op. cit., p. 144.
134  For various perspectives, see:  Harris, George S.  Troubled Alliance:  Turkish-American
Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971.  Washington D.C.:  American Enterprise
Institute, 1972.  pp. 33-35, 79-80.  Keyder, op. cit., pp. 119-120, 127-128, 130.  Owen and
Pamuk, op. cit., pp. 105-106.  Şen, Leyla.  “Highway Improvement and Agricultural
Mechanization:  Turkish High Priority Economic Development Projects in the Framework of
Free World Recovery Program & Their Repercussions.”  Unpublished MA Thesis, Bilkent
University, 1997.  Passim.  Zürcher, op. cit., pp. 235-236.
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One way to approach this problem is to examine the attitude of  Ulus Gazetesi towards the
U.S.  As will be explained in more detail below, Ulus was, by the first days of 1939 (shortly
after Mustafa Kemal's November 1938 death), already extremely pro-American.  This seems
to  indicate  that  Mustafa  Kemal  had  already instructed  a  pro-U.S.  stance  in  Ulus'  pages.
Moreover, Ulus continued this stance after Mustafa Kemal's death, which suggests that İsmet
İnönü agreed with Mustafa Kemal's ideas on this subject.  However, this particular problem
requires research in the issues of Hakimiyet-i Milliye135 and Ulus from the 1920s and 1930s.
Therefore,  at  the end of the 1930s and on the brink of world war, Turkish-U.S. relations
remained traditionally low-level.  Despite initiatives from both sides, Turkish-American trade
also remained at its historically “normal” slow pace.  On the other hand, at least one side of
this pair, Turkey, had begun to see the other side as a potential ally which could fill the role of
overseas  balancer  that  Germany and Bolshevik  Russia  had recently filled.   Coupled  with
increased cultural and technical interaction, the stage was set, given the right conditions, for a
mutually-beneficial relationship that would finally take on the weight of formal alliance and
cooperation in international politics.
135 For information on the foundation of Hakimiyet-i Milliye and its relationship to Mustafa
Kemal, see:  Topuz, Hıfzı.  II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi.  İstanbul:  Remzi
Kitabevi A.S., 2003.  pp. 119-120.  Bakacak, op. cit., pp 2-3, 8-14.  Konyar, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
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3.0  ULUS GAZETESİ, TURKISH SOCIETY, AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT
“Dündar Öğretmen Ulus Okuyor
Yazıişleri Müdürü Mumtaz Faik Fenik'tir.  Başyazarı Nasuhi Baydar.  İç fıkra 
yazarı Yaşar Nabi.  Dış politika yazarı ise Ahmet Şükrü Esmer.  Hatay hür olmuştur.  
Hatay Millet Meclisi ertesi gün toplanacaktır. . . .”136
Ulus Gazetesi has long been understood as the semi-official mouthpiece for the CHP during
the era of single-party rule in Turkey.137  The single-party regime began with the declaration of
the Turkish Republic in November 1923 and continued until the CHP was unseated in 1950,
in Turkey's first  truly free and transparent  elections.   Ulus continued publication,  through
some politically-motivated closures in the 1950s, until it closed in 1971.138
Ulus,  consequently,  was  more  than  just  a  newspaper  --  it  was  an  outlet  for  the  official
viewpoint of the CHP, and was a prime source of information for the first generation of the
Turkish Republic.   This  fact  is  illustrated  by the  quote  included at  the beginning of this
chapter, from Adalet Ağaoğlu's Ölmeye Yatmak (To Lie Down to Die).  Dündar Oğretmen is
the protypical Kemalist village teacher of the early Turkish Republic.  His aim is to create
good Turkish citizens that will take the young nation into the future.  He also symbolizes the
role of the Turkish Republic's first generation as teachers to the following generations.  Most
importantly, however, his source of information and ideas about the world is Ulus.
136  Ağaoğlu, Adalet.  Ölmeye Yatmak.  İstanbul:  Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006.
p. 24:  “The teacher, Mr. Dündar, is reading Ulus:   The editor-in-chief is Mumtaz Faik
Fenik.  The lead columnist is Nasuhi Baydar.  The domestic issues columnist is Yaşar Nabi.
The international affairs columnist is Ahmet Şükrü Esmer.  Hatay has embraced freedom.
The Hatay National Parliament will convene the following day. . .” (author's translation).
137   Bakacak, op. cit., 15; Gürkan, op. cit., 49; Topuz, op. cit., 164.
138   İnuğur, Nuri.  Türk Basın Tarihi (1919-1989).  İstanbul:  Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları,
1992.  p. 354.  Konyar, op. cit., pp. 10-12.
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Dündar Öğretmen is also an excellent example of the influence that the information which
appeared in Ulus had.  The ideas written in Ulus were intended to educate and indoctrinate its
readers,  who  would  then  pass  those  ideas  on  to  others,  as  Dündar  Öğretmen did  to  his
students in Ağaoğlu's novel.  A detail vital to understanding this aspect of Ölmeye Yatmak is
that the novel is semi-autobiographical:  Ağaoğlu was born in a village 150 kilometers from
Ankara in 1929.  Her description of Dündar Öğretmen reflects what she experienced from her
village elementary school  teacher  as  a child.139  Consequently, Ağaoğlu portrayed  Dündar
Oğretmen as  a  reader  of  Ulus  to  illustrate  allegorically  from  where  those  who  felt  a
responsibility to spread the Kemalist doctrine received their information.140
This is not to suggest that  Ulus was the only source of information for the Kemalist elite,
because there were certainly other publications, but it was a leading and prestigious source.141
In order to understand the level of influence that Ulus  had in forming the intellectual life of
early Republican Turkey, several different facets of Turkish life, politics, and society should
be examined.  
The first consideration should be Ulus' daily readership.  According to numbers provided by
Weisband,  Ulus enjoyed the second-greatest readership, 12,000 daily copies, of all Turkish
139  Ağaoğlu indicates that, as a writer, she is interested in historical changes and processes;
see: Andaç, Feridun, ed..  Adalet Ağaoğlu Kitabı.  İstanbul:  Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür
Yayınları, 2005.  pp. 123-124.
140  For Dündar Öğretmen's Kemalism and mission, see:  Erol, Sibel.  “Sexual Discourse in
Turkish Fiction:  Return of the Repressed Female Identity.”  Edebiyat.  Vol. 6.  p. 192.  The
indocrinational charater of Kemalist education was not unusual since educational systems are,
generally, one way that a society controls the information received by that society's citizens.
In 1930s Turkey, indoctrination was a particularly pressing issue since there was not only the
need for education and development, but also the need for a binding ideology that could
provide unity to a culturally, linguistically, and ethnically heterogeneous nation.  As a result,
Dündar Öğretmen should be read as an expression of one way this indoctrination was carried
out.  The commentator referenced above also asserts that all of Ağaoğlu's novels can be read
as attempts to represent Turkey through allegory; see:  Erol, Sibel.  “Toplumsal Dış
Gerçekçilik ve Kişisel İç Şiir: Adalet Ağaoğlu'nun Romanlarındaki İnce Ayar.”  Hayata
Bakan Edebiyat:  Adalet Ağaoğlu'nun Yapıtlarına Eleştirel Yaklaşımlar.  Esen, Nüket and
Erol Köroğlu, eds.  İstanbul:  Böğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi:  2003.  p. 7.
141  Bakacak, op. cit., p. 7.
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newspapers  during  the  second  half  of  WWII.142  If  Ahmet  Emin  Yalman's  statement
concerning  the  relationship  between  actual  newspapers  sold  and  the  real  numbers  of  a
newspaper's readers143 can be considered factual,  then  Ulus reached around 60,000 readers
daily.   Most  of  those  readers  would  have  been  the  educated  Kemalist  elite,  composed
essentially  of  bureaucrats,  military  personnel,  and  other  civil  servants  like  teachers,  that
supported the regime's ideological programs.  
A second consideration is the power that Kemalist ideology, and thus any ideas associated
with the Kemalist goverment and its projects, exercised over Turkey's developing society.  In
1923, Turkey, under the aegis of the Kemalist  regime, began a new program for cultural,
economic,  social,  and  political  development.144  This  program  necessarily  included  the
formation of a national ideology, since the idea of a “Turkish nation” had little more than
fifteen years of maturation after the two initial Ottoman attempts to form an unifying ideology
for the empire, usually labelled respectively as “Ottomanist” and “Pan-Islamic,” failed.145   
142  Weisband, Edward.  Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945:  Small State Diplomacy and
Great Power Politics.  U.S.A.:  Princeton University Press, 1973.  p. 74.  Cumhuriyet, which
Weisband, op. cit., characterizes as “favoring German interests during the war” (p. 78) and
which featured writers of “pro-Axis sympathies” (ibid.) enjoyed the greatest circulation, at
16,000 (p. 74).  Thus, using the same criteria expressed by Yalman (see Footnote 143),
Cumhuriyet's total readership can be estimated at 80,000 for the same period.
143  “Our circulation of 20,000 meant at least 100,000 readers because 1,000s of coffeehouses
subscribed for their patrons' benefit.”  Turkey in My Time.  Norman, Oklahoma, USA:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.  p. 194.  Yalman also mentions other reasons, which
would have been applicable to any newspaper of the time, for his estimate.
144  For various perspectives, see:  Berkes, Niyazi.  The Development of Secularism in Turkey.
London:  Hurst and Co., 1998.  pp. 325-510.  Kasaba, Reşat.  “Kemalist Certainties and
Modern Ambiguities.”  Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Sibel
Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba eds.  Seattle:  University of Washington Press, 1997.  pp. 15-36.
Keyder, op. cit., pp. 71-140.  Lerner, Daniel.  The Passing of Traditional Society:
Modernizing the Middle East.  New York:  The Free Press, 1964.  pp. 111-166.  Lewis, op.
cit., pp. 210-293.  Zürcher, op. cit., pp. 97-214. 
     
145  Karal, Enver Ziya.  “The Principles of Kemalism.”  Atatürk:  Founder of a Modern State,
Ali Kazancıgıl and Özbudun eds.  Hamden, Connecticut:  Archon Books, 1981.  pp. 11-35.
Köker, Levent.  Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi.  İstanbul:  İletişim Yayınları, 2004.
pp. 125-177.  Lewis, op. cit., pp. 325-361.  Zürcher, op. cit., pp. 132-137, 189-190.
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In order to construct a national ideology, the Kemalist leadership turned to the school system
and the media in order to create public awareness of the national project.  Because the level of
education amongst the previously Ottoman populace was extremely low, the Kemalist leaders
could inject  national ideology directly into the population using the educational  system.146
The  first  generation  of  Kemalist  teachers,  like  Dündar  Öğretmen,  thus  had  an  notably
powerful position in Turkish society since the only real competition for their pupils' minds
was  the  village  Islam,  mixed  with  millenia-old  cultural  traditions,  that  had  dominated
Anatolian life for centuries.147  
Schools were not the only institutional project which aimed at spreading nationalist ideology
amongst the Turkish citizenry.  The  Turk Ocakları (Turkish Hearths) movement was also
intended to  reinforce  the formation  of  an enlightenment  and Pan-Turkist  mentality in  the
Turkish people.  After being initiated by Pan-Turkists in the Ottoman empire's waning years,
the Türk Ocakları were tolerated for a short period by the Republic's leadership.148  In 1931
the Ocakları were closed and then re-opened as the Halkevleri (People's Houses) in 1932.149
The Halkevleri had the same indoctrinational aims as the Türk Ocakları, but without the Pan-
Turkist  hues.150  Consequently,  the  Halkevleri,  as  another  educational/indoctrinational
146  Yeşilkaya, Neşe.  Halkevleri:  İdeoloji ve Mimarlık.  İstanbul:  İletişim Yayınları, 2003.
pp. 68-78.  For an early theory concerning media and its influence on development and
culture, see:  Lerner, op. cit., 52-65.  For criticism of Lerner's theory, see:  Karpat, Kemal H.
“Structural Change, Historical Stages of Modernization, and the Role of Social Groups in
Turkish Politics.”  Social Change and Politics in Turkey:  A Structural-Historical Analysis.
Leiden:  E.J. Brill, 1973.  pp. 22-24.  
    
147  This is especially important since more than 70 percent of the Turkish population lived in
rural areas, which expanded, or more accurately, recovered between the wars.  See:  Owen and
Pamuk, op. cit., pp. 22- 28.  Therefore, at a time when the state formulated a national ideology
for its citizens, and education, which was intended to spread that ideology, began to spread to
villages, the national population also expanded.  The vast majority of Turkish citizens, if they
received an education at all during the Republic's first decades, would have experienced an
education similar to that of Adalet Ağaoğlu.  Yeşilkaya, op. cit. p. 70-71, describes how the
Nineteenth Century Russian Narodniks were seen as an example for the Kemalist regime's
education efforts in the 1930s.
 
148  See:  Landau, Jacob M.  Pan-Turkism in Turkey:  A Study in Irredentism.  Hamden,
Connecticut:  Archon Books, 1981.  pp. 40-41.
149  Yeşilkaya, op. cit., 64-65; Zürcher, op. cit., p. 188.
150  Yeşilkaya, op. cit., 61-68.
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institution, were more under the control of the Kemalist government and taught ideology more
compatible to Kemalism. 
Amongst  the Turkish citizens  who were already educated,  the media  served as  a channel
through which the  Kemalist  regime could provide the  information  that  it  wanted Turkish
citizens to consume.  In 1930, for instance, İsmet İnönü discreetly supported a newspaper,
İnkılap (Reform)  to  provide  media  opposition  to  the  Serbest  Cumhuriyet  Fırkası (Free
Republican Party).151  To provide balance to the right-wing İnkilap, İnönü also supported the
left-wing  Halk  Dostu (Friend  of  the  People)  and  Hür Adam (Freeman).152  The  seminal
journal  Kadro (Cadre),  a creator  and  propagator  of  the  early 1930s  Kemalist  Devletçilik
ideology,  also  published  information  written  by  İsmet  İnönü  concerning  policy  and
ideology.153
This use of media as an informational tool also extended to Ulus.  Edward Weisband referred
to  Ulus and  its  lead  editor/writer  during WWII Falih  Rıfkı  Atay as  İsmet  İnönü's  “other
voices.”154  Metin Heper, while discussing İsmet İnönü's efforts to prepare a generation to
succeed him, mentions that Nihat Erim, who began writing for Ulus during WWII and later
became Turkish prime minister, was one of the foremost examples of that generation.155  Erim
was also made a head writer at Ulus shortly after the war's conclusion.156  The potential that
President İnönü saw in Erim must be the reason why Erim was given an important position at
Ulus,  and further  underlines  the  “educational”  role that  İsmet  İnönü envisioned for  Ulus.
151  Tunçay, op. cit., pp. 275-276.
152  Ibid. 276-277.
153  Köker, op. cit., p. 193.
154  Op. cit. p. 77.
155  Heper, Metin.  İsmet İnönü:  Yeni Bir Yorum Denemesi.  İstanbul:  Tarih Vakfı Yurt 
Yayınları, 1999.  p. 50.  See also:  Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya.  İkinci Adam, Cilt II:  1938-
1950.  İstanbul:  Remzi Kitabevi A.Ş., 2005.  pp. 464.
 
156  Erim's lead columns began to appear in late 1945 and he was sharing head writer's duties
with Falih Rıfkı Atay by the beginning of 1946; see: Erim, Nihat.  Günlükler:  1925-1979,
Cilt I.  İstanbul:  Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2004.  pp. 45, 48.  İnuğur, op. cit., p. 210, mentions
that Erim's first column as head writer dealt with the U.S. and the Straits issue.
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Finally,  President  İnönü's  ideas  concerning  the  media's  role  in  informing  society  were
published in a Turkish newspaper on at least one occasion.157 
Correspondingly, the Turkish state kept close control over all newspapers published during
the one-party era.158  During the 1930s, a series of regulations were enacted and organizations
were  founded by the  Turkish  government  with  the intent  of  controlling more  strictly the
Turkish press' activities.159  Any newspaper which did not toe the Kemalist line was punished
through  suspensions  or  closures.160  Mustafa  Kemal  himself  was  extremely aware  of  the
influential role that the press could play in the formation of the young Republic's social and
cultural life:161  sometimes cautioning the Turkish press to be responsible,162 at other times he
acted in an almost fatherly way towards the journalists themselves.163  Mustafa Kemal even
had experience as a journalist from his years in military school and from the time he spent in
Istanbul before heading to Anatolia to lead the nationalist struggle.164
The control over Turkish media and schooling, and the oppression of alternative ideologies
(like Islam, communism, or Pan-Turkism), should not obscure the fact that many citizens of
157  In a note sent by President İnönü to Ulus, in response to a note from Falih Rıfkı Atay, the
President specifically emphasized that the paper had a cultural as well as political role:  “Ulus,
memleketimizin siyaset ve kültür hayatında sağlam bir temeltaşı halindedir” (“Ulus is a solid
cornerstone of our homeland's political and cultural life”):  Turan, İlhan, hazırlayan.  İsmet
İnönü:  Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşiler 1944-1950.  Ankara:  TBMM Kültür,
Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları, 2003.  p. 9.  According to the text, President İnönü's note
was published in Cumhuriyet on 13 January 1945.
 
158  See, for example, the press-related jailings and closures carried out by the Turkish
government in reaction to the Şeyh Sait rebellion:  Mango, op. cit. pp. 424, 426-427.  Tunçay,
op. cit., pp. 149-152.  Zürcher, op. cit. 179-180.
159  İnuğur, op. cit., pp. 159-160. 
160  Gürkan, op. cit., 73-92 passim.
161  Gürkan, op. cit., 75-76, especially Footnote 19.
162  Mango, op. cit., 436.
163  Yalman, Ahmet Emin.  Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, Cilt 2:  1922-1971.
İstanbul:  Pera Turizm ve Ticaret A.Ş., 1997.  pp. 1054-1058.
164  İnuğur, op. cit., pp. 15-22.  
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the early Turkish Republic were sincere supporters of the Kemalist project, and for obvious
reasons.  The Turkish nationalist/Kemalist forces had rescued a large section of the former
Ottoman  empire  from  foreign  occupation  and  provided  the  opportunity  for  the  resulting
nation-state to develop on its own terms.  Consequently, the power and influence of Kemalist
ideology resulted not just from control over media and schooling, but from the support of the
majority of  its  citizens  (exceptions among the Islamically- or  Kurdish nationalist-inspired
segments of the population need not be discussed here).  Support for Mustafa Kemal and the
Turkish nationalists was so ingrained that even Turkish communists  have mostly remained
staunchly nationalist to this day, an effect traceable to the early Republican era.165  
Consequently, that some Turkish journalists spoke openly of trying to express their Kemalist
ideals  in  their  journalistic  endeavors  should  not  be  surprising,  and two examples  can be
provided of Turkish journalists who either openly, or through their compositions, expressed
pro-U.S. opinions to their readers.  Ahmet Emin Yalman, who was editor of  Vatan during
WWII, wrote repeatedly of trying to inject his journalism with the ideals that he embraced.166
Despite the fact that Vatan was considered an oppositional newspaper, Yalman was a staunch
Kemalist and progressivist, and used his position to criticize the regime within the boundaries
permitted by the government's censors.  Yalman's paper was still repeatedly penalized for the
opinions that it expressed.167
Yalman's  colleague  Ahmet  Şükrü  Esmer,  who  studied  journalism  at  Columbia  with
Yalman,168 was the Foreign Affairs Editor for  Ulus during WWII.  Yalman mentions that
165  Aydın, Suavi.  "Sosyalizm ve Milliyetçilik:  Galiyefizmden Kemalizme Türkiye'de
'Üçüncü Yol' Arayışları."  Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt 4:  Milliyetçilik.  Murat
Belge, ed.  İstanbul:  İletişim Yayınları, 2002.  p. 441.  Harris, George S.  The Communists
and the Kadro Movement:  Shaping Ideology in Atatürk's Turkey.  Istanbul:  The Isis Press,
2002.  pp. 11-13.
166  Yalman, Turkey. . ., passim.
167  In only the 1939-1945 period, Vatan's daily publishing was suspended nine times; see:
Güvenir, O. Murat.  2. Dünya Savaşında Türk Basını.  İstanbul:  Gazeteciler Cemiyeti
Yayınları, 1991.  pp. 120-123.  Koçak, Cemil.  Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi, Cilt 2.  İstanbul:
İletişim Yayınları, 2003.  p. 139.  According to Güvenir's list, Ulus was never suspended
during WWII.
168  Yalman, Turkey. . ., p. 135.
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Esmer “established and developed the Turkish Information Office”169 in New York, which
suggests that Esmer, like Yalman, felt a proselytizing urge in his chosen career.  Both Yalman
and  Esmer  received  scholarships  from  the  Ottoman government  (a  total  of  five  students
obtained the same scholarship) to study in the U.S. in 1911-1913.170  Thus, that Esmer, like
Yalman, would have had positive opinions concerning the U.S., and a wish to express those
positive opinions of the U.S. to  Ulus' readers, is likely.  Esmer would also have had direct
connections to information sources in  the U.S.  as the founder of the Turkish Information
Office. 
One event can provide direct evidence of Esmer's pro-U.S. efforts.  Both Esmer and Yalman
were included in a group of five Turkish journalists who toured the U.S. in  late 1942.171  This
delegation, in addition to touring various U.S. war production facilities and Hollywood, were
allowed meetings with FDR, Vice President Henry Wallace, Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, among other U.S. officials; Yalman recounted
that both FDR and Hull praised Turkish war efforts.172  
This tour must have made a strong impression on these journalists, especially since less than a
year had passed since the U.S. entered WWII, and U.S. war production had increased to full
capacity.  Correspondingly, all of the reports published in  Ulus concerning this journalistic
contingent were markedly positive, as were Yalman's recollections.173  Additionally, Esmer
wrote a series of articles while traveling with the delegation that were mostly published in the
third-page space where his foreign affairs column generally appeared.174  After returning to
169  Ibid.  p. 30.
170  Ibid.
171  The delegation of Turkish journalists consisted of Abidin Daver, Esmer, Zekeriya Sertel,
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, and Yalman.  Esmer was an Ulus staff member, but articles by Yalçın
and Daver, who were not, also appeared in Ulus from time-to-time during WWII.  The
journalistic delegation's activities were detailed by a series of articles in Ulus, appearing on 2,
3, 5, 6, 11, 22 October and 23 November, 1942.
  
172  Yalman, Turkey. . ., p. 199.
 
173  For the Ulus articles, see footnote 171; see also:  Yalman, Turkey. . ., pp. 191, 193, 199.
174  These articles appeared in Ulus on 8, 16, 20, 22, 23, 31 October and 1, 6 November, 1942.
The 8 October article was a front-page feature. 
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Turkey, Esmer published a series of columns that consisted of the diary he kept while on the
journey.175  Overall, this information expressed a strikingly positive assessment of the U.S.
government, its position in the war, and of U.S. society.      
For all of the above reasons, the influence of Ulus should be considered greater than just its
circulation  numbers.   Because  Ulus represented  the  CHP,  and  as  a  result,  the  ideals  of
Mustafa  Kemal and the national  project,  the information  in  Ulus had considerable cachet
among the portions of Turkish society which supported the national project and/or Kemalist
ideals.   In turn,  those who believed in those Kemalist  ideals  often tried to transmit  to or
impose  those  ideals  on  other  Turkish  citizens,  and  teachers  and  journalists  were  often
willingly  involved  in  that  dissemination.   For  this  study,  the  important  point  is  that
information presented by Ulus writers such as Ahmet Şükrü Esmer consistently held up the
U.S. as a positive example for Turkey.176
During  WWII,  an  important  component  of  the  Turkish-American  relationship  was
information.  Because wartime conditions limited trade, and because Turkey was not officially
a participant in the war, information became a way for the Turkish ruling party to, at the same
time, remain “neutral,” support the Allied cause, and express the viewpoint of the Allies to its
population.  The accuracy of this statement will become more clear later in the fifth section of
this study, where information concerning the contents of Ulus during WWII will be presented.
Naturally,  it  is  extremely difficult  to  quantify  exactly how much  influence  Ulus had  on
Turkish minds, but it is clear that, despite opposition to the Kemalist project among several
small segments of the Turkish populace, the information presented to the public in the pages
of Ulus must have had a lasting effect on the ideological and cultural composition of Turkish
society.  Consequently, the extent  of  Ulus'  likely influence on Turkish society is  a prime
175  These columns appeared in Ulus on 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 December
1942 and on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 January 1943.  A note
informing Ulus' readers that Esmer's diary notes would be published in the following days
appeared on page one on 10 December 1942.  From 11 December to 27 December 1942 the
diary entries dealt mostly with England, where the Turkish journalists stopped before
continuing to the U.S.
  
176  This point will be fully explored below in Section 5.0. 
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reason that it is valuable as insight into the aims of the Kemalist government during WWII
and into the changes in Turkish society following that conflict.  
41
4.0  READER'S DIGEST, AMERICAN SOCIETY, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
The Turkish government was not the only government during the 1930s that used the media
for its own “informational” purposes and advantages.  As is well-known, governments such as
the Nazis began to use media, especially the relatively new medium of radio, in new ways in
order to affect and control the kinds and the quality of the information their citizens came into
contact with.  Eventually this activity took on international scope.  
At the beginning of WWII, the U.S. government was not experienced in overseas intelligence
operations.  The U.S. State Department had always obtained overseas intelligence through its
ambassadors, but the real movement towards analytical intelligence gathering began only in
the 1880s when the U.S. navy established its Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).177  The ONI
used overseas attachés to collect  information about  “.  .  .   the character of foreign navies,
especially the size, power, and other capabilities of foreign shipping and naval armaments.”178
By 1929, however, “. . .  no U.S. agency conducted clandestine foreign operations abroad and
'no U.S. agency had foreign intelligence as its primary interest or activity. . .'”.179 
The U.S. government, occupied with the Great Depression and FDR's New Deal economic
recovery  program,  and  faced  with  a  public  opinion  dominated  by  the  U.S.'  traditional
isolationism, did not give prime importance to foreign intelligence throughout the 1930s.180
177  Pisani, Sallie.  The CIA and the Marshall Plan.  Lawrence, Kansas:  University Press of
Kansas, 1991.  p. 19.
178  Ibid.  This means that Admiral Mark Bristol, who was the Naval Attaché in Istanbul from
1919 until formal diplomatic relations were established between the Turkish Republic and the
U.S. in 1927, had intelligence as well as diplomatic responsibilities.
 
179  Ibid.
 
180  Pisani, op. cit., pp. 17-30.  On p. 18, Pisani states, “. . .  before Pearl Harbor, intelligence
in the United States tended to take the form of independent efforts prompted by American
diplomatic personnel.”  This author has not been able to learn the exact motivation for the
intelligence gathering carried out in Turkey during the 1930s by U.S. diplomats and citizens
(mentioned above in Section 1.0, especially Footnotes 11 and 12).  For information on FDR's
and the American public's isolationism during the 1930s, see:  Divine, Robert A.  “Roosevelt
the Isolationist.”  Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, Vol. 2 (since 1914), 3rd Ed.
Paterson, Thomas G., ed.  Lexington, Mass.:  D.C. Heath and Company, 1989. 
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This attitude changed permanently after 7 December 1941.  According to Pisani, William J.
Donovan,181 who  had  long  worked  to  convince  FDR  of  the  need  for  an  U.S.  overseas
intelligence  division,  finally  won  FDR  over  after  the  initial  Japanese  attack,  which  was
rumored to have been aided by subversive tactics.  The concerns over Japanese subversion
added to worries about Nazi fifth-column activities in Europe, which were credited as the
source  of  Hitler's  early WWII  successes.   The  department  established  by FDR's  consent
became  known as  the  Office  of  Strategic  Services  (OSS).182  The  OSS  officially  started
operations  in  summer  1942 with  Donovan as  its  head;  Allen  Dulles  was  the  head of  its
European branch in Bern, Switzerland.183  
By establishing the OSS, the U.S government displayed its recognition that information would
be an important component of the war.  This realization, however, came from a new strand in
U.S.  political  life:   interventionism.   Most  of  the  personnel  attracted  to  the  OSS  were
convinced that the U.S. should overthrow its isolationist traditions and play an active role in
world  affairs.184  OSS  interventionism,  during  WWII,  took  form  mostly  in  paramilitary
matters,  but  its  responsibilities also included research,  analysis, and propaganda.185  These
responsibilities, notably, were applied outside of the United States, in order to positively affect
the world's impression and understanding of the U.S., its government, its culture, and its war
effort.
181  In 1942, Donovan met and offered Ahmet Emin Yalman money to write “information” for
him; Yalman claims to have refused on ethical grounds.  See:  Yalman, Gördüklerim. . .  pp.
1199-1202.  The meeting between Yalman and Donovan took place during the 1942 tour by
Turkish journalists of the U.S.  It was after this tour that the first openly cited Reader's Digest
article appeared in Ulus; see, below, section 5.1.5.  According to Yalman, Donovan had, on at
least one previous occasion, traveled to Ankara.
182  From Pisani, op. cit., pp. 27-28.  The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), both in
personnel and in character, was the direct descendent of the OSS; see:  Saunders, Frances
Stonor.  The Cultural Cold War:  The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters.  New York:
The New Press, 1999.  pp. 32-36.  The OSS was disbanded by President Truman in September
1945, and the CIA was established by Presidential order in July 1947.
 
183  Pisani, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
184  Ibid.  pp. 30-33.
185  Ibid.  pp. 30, 32.
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Reader's  Digest was one tool which the U.S. government found useful in spreading U.S.-
related information at an early date.  However, this does not mean that Reader's Digest was
not a legitimate magazine in its own right.  Reader's Digest has a fascinating history as a
publication that was built from the foundations up, from an idea, by a husband-and-wife team,
DeWitt and Lila Wallace.
4.1.  The Genesis of The Reader's Digest:  1920-1945
Reader's  Digest was  created  by  DeWitt  Wallace  in  the  early  1920s  and  was  an  almost
overnight success.186  DeWitt Wallace's concept was unique because he came upon the idea of
condensing articles from other sources in order to make the articles more accessible and less
time consuming for readers;187 he had realized during his travels and attempts to sell  farm
almanacs  that a magazine which condensed articles for easy and fast reading would find a
ready market in the U.S.188  Wallace was quickly proved correct.  
Wallace's success was not just in filling a need for accessible information in the U.S. media
marketplace.  Wallace also intended the magazine to evince his personal beliefs and values,
i.e. Wallace also wanted the digest to reflect what he found important.189  On the surface,
composing a mass-market publication around one person's belief system would seem to be a
sure  road  to  failure,  but  Wallace's  idea  proved  successful.   The  reason  that  this  formula
worked is that Wallace's own ideas reflected the values held by a broad swath of U.S. society,
that of the middle and lower classes, predominantly Protestant, and of northern European or
Anglo-Saxon heritage.190  This was a bias already present in the U.S. media: 
186  For a detailed account, see:  Heidenry, John.  Theirs Was the Kingdom:  Lila and DeWitt
Wallace and the Story of the Reader's Digest.  W.W. Norton and Co.:  New York, N.Y., 1993.
pp. 35-90.
187  Ibid.  pp. 37, 41-42.
188  Heidenry, op. cit., p. 42.
 
189  Canning, Peter.  American Dreamers:  The Wallaces and Reader's Digest:  An Insider's
Story.  New York:  Simon and  Schuster, 1996.  pp. 36, 61-62.  Canning, on p. 62, states  that
Wallace composed the magazine “[a]ll the while staying true to his own likes and dislikes.
What he liked, they [the readers] liked.  It was that simple” (italics in original).
44
“From the  beginning,  his  [Wallace's]  political  bias  was  conservative.   His  
education came mostly from what he read, and what he read mostly was magazines.  
Since the magazines of the day were themselves mostly conservative in outlook --  
attacking big government, opposing social reforms, extolling self-reliance -- it is not 
surprising that his political views developed along similar lines.”191 
The articles in Reader's Digest, therefore, reflected Wallace's values until the 1970s because
he maintained essential editorial control over the magazine up to his retirement.192  Eventually
Wallace's desire to have articles that he considered “suitable” for the magazine produced the
practice  of  “preprinting,”  the  sponsorship  of  original,  not  adapted,  pieces  tailored  to  the
readership's tastes. 193
During  WWII,  Wallace's  political  biases  made  Reader's  Digest  useful  for  the  U.S.
government's “information” efforts.  Wallace, however, needed no convincing to utilize the
magazine in this capacity since he saw supporting the war effort through his magazine as “a
patriotic duty.”194  This means that Wallace was fully cognizant of his magazine's ability to
influence the minds of both Americans and foreign readers.  Accordingly, the “war effort”
from  Reader's  Digest had a psychological aspect,  because Wallace purposefully published
articles which emphasized positives.195  
190  Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 52-53 details the ways in which Reader's Digest reflected
conservative American Protestant culture.  The same text, on  page 67, mentions some of
Wallace's early anti-Catholic articles.
191  Canning, op. cit., p. 62.  Heidenry, op. cit., p. 54, also supports this view.
192  Wallace remained in control of the editorial process until he and Lila retired from the
magazine in the mid-1970s; see:  Sharp, Joanne P.  Condensing the Cold War:  Reader's
Digest and American Identity.  Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 2000.  p. 21.
  
193  Canning, op. cit., pp. 68-69.  Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 76-77, 79-80.  Sharp, op. cit., pp. 37-
38.
194  Canning, op. cit., p. 94.  Heidenry, op. cit., p. 154.
195  Canning, op. cit., pp. 91-92.  Articles reflecting Wallace's opinions also completely
outnumbered those which presented “the other side” of an issue; see:  Heidenry, op. cit., p.
118-119.
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The other main feature of  Reader's Digest's “war effort” was the launch of several foreign
editions during the war.196  The Spanish edition prepared for South America, for example, was
aided by the U.S. State Department.197  An Arabic edition was launched and, though not as
successful as the Spanish edition, greatly exceeded expectations.198  According to one author,
these editions were launched “in cooperation” with the U.S. State Department.199
A Turkish edition of  Reader's Digest was envisioned during the war, but was not realized.
Albert Cole and Fred Thompson200 were charged with establishing a Turkish edition on the
same journey in which they created Al-Mukhtar min Reader's Digest, the magazine's Arabic
edition.201  The U.S. Office of Wartime Information directly supported Cole and Thompson's
trip, during which they spent six weeks in Turkey.202  The Turkish version, however, was
abandoned because of paper supply problems:  the Nazis threatened to cut off paper supplies
if Reader's Digest appeared.203  
196  Reader's Digest's first foreign edition was published in Britain at the end of 1939:
Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 150-152.  Portugese, Finnish, Swedish, and other editions followed;
special editions for distribution among U.S. and British soldiers were also published.  See:
ibid. pp. 155-163.
197  Canning, op. cit., p.  91.  Heidenry, op. cit., p. 121.  Heidenry also relates how the Spanish
language edition received encouragement directly from the U.S. State Department's Cultural
Relations Office, including a face-to-face meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Cordell
Hull and Reader's Digest business manager Albert Cole:  op. cit., p. 154.  The Spanish edition
was launched despite the fact that financial losses were expected from the edition:  ibid. p.
153-155.
 
198  Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 157-158, 160-161.
 
199  Heidenry, op. cit., p. 473.  Canning, op. cit., p. 95, states that Reader's Digest's foreign
editions were “greatly aided” by the U.S. government.
200  Husband of Lila Wallace's niece.
  
201  Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 157-158.
202  Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 157-158.  Canning, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
203  This apparently happened in 1944, but neither Canning nor Heidenry provide specific
dates for these events.  Canning indicates that the pair tried to establish the Turkish edition
before the Arabic edition.  See: Canning, op. cit., pp. 92-93.  Heidenry, op. cit., p. 158. 
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4.2.  Reader's Digest, U.S. Culture, and the U.S. Government
Joanne Sharp's study, titled  Condensing the Cold War, elaborates on exactly why  Reader's
Digest became such a useful tool for U.S. governmental “information” efforts.  Sharp explains
that  Reader's  Digest constructed a “imagined geography” in  which the United States was
juxtaposed against the the Soviet Union in an an “us” versus “them” dichotomy that defined
the world for its readers.204  The result is that Reader's Digest had an important role in both
reflecting and forming the U.S.' national identity during the Twentieth Century.205
According to Sharp, Reader's Digest formulated a vision of the U.S. which had a strong effect
on the U.S.' national identity.  The magazine accomplished this through its expression of a
world geopolitical system in which the U.S., “us,” was confronted by an inimical “them,” the
USSR.206  This perspective was constructed through several techniques.   Firstly,  Reader's
Digest used objective language and wrote articles which were planted in other magazines so
they could be used in Reader's Digest in order to reinforce the magazine's objectivity.207  The
magazine also contextualized its articles, and added a moralistic lesson that the reader should
take away from each piece that he or she read.208
Furthermore, and maybe most  importantly, DeWitt  Wallace's  formula  for  Reader's  Digest
articles  emphasized  three  qualities  that  can  be  closely  identified  with  American  cultural
ideals:   common  sense,  individualism,  and  optimism.209  Finally,  the  articles  themselves
created an atmosphere  of personal  communication  and repetition  which made the articles
more “popular” and easier to assimilate.210
204  Sharp, op. cit., p. x-xi.
205  Ibid.  pp. 22-23, 47.
206  This discussion takes place over pp. 24-54.
207  Ibid. pp. 36-38.
208  Ibid.  pp. 38-41.
209  Ibid.  pp. 41-44.
210  Ibid.  pp. 49-54.
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Reader's Digest also had an essential role in transforming the U.S. public into receptors of
interpreted  information  from  “experts”  who  informed  the  readers  concerning  what  was
important and the ways in which the readers should understand the world.211  Correspondingly,
the  readers  metamorphized  into  consumers  of  information.212  As  noted  above,  Reader's
Digest's founder, DeWitt Wallace, purposefully set out to influence the minds of U.S. citizens
with the content of his magazine, but he also succeeded in changing their role as readers.213
Beginning shortly after its inception,  Reader's Digest became one of the U.S.'s most widely
read magazines.214  This means that its cultural influence was large and remained so for a span
of 70 years, i.e. before and during the Cold War.  As a result, Sharp terms Reader's Digest as
probably the most important magazine in relation to, and overall one of the most important
formative influences on, U.S. culture.215
In relation to Ulus, the important aspect of Reader's Digest is that the qualities identified in
Reader's Digest by Sharp were present even before WWII.216  This means that the innovative
qualities of composition and presentation, the tone, and the messages were all present when
Ulus began publishing  Reader's Digest articles during WWII.  In other words, articles that
were designed to have a specific effect upon American readers were translated and included in
a  Turkish newspaper; Turkish readers thusly read articles from a newspaper considered the
official viewpoint of the Turkish state, at the same time ingesting a perspective and mentality
211  Ibid.  pp. 4-6, 45-46.
212  Ibid.  pp. 7.
213  Sharp, op. cit., pp. 11, 21.  Heidenry's op. cit., p. 154 reference concerning Wallace's
patriotism can only be interpreted as showing that Wallace believed he had the power to
influence people.
 
214  Reader's Digest had the U.S.' largest circulation by the mid-1930s (Heidenry, op. cit., pp.
82-83, 150) and eventually reached the immense circulation of sixteen million domestic and
27 million international readers:  Sharp, op. cit., p. xiv.
215  Sharp, p. 47.  Heidenry, op. cit., p. 13, echoes this sentiment and asserts on p. 122 that, by
the outbreak of WWII, Reader's Digest had “become indisputably an American institution.”
216  An  interesting exception that Sharp mentions is that Reader's Digest's categorical anti-
Soviet stance did not truly emerge until directly after WWII, when the bipolar world system
took shape; see pp. 70-72, 81.
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that was fundamentally American, and which can even be traced back to one person, DeWitt
Wallace.217 
As  stated  above in  Section  3.0,  Ulus  Gazetesi,  because  of  its  status  as  the  semi-official
publication of the ruling CHP, had an effect on the political and cultural formation of Turkish
society.  Even though this effect is probably impossible to determine exactly, and should not
be overstated, there is no doubt that the ideas and information published in  Ulus did have
important influences on Turkish society.  Therefore, if some of the information in Ulus had
foreign sources, and some of those sources,  Reader's Digest being the foremost example,218
are known to have not only supported identifiable and analyzable opinions and perspectives,
but  were  also  composed  with  methods  intended  to  influence  their  readers  in  certain
identifiable ways, then the content, tone, and effect of these sources need to be analyzed for
their potential effects on Turkish readers and on Turkish culture and society.  
After WWII,  Reader's Digest became one of the most important domestic and international
mediums through which pro-U.S. information was broadcasted.  This role was so evident that,
by 1947, critics had already begun to call Reader's Digest a “government puppet.”219  Reader's
Digest has  never  had  any “official”  agreements  with the  CIA,  or  other  U.S.  government
“informational” departments,220 but the magazine had many informal contacts, such as the fact
that several top post-war Reader's Digest executives, including two of the most senior editors,
served in the OSS, the precursor to the CIA, during WWII.221  Sharp provides the important
reminder,  however,  that  Reader's  Digest should  not  simply  be  labelled  U.S.  government
217  This is where the quote included at the beginning of Section 4.0 takes on double
importance:  the time frame may not be the same, but the readership of Ulus continued to be
large throughout WWII, the period which this study concentrates on.  By the end of WWII, as
will be illustrated in Section 5.0, Ulus' readers were regularly encountering information from
Reader's Digest, as well as from other U.S. publications.
 
218  Time and Life, as well as other U.S. magazines, should not be ignored, but are outside of
the scope of this study.
219  Canning, op. cit., p. 95.
220  Sharp, op. cit., p. 21.
221  Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 473-474.  See also:  Canning, op. cit., p. 95.
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propaganda,222 because  it  definitely was never  owned,  operated,  or  supported  by the U.S.
government.223  On the other hand, the methods with which the magazine was composed made
it a powerful expression of U.S. culture and especially useful for disseminating the American
perspective abroad; like Ulus, Reader's Digest was a “site of knowledge production.”224
As will be explained below in Section 5.0, articles from U.S. sources, both attributed and
unattributed, appeared in Ulus after the beginning of 1943.  Since U.S. informational efforts
did not receive official Presidential sanction until mid-1942, the coincidence of the dates may
indicate a connection between Turkish officials and U.S. informational efforts from 1942.  All
articles from U.S. sources published in Ulus during WWII, attributed and unattributed, may fit
the definition of what Pisani labels “gray propaganda”:  “. . .  the United States government
connection is not acknowledged but is concealed and attribution is made to some other source
within or outside the United States.  .  .   or  no attribution of the source is  made.”225  U.S.
information bureaus were established in Ankara and Istanbul during WWII,226 so they would
be a likely source for the U.S.-sourced information published in Ulus.  Finally, a delegation of
Turkish journalists toured the U.S. shortly after the OSS was established, and at least one of
those journalists, Ahmet Emin Yalman, met with the head of the OSS during that tour.227       
222  Op. cit., p. 21.
223  Heidenry mentions that, during WWII, Reader's Digest turned down offers of materials
and financial support from the U.S. Office of War Information:  op. cit., p. 157.
224  Ibid.  p. 54, 172.  On p. 173 Heidenry notes that DeWitt Wallace, along with Henry Luce,
sat on the board of the National Committe for a Free Europe, which sponsored the known CIA
fronts Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; see:  Saunders, op. cit., p. 91.
225  Pisani, op. cit., p. 129.
226  Yalman, in Turkey in My Time, p. 196, mentions Leo Hochstetter as the chief news editor
of the Istanbul office.
227  See above, Footnote 181.
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5.0  ULUS GAZETESİ, THE CHP, AND WORLD WAR II
Şef partisinin kendi gazetesi olan Ulus. . . .228
By the end of the 1930s, Turkey's economic problems had not been solved, and the world
political  situation  was  rapidly deteriorating  towards  WWII.   To  make  matters  worse  for
Turkey, Mustafa Kemal died on 10 November 1938 after a protracted struggle with cirrhosis
of the liver.  İsmet İnönü, one of Mustafa Kemal's long-time comrades and Turkish Prime
Minister between 1925 and 1937, but who had fallen out with Mustafa Kemal over policy in
1937,229 replaced Mustafa Kemal at Turkey's helm.  President and Milli Şef (National Leader)
İnönü subsequently guided Turkey through the treacherous war years and then sponsored the
country's transition to true democracy by allowing second parties to emerge in 1945.230  This
process culminated in Turkey's first free and transparent election in 1950.
Debate still continues concerning exactly why President İnönü allowed the Turkish political
system to become truly democratic in the aftermath of WWII.  Some commentators opine that
İnönü had wanted to open Turkey's political system from the time that he acceded to power;
others  argue  that  he  was  forced  to  make  the  transition  to  democracy by the  post-WWII
international political situation, or by the dire domestic political conditions.231  
228  Berkes, Niyazi.  Unutulan Yıllar.  İstanbul:  Iletisim Yayınları, 1997.  p. 269:  “The ruling
party's own newspaper, Ulus. . .”.
229  Mango, op. cit., pp. 508-511, 514-516.  Zürcher, op. cit., 190-191.
230  Koçak, op. cit., pp. 548-560.  Zürcher, op. cit., pp. 220-221.
231  For the various perspectives, see:  Aydemir, op. cit., pp. 423-449.  Koçak, op. cit., pp. 545-
564.  Lewis, op. cit., pp. 304-318.  VanderLippe, John M.  The Politics of Turkish
Democracy:  İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950.  State
University of New York Press:  Albany, N.Y., 2005.  pp. 97-136.  Zürcher, op. cit., pp. 215-
219.  Also concisely summarized in Sabri Sayarı's review of the Vanderlippe text, published
in Turkish Studies.  Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 2007).  p. 170. 
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Whereas this study will not attempt to discuss the exact reasons why President İnönü decided
to allow the maturation of Turkish democracy, the topic that it concerns is relevant to that
vital question in Turkish historiography.  The U.S. was the country to which Turkey turned for
aid against the looming Soviet threat after WWII.  Even if the U.K. had, for historical reasons,
closer understanding of Turkey's political situation vis-a-vis the USSR, after February 1947
the U.K. was no longer viable as a bulwark against Soviet expansion.232  Furthermore, the
U.S.,  at  the conclusion of WWII, was the world's  foremost  example of a democratic  and
republican political system and possessed the world's most powerful military, in addition to
the nuclear bomb.  Therefore, that İsmet İnönü's ideas concerning the U.S. had an effect on the
policies that he followed is highly probable.
Unfortunately, İsmet İnönü's attitude towards the U.S. is an open question.  Whereas Mustafa
Kemal had expressed favorable opinions of the U.S., U.S. culture, and U.S. democracy,233
İsmet  İnönü  made  fewer  statements  on  the  topic.   Normally,  researchers  would  turn  to
memoirs or official documents for enlightenment concerning a statesman's personal opinions,
but  İsmet  İnönü's  memoirs234 say  almost  nothing  about  the  U.S.,  its  government,  or  its
culture.235  The  second  unfortunate  reality  is  that  most  Turkish  government  documents
concerning the U.S. and WWII are still  not available.  In lieu of more traditional sources,
researchers working on question related to this period in Turkish politics are thus forced to
turn  to  sources  like  newspapers  for  information.   This  is  the  reason  why looking  at  the
information in  Ulus is essential for understanding the Turkish government's policies during
WWII:  Ulus'  publishing tendencies can help one understand what  the İnönü government
232  Athanassopoulou, Ekavi.  Turkey:  Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952.
London:  Frank Cass, 1999.  pp. 55-60.  Kuniholm, op. cit., pp. 405-410.
 
233  See above, Section 2.5.
 
234  Two works that can be considered his memoirs have been published, Şevket Süreyya
Aydemir's İkinci Adam (The Second Man) and his own Hatıralar (Memoirs).
 
235  Also, İsmet İnönü's speeches rarely mentioned the U.S. in any capacity other than purely
diplomatic terms as “dost” (“close friend”), and he referred to U.S. democracy in general
terms.  See, for example:  Turan, İlhan, hazırlayan.  İsmet İnönü:  Konuşma, Demeç, Makale,
Mesaj ve Söyleşiler 1944-1950.  Ankara:  TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları,
2003.  Passim. 
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wanted Turkish citizens to understand in relation to the U.S. and, by inference, what the İnönü
government's opinion of the U.S., and the U.S.' political system, was.
  
The first important result obtained from examining  Ulus' publishing practices is that, in the
period between January 1939 and August  1945, there is  no point  at which  Ulus could be
evaluated as an “anti-American” newspaper.236  For that entire time period, Ulus consistently
expressed positive opinions towards the U.S. and towards the U.S. political system.237 
The  second result  is  that,  during WWII,  Ulus underwent  a  transformation  in  the  kind of
information that it published concerning the U.S.  At the begnning of WWII, Ulus published
essentially no information that was directly sourced from U.S. publications.  If there was an
occasional note or article from a U.S. source it came from an article in a European newspaper
which  used  that  U.S.  source.   Any other  U.S.  sources  were  reported  as  summaries  from
Anadolu Ajansı.
Anadolu Ajansı (AA), or  The Anatolian Agency, was the original Turkish government news
agency established by the Kemalist leadership in 1920.  Most foreign news published in Ulus
between 1939 and 1945 came from the  AA.   For example,  New York Times articles were
filtered through the AA into Ulus, not directly translated.  Events in other countries were also
normally reported in Ulus with the AA listed as the source.
The main exceptions to this practice, both before the beginning of WWII and during the first
years of the conflict, were articles taken from European sources, translated, and published in
Ulus as foreign articles.  During the majority of 1939, for instance, a regular feature called
“Ulus Postası” printed translated versions  of articles from a variety of European sources,
usually British, French, and German.238  The articles published usually were comments on the
236  In fact, the Turkish press was so adamantly anti-German that it became a diplomatic issue.
See:  Erkin, Feridun Cemal.  Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl:  Anılar-Yorumlar, 1. Cilt.  Ankara:  Türk
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1980.  p. 121.  Ulus was no different than the rest of the Turkish
press.
 
237  The information presented below will make this point more clear.
238  The order does not reflect frequency of articles which appeared from those countries.
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current European political situation but sometimes concerned other topics.  The situation that
existed until the war's outbreak can be exemplified by 10 January 1939's newspaper:  in that
edition,  Ulus printed  articles  translated  directly  from  Le  Figaro,  Deutsche  Allegemeine
Zeitung, and Neue Zürcher Zeitung.239
After  the  beginning  of  the  war,  in  September  1939,  Ulus  Postası disappeared  from  the
newspaper's pages; subsequently, articles taken directly from foreign sources became more
infrequent.   The shortage of newsprint  caused by the war240 must  have contributed to  the
reduction of foreign-sourced articles since the amount of space in Ulus for those articles was
greatly reduced.
On the other hand, once the German military settled on Turkey's borders, and articles from
European  sources  began  to  appear  again,  those  articles  that  did  appear  had  a  different
character.241  Often they came from Swiss,  in  other words neutral,  sources.   Occasionally
articles from British or German sources were also published, but not as frequently as in the
pre-war or early war years.  
Not until 1943 did articles, both referenced to U.S. sources and not referenced but apparently
from U.S. sources, begin to appear frequently.  The following sections will relate in detail the
kinds of U.S.-sourced information that appeared in  Ulus between January 1939 and August
1945.  Conclusions concerning this U.S. information will be explored in Chapter 7.
This explanation will utilize several terms to describe the articles that were examined:  1) a
note is something extremely short,  usually no more than one paragraph and consisting of
under  ten column lines;  2) an  article is  a longer  text,  often several  paragraphs;  3)   long
articles are any text that was longer than three or four paragraphs, or which extended over
more than one page.
239  Printed on pages four, five, and eight respectively.
240  See:  Koçak, op. cit., pp. 135-136.
241  Over the course of 1942.
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Also,  U.S.-sourced  articles  lacking  a  purely  news-based  reason  for  their  appearance  are
referred to as “informational” features.  These are articles which do not have a direct tie to the
events or news reports of the previous day and include anything from Reader's Digest articles
about the possibility of organ transplant and reuse242 to news about the lives of Hollywood
movie stars.243  “Informational” articles also include articles which referred to a person, place,
or event that was in the news, but did not concern the actual reportage of that person, place, or
event,  or  the  reason  why they were  in  the  news.   For  example,  on  16  February 1945  a
translation from  Reader's  Digest on U.S. efforts  to  eradicate malaria244 appeared on  Ulus'
second page; this translation was directly related to the Turkish government's own efforts to
battle  malaria,  which  were  given  wide  coverage  throughout  the  months  in  1945  that  I
examined.  The Reader's Digest article, however, had no specific link to an event or person
that was in the news on 15 or 16 February 1945.  
5.1.  Information published in Ulus Gazetesi concerning the U.S. during WWII
5.1.1:  1939
During 1939, Ulus' presentation of the U.S. was dominated by three tendencies, none of which
was taken directly from U.S. publications.  The most important U.S.-oriented article type was
intermittent  notes,  almost  never  very large,  usually about  the  U.S.'  industrial  capacity  or
military strength, but also about the U.S.' foreign policy.  These notes were almost always
credited to the AA.  For example, on 5, 19 January, 15, 18 February, 20, 29, 30 March, 19, 24
April,  1,  6,  20  May,  and  4,  13,  23  June  1939245 Ulus published  notes  and/or  articles
concerning  U.S.  military  strength,  spending,  and/or  construction  activities.   All  of  these
242  See: 14 January 1945, p. 4.
243  Such Hollywood news appeared throughout 1939 until the outbreak of war.
244  The author was listed as Paul De Kruif, but no translator was credited.  The article
published in Ulus on 16 February 1945 is a translation of the De Kruif article titled “Atrabrine
Fully Vindicated -- Malaria Scourge Of Mankind Can Be Licked” published in the December
1944 edition of Reader's Digest (pp. 22-27).
245  Notes about U.S. military strength and industrial capacity continued throughout the war
years.
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articles  cast  U.S.  actions  in  a  positive  light  and  in  preparation  for  a  possible  conflict.
Concurrently, Ulus followed the U.S.' domestic debate about neutrality policies and weapons
exports closely.
The next major source of information about the U.S. was Neşet Halil Atay.246  As a part of the
Turkish delegation to the 1939 World's Fair in New York, Atay wrote a series of letter-format
columns, which were intended to inform Turkish readers about the Turkish exhibit's reception
at the World's Fair, about his experiences in New York, and about what he saw and learned
while driving across America after  the World's Fair's conclusion,  for  Ulus.247  These letters
were supplemented several times by columns from Vedat Nedim Tör, the head of the Turkish
World's Fair delegation.248 
Lastly,  the  regular  pages  devoted  to  Hollywood  or  cinematic  news  were  a  source  of
information about  the U.S.,  even if  not serious.   These pages usually featured pictures of
various movie stars, from both Europe and the U.S., along with socialite news (no more than
gossip) that was never credited to a source.249  After appearing at least twice a month from the
beginning of the year, these features disappeared by the end of WWII's first month.
246  According to Niyazi Berkes, Neşet Atay did not know English:  op. cit. p. 136.
247  These column/letters were published on 8 February, 1, 2, 4, 23 May, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 18,
19, 20, 21 June, 3, 6, 7, 14, 15, 19, 21, 27, 28, 31 July, and 1, 2, 5 August, and expressed
almost unanimously a glowing impression of the U.S., U.S. society, and U.S. culture.  Later in
1939, Neşet Atay's letter-column series continued in a more prominent second-page position;
this second group of letter-columns appeared on 29, 30 November 1939 and then on 31
January, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28
February, 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28 March, 1, 2, 6, 12, 13,
15, 21, 26, 28, 30 April, 2, 3, 10, 13, 15, 17, 20, 27 May, and 2, 3, 8, 9 June 1940 under the
title of “Amerika'dan Mektüpları” (“Letters from America”).  These columns were  published
in 1941 as a 239-page book titled Buhran Yıllarında ve Harp Karşısında America (America in
the Depression Years and Facing the War) with strong advertising support from Ulus itself
(see, for example, the 2 July 1941 issue, which both announces the book's publication and
recommends that Ulus' readers buy the book). Neşet Atay's book subsequently went to a
second printing (see the 31 March 1943 Ulus edition). 
     
248  See, for example, 1 July 1939, p. 6 and 2 July 1939, p. 2.
249  An example is the large Shirley Temple article published 2 March 1939 on Ulus' page
seven.
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There were several exceptions to these general  tendencies that  deserve mention, but these
exceptions were also not sourced in U.S.  publications.  The first  was İsmet  İnönü's  radio
address to the U.S. on 26 February 1939.  Ulus presented this  event  with  several  days of
anticipatory articles, wide coverage the day of and the day after the radio address, and several
days of columns about the event afterwards.250  This event should be compared to  Milli Şef
İnönü’s interview with a British newspaper and direct messages for the British public in July
1939,  which  received  relatively much less  coverage from  Ulus.   The  impression that  the
reader receives is that  Ulus thought President İnönü's address to the U.S. was much more
important that his address to the U.K.251 
Another exception was the columns on issues involving the U.S. written by regular Ulus staff
writers  like  Ahmet  Şükrü  Esmer  or  Falih  Rıfkı  Atay,252 both  of  whom were  also  TBMM
members.  Esmer, as the foreign affairs columnist,  wrote columns that generally appeared
with other foreign news.  Esmer wrote a number of columns dealing with the U.S. which were
250  The day  following the event, on 27 February 1939, Ulus featured a front-page picture of
İsmet İnönü standing while the Star-Spangled Banner, the U.S. national anthem, was played.
President İnönü gave the radio address from Ankara.  The same day Nasuhi Baydar wrote a
long column explaining U.S. history to Ulus' readers.  On 28 February 1939, Falih Rıfkı Atay
and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer continued the theme with columns, both of which concerned
President İnönü's speech, the U.S., and Turkish-U.S. relations.  More columns, with the same
themes but by different writers, appeared on 1 and 3 March 1939.
 
251  The Turkish-U.S. Trade Agreement was signed on 1 April 1939, so one could argue that
İsmet İnönü had those negotiations in mind while giving his radio address to the U.S.
President İnönü's address to the U.K., on the other hand, occurred after the joint Turkish-
English Declaration was signed in May 1939, but while negotiations on a more concrete
Turkish-English-French tripartite pact were still continuing.  Aydemir, op. cit. pp.  114-116,
also notes the activities of German Ambassador to Turkey Franz von Papen, who was
energetically encouraging Turkish neutrality during the same time frame.  Consequently,
arguing that on-going negotiations had an influence on Ulus' coverage of President İnönü's
respective addresses to the U.S. and the U.K. is either untenable because of the complex
situation, or must be supported by other sources.  The issue of İsmet İnönü's U.S. radio
address and its possible relation to his famous “Demokrasi Müjdesi” (“Tidings of
Democracy,” to use Cemil Koçak's term) speech at Istanbul University ten days later will be
discussed below in Section 6.0. 
 
252  Neşet Halil Atay's brother:  Berkes, op. cit., p. 136.
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almost uniformly positive.253  During 1939, before the war's initial hostilities, Esmer wrote
concerning the U.S. more frequently than Atay.
Falih Atay was Ulus' head editor during the war years,254 so his columns appeared on the front
page; his contributions, like Esmer's, should be understood as an “official” opinion since he
was a member of the TBMM.255  He wrote extensively concerning the U.S. throughout the war
years.256   Other columnists also occasionally wrote U.S.-themed pieces.257 
On two occasions in 1939, “Ulus Postası” published articles from U.S. papers.  The first, on
29 June, was a New York Times article about the Turkish exhibit at the World's Fair.258  The
second exception occurred on 5 August  1939 when an Associated Press reporter based in
Istanbul, named Elmer Peterson, wrote an article about Turkey for U.S. readers.  A further
example was the articles, published on 2, 7, 14 April, 9, 10, 17 May, and 5 June 1939, which
explained to  Ulus' readers the signing process, products included, goals, benefits, and even
results259 of the recently signed trade agreement with the U.S.260  Naturally, these articles all
presented a positive assessment of the U.S.
253  See, as examples, the 23, 29, 31 July 1939 Ulus issues.
254  Bakacak, op. cit., p. 5.
255  Bakacak, op. cit., pp. 6, 17.  Falih Atay was a member of Mustafa Kemal's inner circle and
had close relations with important figures in the CHP government.  See, for example:  Erkin,
op. cit., p. 91.
  
256  For an example from 1939, see Ulus' 5 November 1939 edition.
257  Such as Burhan Belge (17 April 1939), Cemal Kutay ( 5 July 1939), Hazım Atıf Kuyucak
(6, 31 July and 5 November 1939), Necip Ali Küçüka (17 April 1939), and Selim Sırrı Tarcan
(24 September 1939).
258  The same Ulus issue also featured an article about the New York Times article!
259  On 17 May 1939, a page two Ulus article stated that the new Turkey-U.S. Trade agreement
had increased U.S. imports to Turkey by 300,000 lira in just one week and increased Turkish
exports to the U.S.
260  For the text of this agreement see:  Armaoğlu, op. cit., pp. 117-124.
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A final, somewhat strange, occurrence was the printing of Turkish stamps that commemorated
the U.S.' 150 years of independence.  These stamps were brought to the attention of  Ulus'
readers  on  at  least  five  different  occasions261 and  the  stamps'  likenesses  were  published
once.262  One stamp featured side-by-side portraits of George Washington and Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk, another featured the same presentation of FDR and İsmet İnönü, and a third featured
the Turkish and U.S. flags side-by-side.263  Apparently, these stamps were meant to show a
historical parallel between the leaders and the two countries, and it should especially be noted
that the first announcement concerning these stamps was made on the same day that President
İnönü gave his live radio address to the U.S.
In sum, Ulus' 1939 coverage of the U.S. was dominated by bits of information from the AA
about  the  U.S.'  industrial  and  military  capacity,  as  well  as  about  U.S.  foreign  policy.
Information about U.S. culture came almost exclusively from the letters and columns written
by Turkish representatives to the 1939 New York World's Fair.  Taken together, these articles
can be understood as the stance of Ulus towards the U.S.264
5.1.2:  1940
In  1940,  the  information  published  about  the  U.S.  continued  in  a  similar  vein:   most
information  concerning  the  U.S.  still  came  from  the  usually  brief  notes  and/or  articles
concerning U.S. military activities, its industrial and economic strength, and foreign policy.265
261  26 February, 4, 9,16 July, and 1 August 1939.
262  16 July 1939, page two.
263  Also mentioned in Denovo, op. cit., pp. 229-230.  DeNovo notes that the calculation on
150 years of U.S. independence was actually incorrect.  Possibly the date referred to the U.S.'
first presidential election, or was simply a late commemoration of 1776 or 1783.  
264  During 1939, advertisements for U.S.-made products like Caterpillar, John Deere, Kodak,
or RCA generally did not indicate that the products were from America.  By 1943, however,
most advertisements for U.S.-made products would trumpet that status.
265  Some examples:  16 February (U.S. military spending), 28 February (U.S. aeronautical
exports), 25 March (on the high quality of U.S. bombers), 12 April (U.S. aid to the Allies),
and 18 May (U.S.' energetic military preparations).  Dozens of similar articles appeared
throughout 1940 and were, almost without exception, sourced from AA.
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The activities of U.S. officials, such as FDR, Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles and Republican
Presidential  candidate  Wendell  Willkie,  were closely followed.266  Another  way that  Ulus
called attention to the U.S. was by noting when groups of Turkish students went to the U.S.,
and  by  mentioning  what  those  students  intended  to  study.267  Few,  if  any,  such  notes
concerning students heading to Germany to study were published.
The most important aspect of this information concerning the U.S. is that both the quality and
the  quantity  of  this  information  completely  overshadowed  the  information  presented
concerning Germany or Adolph Hitler.   Hitler's picture rarely appeared, as opposed to the
common  inclusion  of  FDR's  picture;  Cordell  Hull's  picture  was  also  more  common  than
Joachim von Ribbentrop's.268  The information concerning America usually conveyed a sense
of strength and ability, whereas the information about Germany was, at best, neutral.  Another
way Ulus expressed this favoritism for the U.S. was by frequently using U.S. terms, translated
by loan to Turkish, for certain armaments.   The U.S.'  B-17 bombers, known popularly as
“Flying Fortresses,” were referred to in  Ulus as “Uçan Kaleler,” a calque from the English
term.269  In stark contrast,  neither  the  original  words  nor  calques  of  well-known German
military or armament terms, like blitzkrieg or panzer, were often used.   
The exceptions to Ulus' general U.S.-related information publishing patterns were also similar
to those present in 1939, and a prominent example was once again a series of columns by
266  FDR's speeches and press conferences always warranted Ulus' notice:  examples can be
found in Ulus' 5 January, 18 March, 14, 16, 22 April, 9 May, 13 June, 13 September, and 30
October 1940  (among many others) issues.  Cordell Hull's occasional comments were also
reported; for examples, see the 1 March, 31 May, 7 July, 26 August, 29 September, and 27
November 1940 (amongst others) editions of Ulus.  Ulus reported Sumner Welles' early 1940
tour through Europe on a nearly daily basis between 18 February and 30 March 1940.  After
Willkie was declared FDR's opponent in the 1940 elections, his activities also began to
receive attention from Ulus; see:  29 June, 18 August, 2, 4, 10, 11, 14, 30 October, 9, 13
November.  Ulus continued to report on Willkie's statements and activities in 1941 and 1942.
267  See, for example:  17 December 1940.
268  Von Ribbentrop's picture actually appeared more often than Hitler's, which can probably
be counted as a negative for the Nazis since von Ribbentrop looked somewhat unbalanced in
the picture that was normally published.
269  See: 14, 16 November 1940.  Later in the war, Ulus used terms like bazooka and V-1
directly because they could not be expressed as a calque.
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Neşet Halil Atay.  In addition to the previously mentioned columns,270 Neşet Atay, later in
1940, wrote more columns relating his experiences in the U.S.  These columns were published
under  the  heading  “Hulasa  ve  Birkaç Not”  (“Summary and  a  Few  Notes”)  and  were
numbered.271  The impression that the reader receives from Neşet Atay's columns on the U.S.
is that absolutely as much information as possible was squeezed from his experiences in order
to provide material for Ulus.272  These columns also marked one of the few occasions where
the U.S. was openly criticized by information in Ulus:  the second and third installments of
this series273 condemned U.S. racial segregation and policies supporting that segregation.
Columns concerning U.S.-related topics from regular contributors to Ulus, especially Ahmet
Şükrü Esmer and Falih Rıfkı Atay, continued to appear.  Esmer, for example, wrote on topics
as diverse as FDR's 4 January 1940 Congressional speech,274 on the U.S. election,275 on U.S.
policy in the Far East,276 and on U.S.-USSR relations.277  Atay wrote on topics such as the U.S.
attitude towards the war in Europe,278 the situation in post-election America,279 and the Anglo-
270  See above 5.1.1.
 
271  These columns were published from 15 September to 25 September 1940, and reached
eight installments.
272  Naturally, the possibility that his brother was doing him a favor also exists, but seems
unlikely, or at least not the primary motivating factor, to this author.  On the other hand, an
article published by Ulus on 20 September 1939 summarized an article by French academician
Andre Maurois, who had travelled around the U.S. between February and May 1939; the
Maurois article may well have been the source of the idea to send Neşet Atay on a road trip
around the U.S., all the while keeping a diary which could then be used as material for Ulus.
Another possible source for the idea was the long Ottoman Seyahatname tradition.
273  16, 17 September 1940.
274  See:  6 January 1940.
275  More than one of Esmer's columns commented on the November 1940 U.S. election.  See,
for example, 11 April, 5 November (the U.S. Election Day in 1940), and 7 November 1940.
 
276  See:  2 July 1940.
277  See:  4 December 1940.
278  See:  9 June 1940.
279  See:  7 November 1940.
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Saxon character of U.K.-U.S.  cooperation.280  Some other  columnists  that  wrote  on U.S.-
related topics included Mümtaz Faik Fenik,281 Hazım Atıf Kuyucak,282 Hüseyin Sami,283 and
Selim Sırrı Tarcan.284
One  columnist  published  in  Ulus during  1940,  unconnected  to  Ulus but  who  had  made
acquaintances  with  Turkish  journalists,  merits  mention.   Nilla  Gram  Cook  met  Turkish
journalists attending the New York World's Fair in 1939, and later wrote several columns that
were translated and included in  Ulus.285  Cook was an American adventurist who spent her
childhood in Greece,  was a former resident  in Mohatma Gandhi's  ashram,  and  apparently
converted to Islam some time in the late 1930s.286  Possibly the most interesting aspect of
Cook's articles is that she was not trained as a journalist, but her chosen religion and interest
in Turkey got her articles published not only in Vatan, but also in Ulus.287  
280  See:  18 December 1940.
281  See:  24, 28 September, 14 October, and 19 December 1940.
282  See:  11 September and 4 December 1940.
283  See:  7 September, 7 October, and 22 December 1940.
284  See:  8 September 1940.
285  The first Cook column published in Ulus appeared in December 1939; later, Ulus would
publish more of her columns, but infrequently.  See:  26 December 1939  and 21, 23, 24
January 1940. 
286  Ahmet Emin Yalman indicated that Cook was a Muslim when he met her at the American
Islamic Association (in New York) in 1939; see:  Gördüklerim. . .  pp. 1110-1112.  At the
beginning of WWII, Cook found work as a correspondent for Liberty magazine, spent time in
Greece and Turkey, and wrote several columns for Vatan:  ibid. pp. 1117, 1120-1121.
Yalman blames the small number of her columns published on official censorship.
    
287  Whether her nationality also had something to do with the preference shown for her
columns can only be speculated on (Yalman does not suggest it), but it is difficult to imagine
that an individual like Cook, but from a country like Brazil, China, or even France, would
have been granted the same opportunities by Yalman and other Turkish journalists.
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5.1.3:  1941
In 1941, Ulus' previous publishing patterns endured unchanged for the year's first few months.
For  the entirety of 1941,  numerous small  notes  and/or  articles  from the  AA continued to
express  a  positive  impression  of  the  U.S.,  its  industrial  strength,  increasing  military
preparedness,  and  foreign  policy.288  After  the  Nazi  occupation  of  Greece,  though,  the
coverage of the war did become more subdued.  Correspondingly, the number of articles that
could be interpreted as strongly pro-U.S. decreased.  That more subdued atmosphere did not
result  in  a  concurrent  increase  in  pro-German  articles,  which  still  remained  few and  far
between, but Hitler's speeches did begin to see greater attention.  Articles such as the one that
appeared on 13 October 1941, which was a report on a  Chicago Tribune article criticizing
FDR, were extremely rare.
Throughout 1941 Ulus' staff writers reflected a positive assessment of the U.S.  Ahmet Şükrü
Esmer289 and Falih Rıfkı Atay290 continued to write regularly, and positively, on U.S.-related
topics.  Also continuing the pattern set in previous years were a number of other contributors,
such as Nüzhet Baba,291 Abidin Daver,292 Necdet Erzen,293 Mümtaz Faik Fenik,294 Necip Ali
288  For examples, see:  17 January (multiple articles about U.S. military-industrial
production), 7 February (U.S. military aid and activities, U.S. foreign policy), 12 March (U.S.
military aid, spending, and production) 10 April (U.S. naval strength and anti-Nazi comments
from U.S. Vice President Henry Wallace), 24 May (U.S. military production and foreign
policy), 11 July (U.S. military production and foreign policy, plus a picture of U.S. Navy
Secretary Frank Knox), 16 September (U.S. weapons production and foreign policy), 16
October (picture of FDR with articles concerning the U.S. and the war). 
289  For examples (amongst many others), see:  8 January, 18 February, 18 April, 16 May, 11
July, 23 September, 11 October, and 9 December 1941.
290  For examples (amongst many others), see:  8 January, 10 March, 29 May, 16 June, 7
August, 15 September, 16 November, and 13 December 1941.
291  See:  24 January and 30 August 1941.
292  See:  18 November and 7 December 1941.
293  See:  13 March and 20 June 1941.
294  See, amongst many others:  10 January, 15 March, 29 September, 1 December, and 11
December 1941.
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Küçüka,295 Hüseyin Sami,296 and Kemal Turan,297 who wrote infrequent columns concerning
the U.S.  Nilla Cook also wrote a brief series of columns, three in total, about Turkey that
were published in Ulus between 1 and 7 October 1941.298
Another writer without any connection to Ulus, but who had knowledge of the U.S., began to
be published in Ulus' pages, similar to the appearance of Nilla Cook's columns in Ulus during
December  1939  and  January  1940.   This  writer  was  a  Turkish  woman  named  Nezahat
Nurettin Ege.  Nezahat (or Nezahet) Nurettin Ege had traveled widely in the U.S., and was
apparently an idealist  concerned with social  service.   As  a result  she knew the U.S. well
enough to  write  a series  of columns for  Ulus,299 many of  which were eventually used to
compile and publish a book entitled Demokrasi Cihanında Kadın (Women in the Democratic
World).300  The title page of this book indicates that Ege used materials that she obtained in
English,301 so she apparently added her own knowledge and comments, and turned them into
columns written in Turkish.302 
295  See:  18 and 23 May 1941.
296  See:  14 January and 30 May 1941.
297  See:  15 February and 19 March 1941.
298  The columns appeared on 1, 4, 7 October 1941.
299  The columns were published on 28, 29 March, 5, 8 April, 10, 19 June, 23 July, 26 August,
7, 16, 18 September, 1, 16, 24 November, and 26 December 1941.
 
300  Ege, Nezahat Nurettin.  Demokrasi Cihanında Kadın.  İstanbul:  Dünya Kağıtcılık ve
Kitapcılık Evi, 1946. 
 
301  On the title page “İngilizceden iktibas eden:  Nezahat Nurettin Ege” (“excerpted from the
English by Nezahat Nurettin Ege”) is written, but the columns are obviously not directly
translated from English.  The book is composed entirely of short chapters -- generally four-to-
five pages in length -- each concerning an American woman or an issue that American women
face(d).  The columns published in Ulus were sometimes exactly the same as what was
published in the book, but others had more diverse themes.  For example, Ege's column
published on 26 August 1941, on “Tung Trees,” is a direct translation of an article on the
same topic by Roy L. Pepperburg in the April 1939 issue of Reader's Digest (see:  “Tung
Trees – the South's New Cash Crop” on pp. 101-103 of that issue).  The “Tung Trees” column
was not included in Ege's book.
302  This author has not been able to ascertain exactly how Ege ended up writing columns for
Ulus.
64
Another event which has gained historical interest  was the conference on theater given by
English playwright/journalist Derek Patmore on 13 March 1941.  Patmore was the The News
Chronicle's Istanbul reporter during WWII and, even though Patmore was not an American,
Patmore was apprently in contact with U.S. officials in an intelligence capacity.  Ulus gave
extensive  page  one  coverage  to  Patmore's  conference,  which  was  unusual  in  that  the
conference  was  not  an  event  of  any  special  occasion.303  Recently,  Rıfat  Bali  found  a
document  indicating  that  Patmore  was  in  contact  with  U.S.  officials  concerning  wartime
intelligence and that he actually forwarded suggestions for propaganda activities in Turkey to
U.S. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt in 1942.304  Because of that document, the attention
given to Patmore's conference becomes highly suspect, and one wonders exactly what sort of
connections  Patmore  may  have  had  with  Ulus'  staff  and/or  the  American  and  Turkish
governments.  However, until more official documents come to light, this subject will remain
in the realm of speculation. 
At least one notable occasion was not included in Ulus' pages.  President İnönü was featured
on the cover of the 19 May 1941 issue of  Time magazine, but the article was not only not
published in  Ulus,  it was not  even mentioned.  Possibly this  was a result  of  the German
military forces newly lodged on Turkey's doorstep in Greece, but more likely it was a result of
the article's generally condescending tone and several untoward comments on Mustafa Kemal
(“died of  over  indulgence”),  President  İnönü (“deafness  has  often been,  and is  today, his
greatest asset as a statesman;” “a Moslem Asiatic”), Turks (“Turks bred hatred and fear far
and wide”) and Turkey (“scarcely a single good road”).   To top off the article,  the cover
303  See the 13, 14 March 1941 issues of Ulus.
304  See: Bali, Rıfat N.  “II. Dünya Savaş Yıllarında Türkiye'de Amerikan Propagandası.”
Toplumsal Tarih.  Şubat 2007, Sayı 158.  pp. 74-75.  Also see below, Section 5.1.7.
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portrait had a religious theme (minarets behind President İnönü's bust).305  Thus, the absence
of the Time article from Ulus' pages is not difficult to comprehend.
Even after 3 December 1941, when FDR declared that Turkey was vital to U.S. security and
opened the Lend-Lease Program to Turkish participation,306 Ulus did not change its publishing
practices with regard to the U.S.  On the other hand, small changes did occur in Ulus' pages
after the U.S. entered WWII; apparently it then became more difficult for Ulus to publish pro-
Allies material since the U.S. was now included. This did not mean that pro-U.S. material
became less prominent than pro-German material, though.
Pictures especially portrayed an obvious pro-Allied bias, with FDR pictures (and other U.S.
officials) still greatly outnumbering those of German officials.  Hitler's picture became again
slightly more common, but still nowhere near as prevalent as picures of FDR, who was even
pictured with his mother.307  This was carried to the point that, when a crisis erupted between
Hitler and Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch in late December 1941, Ulus published von
Brauchitsch's picture twice, but not Hitler's, in relation to the event.
The edition which can most clearly define Ulus' 1941 attitude vis-a-vis the U.S. and Germany
was published shortly after 7 December 1941.  Following the Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S.
quickly joined the Allied cause, which resulted in Germany and Italy declaring war on the
U.S. on 11 December 1941.  On 12 December 1941, Ulus juxtaposed two page one pictures in
a remarkable manner.  One picture is of Hitler, apparently declaring war on the U.S.  Directly
next to Hitler's picture is a picture of several U.S. aircraft carriers.  A picture of U.S. military
vessels was not such an unusual event, even in 1941 and 1942; what was unusual was that the
305  Another possibility is that Ulus' staff did not know about this article, but that would be
difficult to imagine, especially when Ulus' staff had contacts with foreign journalists.  On the
other hand, it would be easy to understand if they were ordered to not include anything about
the Time article in Ulus.  Furthermore, İsmet İnönü knew English well enough to read
magazine articles comfortably (see: Yalman, Turkey in My Time, p. 241) so the possibility that
he read Time's article, formed his own opinion of it, and told Ulus' writers to not mention it,
exists.  Finally, this article on President İnönü was not attributed to any author and can be
accessed through Time's on-line archives.
306  Thomas and Frye, op. cit., p. 143.  Howard, op. cit., p. 68.
307  See:  1 February 1942.
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picture was shot from below, which inspires the feeling that the ships are bearing down on the
observer.  However, because the picture was placed next to the picture of Hitler, the reader
receives the impression that the ships are looming over Hitler, about to run him down.  
The  positioning of  these  pictures  is  unlikely to  have  been accidental,  since  Ulus quietly
maintained a pro-U.S. tone throughout the darkest days of WWII.  Politics even played itself
out in Ulus' “Cinema” page, which reappeared only days before the U.S. entered WWII.  This
section carefully balanced the numbers of pictures of American and German film stars until
the end of January 1942, when that section began to be dominated by Hollywood idols.308  
5.1.4:  1942
In 1942, the first wartime signs of a change in  Ulus'  publishing habits regarding the U.S.
began to emerge.  Despite the dire military situation in the early and middle months of 1942,
with Germany already ensconced in Greece and the Aegean islands, Nazi  allies in Bulgaria,
instability  in  Iraq  and  Syria,309 and  the  German  panzers  speeding  towards  the  Caucasus
mountains in the north and Cairo in the south, Ulus did not become a voice for pro-German
propaganda.   Instead,  articles  from  European  newspapers  and  magazines,  having  been
discontinued shortly after the war's start, began to appear regularly again.  The articles usually
were from Swiss (i.e. neutral) sources and were sometimes about the U.S.310  In parallel, the
same sort of small notes and/or articles about U.S. foreign policy and industrial and military
production that had always been a part of Ulus' coverage of the U.S. were now joined by more
frequent notes on worldwide U.S. military activity.311
More pictures of Adolph Hitler appeared in Ulus during 1942's first five months than in the
previous three years combined.  However, this is not such a radical statement because  Ulus
308  See:  3, 9, 16, 23 December 1941, 6, 13, 20, 28 January, and 4 February 1941.
309  Both had been under the control of pro-Axis forces as recently as May-June 1941.
310  For examples, see:  18 February and 6 September 1942 (French), and 22 November 1942
(Swiss).
311  For typical examples, see:  27 January, 8 February, 13 April, 23 May, 9 June (the Battle of
Midway), and 27 August 1942.
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had printed so few pictures of Hitler during those three years.  Another interesting, Hitler-
related front page was presented to Ulus' readers on 21 April 1942.  That day, the front page
featured a picture of a U.S. B-17 Flying Fortress higher on the page than a picture of Hitler.
Thus, Ulus commemorated Hitler's birthday by essentially showing him under attack by U.S.
bombers.  Front page pictures of this sort served to emphasize the implied message first laid
out in the pictures included on Ulus' 12 December 1941 front page.312   
On 2 Nisan 1942,  Ulus went  so far  as to  print  news about  an uprising amongst  German
soldiers in Bohemia on page one; that same day there was wide coverage in the entire edition
of  the  trial  of  Franz  von Papen's  would-be  assassins.   Since  news  about  an  insurrection
amongst  German soldiers  is  one of  the last  things that  von Papen would have wanted in
Turkish dailies, one wonders how Ulus was able to commit such an affront.
However,  when one examines  Ulus'  contents,  the conclusion that  von Papen did not have
nearly as much influence over the Turkish press, even in Germany's most powerful WWII
years, that one might suppose becomes inescapable.  Feridun Cemal Erkin, who was a high-
ranking official in the Turkish foreign ministry throughout the 1930s and 1940s, wrote that
von Papen "Türkiye'nin samimi bir dostu olmuş."313  In spite of other possible interpretations
for that statement, the combination of Erkin's warm relations with von Papen and the friendly
feelings that von Papen supposedly had for Turkey apparently worked in tandem to keep the
pressure on  Ulus to publish pro-German information  from being excessive.  Good relations
between the Turkish Foreign Ministry and von Papen  would also help to explain why Ulus
was able to remain pro-U.S. throughout the war.
312  See above, Section 5.1.3.
313  “Turkey's close friend.”  Erkin, Feridun Cemal.  Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar
Meselesi.  Ankara:  Başnur Matbaası, 1968.  p. 176.
68
Columnists associated with  Ulus continued to pen commentary, nearly always laudatory, on
the U.S.  Falih Rıfkı Atay314 and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer315 continued with the same tenor as in
the previous years.  Ulus' cadre of occasional writers, like Nüzhet Baba (19 July 1942), Abidin
Daver (25 April, 15 May, 10 June, 12 August 1942), Sadreddin Enver (2 May, 17 July 1942),
Mümtaz Faik Fenik (26 November 1942), and Hazım Atıf Kuyucak (27 April, 13 May 1942)
also  wrote  pro-American  pieces.   Nezahat  Nurettin  Ege's  columns  on  various  aspects  of
American life and society also continued.316
1942's Ulus editions featured several several attention-grabbing, U.S.-related incidents.  On 30
June 1942, i.e. during the high point of Nazi success during WWII,317 Ulus printed the first of
several  advertisements  for  Turkish-language  radio  broadcasts  of  U.S.  news.318  These
advertisements listed the times and wavelengths for the Turkish-language programs and were
printed by Ulus in its advertisements section.  The first advertisement was a half-page spread
and  all  of  the  advertisements  had  the  same  “Lütfen  bu  listeyi  kesip  saklayınız”319
admonishment at the bottom.  At that point in the war, publishing such blatantly pro-U.S.
information must have seemed like an act of defiance. 
Another important event was the trip to the U.S. taken by a delegation of Turkish journalists
in  late  1942  (mentioned  above  in  Section  3.0).   After  stopping  briefly  in  London,  the
journalists continued on to the U.S. where they went on a cross-country tour of important U.S.
314  See (amongst many others): 8 January, 10 April, 13 May (on the Battle of the Coral Sea),
20 June, and 25 August 1942.  Atay wrote his 13 September column as a reflection on a
picture in the most recent copy of Life that he had received.
315  See (amongst numerous others):  8 January, 12 February, 10 April, 11 June, 12 August,
and 7 September (Wendell Willkie in Turkey) 1942.
316  See:  11, 18 January, 25 March, 18 May, and 6, 31 July 1942.
317  German forces were pressing El Alamein in Egypt and had reached the Caucasus
Mountains' foothills.
318  These advertisements were printed on 30 June and 15 July 1942.  There were also later
advertisements for broadcasts in French and English.  Consequently, three of Germany's main
enemies had their viewpoints broadcast in Turkey, and not only in the language of the
enemies, but also in Turkish.
319  "Please clip and save this list."
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economic, industrial, and cultural locations.320  The detailed columns written by Ahmet Esmer
presented a powerful image of a nation fully engaged in all-out  war.  Esmer devoted one
piece, on 8 October 1942, to FDR's reminiscences of his letter correspondences with Mustafa
Kemal.  Furthermore, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Laurence Steinhardt accompanied Esmer
on the return trip to Turkey.321 
Similarly,  Wendell  Willkie's  visit  to  Turkey while  on  his  round-the-world  tour  as  FDR's
representative received intense, and positive, coverage in Ulus between 7 and 12 September
1942.  One other occasion of note was U.S. Air Attache Robert Creswell Brown's reception of
a parachuting certificate  from the  İnönü Air  Camp,  illustrated with a picture  in  Ulus'  27
October 1942 edition.
5.1.5:  1943
The tour of the U.S. taken by the Turkish journalists may, as far as Ulus is concerned, have
been the turning point in the war as much as the Battle of Midway, the Second Battle of El
Alamein, or Stalingrad was in the military realm.  The first article from Reader's Digest  322
was published on 13 January 1943, directly after the Turkish journalistic delegation returned
from the U.S.323  The particular article in question324 was not immediately followed up by
more Reader's Digest pieces, but it foreshadowed later Ulus publishing trends.  Other articles
320  The journalists visited Washington D.C., New York, Chicago, Detroit, Seattle, Portland,
Los Angeles, San Antonio, and New Orleans (amongst other places), toured military-
industrial installations in Detroit, Seattle, Portland, and San Antonio, met with high-ranking
officials including FDR, and got a tour of Hollywood.
   
321  See Ulus' 17, 18, and 19 January 1943 editions.
322  As explained above in Section 4.0, Reader's Digest was important because of its role in
U.S. government “information” activities.
323  Yalman and Yalçın returned to Turkey in the first week of December 1942, but  Daver,
Esmer, and Sertel stayed for a slightly longer period of time; see:  Yalman, Gördüklerim. . . ,
p. 1208.
324  Originally taken from the American Medical Association's health and medicine journal
Hygeia, the article concerned blood donation and blood banks.  The author was listed as
Myron Stearns and the translator as Celal Ertuğ. 
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translated directly from  Reader's  Digest and various U.S. publications, this time greater in
number but yet again limited in duration, appeared later in 1943.325
Continuing  alongside  this  new  U.S.-sourced  information  were  the  continual  small  notes
and/or articles on U.S. government, economic, and military issues.326  As always, Falih Rıfkı
Atay327 and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer328 produced a steady output of pro-U.S. information while
other columnists such as Nüzhet Baba (27 January 1943),329 Abidin Daver (9, 17 April and 2
May 1943),  Hasan  Halef  Işıkpınar  (3  May and  22  June  1943),  and  Esat  Tekeli330 wrote
325  These articles appeared on 13, 17, 18, 23, 27 October and 4, 6, 13, 15 November 1943.
None of these articles were credited to Reader's Digest, but Ulus staff members obtained at
least five of the nine articles from Reader's Digest.  The 4-6 November two-part article
attributed to Dorothy Thompson is the same article as that titled “Germany Must be
Salvaged,” published by the same author in Reader's Digest's July 1943 edition (pp. 51-56);
the 13 November article was actually a book excerpt, and is exactly the same (even similar
portions of Ulus' article were italicized) as the article published in the September 1943
Reader's Digest edition (pp. 71-73) as “Getting Rid of the Nazis Is Not Enough.”  The author,
Henry J. Taylor, was credited by Ulus.  The 23 October article was credited to Carl Crow and
is a direct translation of the article, called “The Philippines Under the Japanese Boot Heel,”
published by Reader's Digest and credited to Crow in its September 1943 edition (pp. 25-28).
The article attributed to Clark Lee on 15 November is a direct translation of the article
credited to the same author, titled “Japan Has Already Won Her War!,” published by Reader's
Digest in its July 1943 edition (pp. 29-32). 
326  For typical examples from 1943, see:  18 January, 14 March, 13 May, 28 July, 20
September, and 29 November 1943.
  
327  Falih Atay did not write on U.S. themes during the first half of 1943, but in May 1943 he
began to touch on the topic.  See, amongst others:  20 May, 4 June, 2 August, 31 October, and
4 December 1943.  His 31 October column, titled “İyi Dostlarımız Vardır” (“We Do Have
Steadfast Friends”), is especially notable because it discusses former U.S. Ambassador to
Turkey Joseph Grew and the Turkish-U.S. friendship.
328  Esmer continued to write foreign affairs articles on U.S.-related themes after his return
from the U.S.  See, amongst many others: 12 February, 10 March, 18 April, 3 July, 15
September, 23 October, and 7 December 1943.
 
329  This article was essentially a summary of a New York Times article on the military use of
dogs.
330  See:  31 March, 24, 29 April, 7, 9, October , 18 November, and 2, 16 December 1943.
Several of Tekeli's contributions included notes on economic news published as a regular
feature.
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infrequent, but also pro-U.S., columns.  Nezahat Nurettin Ege wrote several more columns in
1943 as well.331  
Added to these columns were some translations by staff members of articles that were about
the U.S., but for which no U.S. publication was cited as a source.  Most of these articles are
probably from Reader's Digest, Life, or Time, but only a search of the magazine archives for
these articles  will  define exactly where they came from.  Occasional  column writers  like
Nezahat  Nurettin  Ege  (9,  10  March  1943332)  and  Nüzhet  Baba  (7,  16,  24  May  1943)
contributed to this effort. 
In some exceptional cases, the writer of, but not the source of, these translated articles was
identified.  The authors listed for these articles suggest that the articles were extracted by Ulus'
writers  from  Reader's  Digest.   On  29  and  30  September  1943,  for  example,  an  article
attributed to Frederick C. Painton was published in two installments in Ulus.  From the tables
of contents  listed for 1943  Reader's Digest editions,  one learns that  Frederick C. Painton
sometimes had as many as two articles included in a single edition of  that magazine.333
In  1943,  Time once  again  made  Turkey  the  subject  of  a  cover,  this  time  composing  a
somewhat  strange  picture  of  Şükrü  Saraçoğlu  against  a  weather  vane  with  symbols
representing  the  four  great  warring  powers  –  the  U.S.,  the  U.K.,  the  USSR,  and  Nazi
Germany,  suggesting  that  Turkey's  decision  depended  “on  which  way  the  wind  was
331  See:  16 January and 6, 12 March 1943.
332  The 9-10 March two-part article series, credited to Karl Detzer, was almost certainly from
Reader's Digest since Detzer was a “roving editor” for Reader's Digest starting in 1940; see:
Heidenry, op. cit, p. 124.
333  See, for example, the September 1943 edition of Reader's Digest.  Some Internet sites sell
back issues of magazines; I found pictures of the front covers and content lists for various
Reader's Digest editions in some of these sites.  Reader's Digest, notably, always listed its
contents on its front cover.  Other authors that were published in Ulus during the time frame
covered by this study, such as Andre Maurois and Paul De Kruif, were frequent contributors
to Reader's Digest during WWII.  De Kruif was, like Detzer, a “roving editor” for Reader's
Digest during WWII.  Unfortunately, De Kruif published medical articles that were of
questionable accuracy; see:  Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 136-137. 
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blowing.”334  As should be obvious from the information presented in this study, the İnönü
government clearly, but indirectly, showed a preference for the Allied side; this was never in
doubt.  Thus, simply the suggestion present in the  Time cover was probably enough for the
result:  that article was also never mentioned or excerpted in Ulus.335  Saracoğlu's picture, like
the portrait of İsmet İnönü used by Time in 1941, was framed by a minaret.336
The  Time article itself  was notable for several things.  Firstly, it  described Saraçoğlu in a
generally positive light, effusing that,  "[Saraçoğlu] is more like an American politician than
anyone  else  in  European  governments,"  and  that  “.  .  .   there  can  be  no  question  that
[Saraçoğlu] would like to see the Allies win.”  Furthermore, the article noted that Saraçoğlu
and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Laurence Steinhardt were “friends,” that Saraçoğlu's closest
relationship  was  with  the  British  Ambassador  to  Turkey,  and  that  Saraçoğlu  was
“scrupulously correct, but impersonal” when interacting with German Ambassador to Turkey
Franz von Papen.  Overall, despite the use of the word “totalitarian” to characterize Turkey's
government,  the  article  was  much  more  positive  in  tone  than  the  1941  Time article  on
President İnönü.  However, these positive aspects were apparently not strong enough for it to
warrant mention in Ulus.   
Political explanations for the appearance of U.S.-sourced articles in  Ulus during 1943 can
only be ventured on.  The first article in January 1943 can easily be linked to the return of the
Turkish journalistic delegation from its  U.S. trip.   However, during the middle months of
1943 Swiss publications were the openly cited sources.337  Only in October 1943 did  Ulus
begin to frequently and openly cite U.S. publications.
  
334  This issue of Time was published 12 July 1943, and can also be accessed through Time's
on-line archives.  No author was credited for this Time article, although it is obvious that the
author had interacted with Saraçoğlu personally.
335  The same treatment that the 1941 Time issue on İsmet İnönü, mentioned above in section
5.1.5, received.
336  The covers of these Time editions are also accessible through Time's on-line archives.
337  For examples, see the 17 August and 4 September 1943 editions of Ulus.  On 29
September 1943, Ulus listed “from an American magazine” (“Amerikan bir mecmuadan”) as a
source for a two-part article.
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One possible reason for this behavior could have been more German pressure.  A Turkish-
German trade agreement was sıgned in April 1943; between that point and the Allied invasion
of Italy, which began on 3 September 1943, several  translated articles appeared that were
probably from U.S. sources, and one more article was translated from the New York Times.338
After the invasion of Italy,  Ulus almost  immediately began to utilize a significantly larger
amount of material openly cited as coming from U.S. sources.  
5.1.6:  1944
In 1944 Ulus preserved the trends concerning U.S.-sourced information that had appeared in
1943, in addition to continuing the patterns that had existed since early 1939.  The favorable
notes and small articles concerning U.S. miltary and economic strength, foreign policy, and
politics continued apace,339 as did the generally pro-U.S.columns from Falih Rıfkı Atay340 and
Ahmet  Şükrü  Esmer.341  Complementing  these  articles  and  columns  were  the  occasional
columns written by other  Ulus contributors.342  As in 1942 and 1943,  Ulus also included
338  Examples of these translated but uncredited articles appeared on 7, 24 May and 6 June
1943, and the New York Times article on 21 July 1943.  Another article, published on 16 May
1943, was attributed to a New York Times writer.
339  For a representative sample drawn from the multitude of instances, see:  3 January, 12
February, 13 April, 30 June, 1 August, 4 October, and 14 December 1944.
 
340  For examples, see:  15 January, 4 March, 11 April, 10 August, and 9 November (on the
U.S. election) 1944. 
    
341  For examples, amongst numerous others, see:  8 January (on the approaching U.S.
election), 2 February, 24 March, 24 October (on the approaching U.S. election), and 8
December 1944.  For an example of Esmer criticizing U.S. foreign policy, see Ulus' 9 January
1944 edition.  Esmer also went to Philadelphia for the International Labor Conference in 1944
and wrote a series of columns concerning that experience which appeared on 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 September and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
October 1944.  The column published on 3 October was notable for its enthusiastically pro-
U.S. stance.
342  Such as Abidin Daver (12 February 1944), Kasım Gülek (6 September 1944), Esat Tekeli
(9 February, 31 July, 13, 29 August, 16, 21 September, and 21 October 1944), and Kemal
Turan (28 February 1944).
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infrequent notes concerning U.S. war losses, but usually these notes were sourced from the
AA and taken from the regular U.S. government press releases.343 
In 1944, a handful of articles translated directly from U.S. sources did appear.  The sources
Ulus cited for these articles included  Air Facts,  Collier's,  the  New York Times,  and  USA
Magazine.344  More translated articles which listed an author but no source also appeared, and
at least one of these, the 2 January 1944 piece credited to Don Wharton, was from Reader's
Digest.345  Ulus'  other  interesting publishing decisions  during 1944  included an  artcle  on
Abraham Lincoln by Carl  Sandburg,346 an article  concerning the publication of  a  Turkish
version of Wendell Willkie's One World,347 an uncited article on malaria by U.S. government
medical researcher Lyle Goodhue,348 and an article on the post-war situation by FDR aide
Harry Hopkins.349  
In April 1944, the U.S. began to put pressure on Turkey over its neutrality; one aspect of this
pressure was cuts in U.S. economic aid.  Even though this pressure did achieve the end of
Turkish chrome shipments to Germany in that same month, and the eventual end to Turkish-
German relations in August 1944, it did not have a positive echo in Ulus' pages.  U.S.-sourced
343  For examples, see:  2 January, 19 February, 20 August, 21 October, and 11 November
1944.
344  For the Air Facts article (translated by Nüzhet Baba), see 29 August 1944; for the Collier's
articles, see 14, 15 February and 28 November 1944; the New York Times articles appeared on
2 May, 21 June, and 14 October 1944; the USA Magazine article appeared on 3 May 1944 and
was attributed to Eleanor Gilchrist.
345  This article, titled “Bir İstila Nasıl Hazırlanır?” (“How is an Invasion Prepared?”) is a
direct translation of the article titled “How The North African Campaign Was Organized”
from the February 1943 edition of Reader's Digest.  Don Wharton  was a regular contributor
to Reader's Digest.  For other examples of unsourced articles, see 9, 18 February and 7
November 1944.
346  See:  13 February 1944.  No source or translator was cited for this article.
347  See:  2 March 1944. 
348  See:  3 March 1944.
349  See:  9, 10 March 1944.  This article is similar to, but not the same as, the Hopkins article
titled “You Will Be Mobilized” published in the February 1943 edition of Reader's Digest.
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information essentially disappeared after the first week of May 1944 and did not re-emerge
until January 1945.  If any change did result from the cut in Turkish-German relations, it was
an increase in advertisements for imported U.S. products and companies.350  
No apparent change in  Ulus' publishing patterns occurred after the June Allied invasion of
Normandy, either.  On 24 June 1944 Ulus did note the beginning of Turkish-American radio
program exchanges,  and seemed so desperate  for information concerning the U.S. that  an
article on a storm in the U.S. was published on the 26 June 1944 edition's front page.  On 17
July 1944,  Ulus noted a  Laurence Steinhardt  comment  to  the  effect  that  “talks”  between
Turkey and the Allies had begun in late June 1944 but, again, no difference can be noted in
Ulus' publishing patterns immediately after late June 1944. 
Towards  the  end  of  1944,  however,  various  notes,  features  and/or  articles  signalling  a
broadened  Turkish-American  relationship  began  to  appear.   These  included  an  official
announcement concerning an opportunity for qualified students to study in the U.S. and the
U.K.,351 an article concerning the expansion of official Turkish trade representation in New
York  and London,352 and  the  government  decision  to  give  greater  preference  to  the  U.S.
dollar.353   Ulus noted on 20 August 1944 that the first U.S. cargo ship in five years arrived in
Mersin,  a  Turkish  delegation  went  to  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Conference  in
Chicago,354 and İsmet İnönü gave a speech in which he mentioned a need for closer relations
350  During 1944, advertisements for Consolidated Vultee Airplanes, RCA, Remington, and
U.S. Steel were especially common.
351  See:  11 October 1944.  This notice was followed up by other notes, published on 7
November and 24 December 1944, regarding the same topic.
352  See:  15 October 1944.
353  See:  15 November 1944; the article states that the U.S. dollar will be given preference in
order to expand trade with the U.S.  In 1943 and 1944, mutual trade with the U.S. was already
increasing; see:  Oran, Baskın.  “Dönemin Bilançosu.”  Türk Dış Politikası:  Kurtuluş
Savaşından Bugüne Olgular,  Belgeler, Yorumlar.  İstanbul:  İletişim Yayınları, 2004 (10.
baskı).  p. 393.  Aydın, Mustafa.  “İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye, 1939-1945.”  Türk Dış
Politikası:  Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular,  Belgeler, Yorumlar.  İstanbul:  İletişim
Yayınları, 2004 (10. baskı).  p. 466.
     
354  This conference was held between 1 November and 7 December 1944.  Ulus published a
number of articles concerning this conference; see, for example:  17, 19 October, 11, 23, 24
November, and 10 December 1944.  Several of these articles were penned by B. Şükrü Koçak,
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with the U.S.355  At this point, notes specifically concerning Turkish-U.S. trade also began to
appear more frequently,356 and two Turkish trade/economic delegations went to the U.S. for
inspections  and  negotiations  in  November  1944.357  Even  sport  was  included  in  this
development as a group of U.S. boxers came to Turkey in November 1944 and held matches
with Turkish boxers.358
5.1.7:  1945 -- January through August
After several fitful  starts for information culled from U.S. sources, the final turning point
came immediately after the New Year in January 1945.  On 3 January 1945, the TBMM voted
to cut political and economic ties with Japan.  Within two days, Ulus began a new wave of
American-sourced information.  The difference this time was that the wave did not fade as
had similar occurrences of U.S.-sourced materials over the previous war years.  In fact, even
though American “informational” materials were once again openly published starting from 6
January 1945, U.K. materials were actually more prevalent for several weeks.  By the end of
January 1945, however, U.S. materials had become more frequent and lengthy than the U.K.
materials, and were dominated by magazines like  Reader's Digest,  Life,  Time, and  Atlantic
Monthly.  
Whether the cutting of diplomatic and economic ties with Japan was the key event is not
immediately determinable, but the change in Ulus's pages was apparent immediately after that
decision.  The cutting of ties with Japan also seems to be a more likely trigger than simply the
the head of the Turkish delegation.
 
355  See:  3 November 1944.
356  For examples, see:  19, 25 November and 8, 11, 15, 24, 26, 31 December 1944. 
 
357  Articles concerning these delegations were published on 21, 29 November and 6, 31
December 1944.  According to the articles, one delegation was charged with procuring
railroad infrastructure and the other, composed of three Turkish banking heads, with securing
industrial development credit. 
358  The articles concerning the U.S. boxers and their matches in Turkey were published on 29
October and 4, 9, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19 November 1944.
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turning of a New Year.359  Furthermore, Ulus's information effort in January 1945 appeared to
be coordinated with political developments, in stark contrast to the aftermath of ceasing ties
with the Nazis the previous August.  After the TBMM voted to cut ties with Germany, there
was no perceivable change in the kind of information presented to Turkish readers about the
U.S.  On 3 August 1944, the TBMM's vote to cut relations with Germany was announced, and
in the following days  Ulus included only articles, generally  AA summaries of U.S. or U.K.
newspaper reports, relating how pleased various Allied countries were.360    
The five months that elapsed between the cut of relations with Germany and the cutting of ties
with Japan seem to have made all the difference.  Ulus's reaction to cutting ties with Japan
was, for only one day, similar to that displayed the previous August.  On 5 January, a first-
page article noted that FDR was pleased that Turkey cut ties with Japan.  Pictures of U.S.
military personnel, a routine occurrence, also were printed.  
The next day, however, the first  Reader's  Digest translation in twelve months appeared361;
notably, that article described how terrible life was for Japanese women (!).362  On the page
facing the  Reader's Digest article was an excerpt from Life  on three American women who
lived through the war in Leipzig.  The  Life excerpt was massive, taking up three-fourths of
page five, a size usually reserved for important speeches by Turkish governmental figures.363
359  January 1945 also coincided with a change in font and page layout in Ulus.
360  U.S. and U.K. on 4 August 1944; more reaction and a related article from the New York
Sun on 5 August 1944.  A New York Times article, along with some other U.S. journalistic
reaction on the same topic, was noted on 10 August 1944.  On 11 August 1944 there was a
large article summarizing U.S. press reaction to the break in Turkish-German relations.
361  The Don Wharton article which appeared in January 1944 was not cited by Ulus as coming
from Reader's Digest.  The 6 January 1945 article was the first article openly attributed to
Reader's Digest in two years, since 13 January 1943.  Overall, in the period from 1939-1945
this was only the second article that Ulus labelled as sourced from Reader's Digest.
362  The author was listed as Helen Moscicki and is the translation of the article called “The
Unhappiest Women In The World” by Moscicki which appeared in the December 1944
edition of Reader's Digest (pp. 19-21).
363  Such as speeches by President İsmet İnönü or the modern-Turkish version of the Turkish
Republic's Constitution, which was published in full in Ulus on 11 January 1945.
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In other words, suddenly a previously unseen amount of U.S.-sourced “informational” features
began to appear in Ulus, only two days following the TBMM decision to cease ties with Japan.
The new “informational” features were also granted, in terms of the space used to print them,
a high place of importance.  In the years previous to 1945, pages four through six in Ulus were
usually devoted to classified advertisements or to the occasional economy or art feature.  From
January to  April  1945,  however,  pages  four and  five  were  regularly filled  by,  especially,
“informational”  features  from  U.S.  sources  or,  less  frequently,  U.K.  or  French-language
sources.  
In the middle of April 1945 the amount of U.S.-sourced information declined dramatically,
but these U.S.-sourced articles still appeared, on a monthly basis, with greater frequency than
in the previous six years.  The 1945 January-August amounts of American “informational”
features  included  in  Ulus are  as  follows  (the  numbers  from  October,  November,  and
December 1944 are also provided as comparison to the following months):
TABLE 1
October 1944:
Reader's Digest -- 0
Life -- 0
Other Sources -- 0
Others (unidentifiable) -- 0
November 1944364:
Reader's Digest -- 0
Life -- 0
Other Sources -- 1 (28 November365)
Others (unidentifiable) -- 1 (7 November366)
364  Ulus' 26 and 27 November 1944 editions are missing from the bound volume at the Milli
Kütüphanesi in Bayazıt.
365  A summary, not a translation, of a Harold Ickes article from Collier's.
366  A large article on FDR and Thomas Dewey relating to the U.S. election; the translator is
listed as Nermin Suley.
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December 1944:
Reader's Digest -- 0
Life -- 1367 (5 December)
Other Sources -- 0
Others (unidentifiable) -- 0
January 1945:
Reader's Digest -- 4 (6, 14, 27, 30 January)
Life -- 1 (6 January)
Other Sources -- 0
Others (unidentifiable)368-- 6 (15, 18 -- 2 articles, 27, 31 January -- 2 articles)
February 1945:
Reader's Digest -- 3 (8, 9, 16 February)  
Life -- 0
Other U.S. Sources -- 6 (2, 16, 19, 20 -- 2 articles, 27 February)
Others (unidentifiable) -- 16 (1, 3, 6369 -- 4 articles, 7, 9, 10 -- 2 articles, 12 -- 2 
articles, 14, 15, 16, 19 February) 
March 1945:
Reader's Digest -- 3 (5, 8, 13 March) 
Life -- 2 (2, 30 March)
Other Sources -- 9 (5 -- 3 articles, 6, 9, 10, 22, 28, 30 March)   
Others (unidentifiable) -- 4 (3, 8, 13, 28 March)
367  Article originally from Life but actually taken from the Cairo publication Images.
368  This includes some features which were almost certainly from U.S. sources, such as the 31
January article on a Washington squirrel living as a domestic pet, or articles on animals in
U.S. zoos (see:  15 and 16 February), but which were not attributed to a source by Ulus's staff.
I have also included under the “other” category a number of articles which strongly resemble,
both in the type of information presented and the format, typical articles from Reader's Digest
or Life, but which were not attributed to any source.  An example of this type of article is the 6
February article on tornadoes in the U.S.  The only way to determine these articles' source
would be to search the archives of these magazines and others.  I included “informational”
articles (but not public addresses) by U.S. officials (e.g. the half-page 6 March commentary by
Edward Stettinius on the Dumbarton Oaks agreement).  I did not include articles from non-
U.S. sources; a source like Magazine Digest, which carried articles that were definitely useful
as pro-U.S. “informational” materials, was not included in the article statistics because it was
published in Toronto. Also not included were the many anecdotes, almost certainly from
Reader's Digest, that frequently appeared in Ulus' “Dünyada Olup Bitenler” (“What's
Happening in the World”) feature, which appeared almost daily.
   
369  One of these articles, a story by Kressman Taylor called “Address Unknown,” was
published in Reader's Digest in January 1939.
80
April 1945:
Reader's Digest -- 0
Life -- 2 (3, 7 April)
Other Sources -- 6 (4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 29 April) 
Others (unidentifiable) -- 0
May 1945:
Reader's Digest -- 1 (1 May)
Life -- 0
Other Sources -- 2 (13, 15 May)
Others (unidentifiable) -- 3 (3, 4, 27 May)
June 1945:
Reader's Digest -- 0
Life -- 0
Other Sources -- 1 (10 June)
Others (unidentifiable) -- 3 (11, 15, 29 June)
July 1945:
Reader's Digest -- 0
Life -- 0
Other Sources -- 3 (2, 5, 22 July)
Others (unidentifiable) -- 3 (6, 13, 29 July)
August 1945:370
Reader's Digest -- 0
Life -- 0
Other Sources -- 4 (17 -- 2 articles, 21, 26 August)    
Others (unidentifiable) -- 4 (1, 7, 9, 21 August)  
Starting from the  middle of  April  1945,  the  U.S.-sourced information  suddenly begins  to
slacken.  The most likely explanation is that the nexus of political events in the middle of
April  1945  --  FDR's  death  and  Truman's  accession  to  the  Presidency (and  the  resultant
shuffling  in  U.S.  official  positions),  the  chaotic  flood  of  information  surrounding  the
approaching end of WWII, and the departure of Laurence Steinhardt, who apparently had a
close working relationship with the Turkish press, from Ankara 371 -- resulted in this lowered
pace of U.S.-sourced information. After May 1945, the articles that were cited as coming from
370  August 1945 is notable because a short story by an American author, O. Henry, appeared
on 23 August; this was the first story by a U.S. author published in Ulus in the period I
examined.  O. Henry was known for his clever and entertaining portrayals of everyday
American life and culture.
371  See:  17 February 1945; see also above, Section 5.1.4.
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U.S. sources were often in the weekly Arts feature.372  However, a comment in the 1 May 1945
“Dünyada Olup Bitenler” feature clearly shows that  Ulus had access to, at least,  Reader's
Digest in these months.373  The source of these issues, whether Ulus was obtaining these issues
through its own means or if the issues were being provided to them, is not clear.
Steinhardt's replacement, Edwin Wilson, did not arrive until June 1945, but even then there is
not a notable increase in U.S.-sourced information.  Wilson seems to have focused on other
activities, since  Ulus began to feature pro-U.S. information more prominently after Wilson
took up his  post.374  This information was the same kind of  information that  had always
appeared concerning the U.S., i.e. the quality or nature of the information did not change, only
the emphasis changed.  An Ankara Halkevi also opened an exhibit of U.S. art and architecture
shortly after Wilson's arrival.375  
On the other hand, after mid-April 1945, other  Ulus writers begin to write more frequently
about the U.S.  This may have been because Falih Atay went to the U.S. for the San Francisco
conference,  but  mid-April  also  coincides  with  the  span of  time in  which  Nermin  Suley's
translations of English-language articles became more common.376
372  See 13 May and 2 July 1945 as examples.
373  The always-anonymous compiler of this feature states “. . .  yeni gelen sayılarda gözümüze
çarpan fıkralar şunlardır” (“these are the anecdotes from the newly-arrived issues that
caught our eye”).
374  Edwin Wilson arrived in Ankara on 4 June1945 and presented his credentials to President
İnönü on 11 June 1945; the following day Wilson met with Şükrü Saraçoğlu (see: 12, 13 June
1945).  The Ulus editions on 4, 5 July 1945 were notable for the manner in which relatively
unimportant events related to the U.S., and unrelated to Turkey, were given page one headline
status.  These headlines were published only a week after Wilson met with Turkish journalists
at the Ankara U.S. War Information Bureau (see 27 June 1945).
  
375  See:  30 June 1945.  The opening for this exhibition was attended by Wilson and a number
of Turkish officials.
376  See, for example:  2 May and 6 August 1945.  Suley's translations often did not cite a
source.
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Other publishing patterns established by Ulus remained unchanged.  The positive-toned short
notes and/or articles on various U.S.-related topics continued unabated.377  The notes on U.S.-
Turkish economic activities which began to be prominent in 1944 also proceeded.378  Falih
Rıfkı  Atay379 and  Ahmet  Şükrü  Esmer380 continued  their  pro-U.S.  columns.   Other  Ulus
contributors,  such as Mümtaz Faik Fenik (14,  27 April,  27 May, and 1,  8 August  1945),
Hazım Atıf Kuyucak (11 June), Esat Tekeli (7, 26 April and 6 July), Osman Nuri Uman (19
April and 4, 17 May), and Kemal Turan (15 April) also contributed pro-American features.
Other notable events included the arrival of a U.S. press delegation,381 the publication of a
“question-and-answer”  list  prepared  by  Edward  Stettinius  on  the  Dumbarton  Oaks
agreement,382 and the lowering of Turkish flags to half-mast after FDR's death.383  An entire
page  of  Ulus'  14  April  1945  edition  was  devoted  to  pictures  and  articles  on  FDR  to
commemorate his death, and the 16 April 1945 edition noted that all Turkish football matches
from the previous day were begun with a moment of silence for the same reason.  Finally,
Turkish and foreign journalists met U.S. Representative Everett Dirksen at the Istanbul U.S.
War News Bureau.384  
377  Amongst the many examples, see:  3 January, 1 March, 8 April, 2 June, 9 July, and 13
August 1945.  
 
378  For typical examples, see:  9 January, 1 February (on the price of Turkish carpets in the
U.S.), 24 February (extension of Turkish-U.S. Lend-Lease Agreement), 17 March (a shipment
of U.S.-made portable grain silos arrives in Iskenderun), 2 April, 10, 25 May, 3 June, 27 July,
and 2 August 1945.
379  See, amongst others:  3, 28 March and 16 August 1945.  
380  See, amongst others:  4 January, 9 February, and 15 March 1945.    
381  See:  20, 21, 22, and 27 February 1945. 
382  See:  11 April 1945. 
 
383  See:  14 April 1945.
384  See:  17 April 1945.  Dirksen later met with Şükrü Saraçoğlu and observed a TBMM
session; see:  19 April 1945.  Nermin Suley interviewed Dirksen for the 20 April 1945 edition
of Ulus.
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After Şükrü Saraçoğlu was made an honorary member of the Mark Twain Society, an entire
page in Ulus' 27 May 1945 edition was devoted to Mark Twain's life and writings.  Similarly,
after President Truman declared 1 August Air Forces Day, Ulus devoted several articles and
an entire page of its 1 August 1945 edition to articles concerning the U.S. air sector.   Finally,
Ulus noted on 20 June 1945 the departure of 28 Turkish students for studies in the U.S.
Several  questions  are  either  answered  or  raised  by  the  January  1945  change  in  Ulus's
publishing preferences.  One question that is apparently answered concerns Derek Patmore's
1942 request to Laurence A. Steinhardt to increase U.S. propaganda efforts in Turkey.385  The
answer is that, judging from the articles published in  Ulus from 1942 to the end of 1944,
Patmore's suggestion was not taken up.  Why that suggestion was not taken up is a question
that is raised.  Whether Patmore's suggestion had an influence on the January 1945  Ulus is
doubtful since at least two years passed between the time that Patmore forwarded his letter to
Steinhardt and a greater application of American “information” to Ulus' pages. 
Another possible reason for the delay in Ulus's change to more active American “information”
sources is that there were still German forces in Greece, within striking range of Turkey, when
the TBMM cut ties with the Nazis; in January of 1945 that situation no longer existed.  Since
German forces could, potentially retaliate against Turkey for an essentially hostile action, or
for any excessive provocation, Ulus would still have to have been more circumspect in what it
published in August  1944.  By January 1945 the need for such circumspection no longer
existed since Germany had evacuated the Aegean islands in September 1944, and in October
1944, Bulgaria had been occupied by the Red Army while Greece had been invaded by the
Allies.   
However, the change in the German position in Greece was not of a quality which could fully
account for the dramatically different reaction by Ulus to the cutting of ties with the two Axis
powers.  After all, in early August 1944, two months after D-Day and only two weeks before
Paris's liberation, Germany was well  on its  way to defeat.   The German threat to  Turkey,
though  still  present,  had  already  been  drastically  reduced  from  the  dark  days  of  1942.
Furthermore, if the German threat was the entire reason that Ulus had not immediately begun
publishing massive amounts of American “information” in August 1944, then why did Ulus
385  See above, section 5.1.3.
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not  begin  to  publish  that  “information”  after  the  German  threat  was  entirely removed  in
October 1944?  Consequently, reasons for the different reactions of Ulus in August 1944 and
January 1945 are apparently more complicated than just the German threat.
Another change was the appointment of Joseph Grew to a more important post in the U.S.
State  Department.   After  Edward  Stettinius  replaced  Cordell  Hull  as  State  Department
Secretary  in  December  1944,  Grew  became  Undersecretary  of  State  and  often  took  on
Secretary  of  State  responsibilities  while  Stettinius  attended  the  many  conferences  that
occurred in the first half of 1945.  Grew, a former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, was known as
a strong advocate of pro-Turkey policies.386  Another factor may have been the approaching
February 1945 U.N. conference in San Francisco.
A final intriguing possibility is an event that received only a small, passing mention in Ulus
on 3 November 1944.  In that edition, a small page three note related a cocktail party given the
previous  evening in Ankara.   Cocktails were apparently a fashion at  that time since such
parties, whether among society or government officials,  received regular mention in  Ulus.
This cocktail was different, however, since it was hosted by American intelligence officials
stationed in Turkey's capital and attended by Turkish journalists and press officials.387  This
386  See above, Section 2.1.
387  The article was entitled “M. Damon Dün Akşam Bir Kokteyl Verdi”: 
“Amerikan istihbarat dairesinden M. Damon, Amerika'ya gitmekte olan 
istihbarat dairesi şefi M. George Britt ve ödünç verme ve kiralama reisi M.H. Fedler 
şerefine dün akşam bir kokteyl vermiştir.
Bu toplantıda gazeteci mebuslar, basın ve yayın umum müdürü Nedim Veysel 
İlkin, Anadolu Ajansı umum müdürü Faik Hozar, Fransız ve Çek siyasi mümessilleri, 
Anadolu Ajansı ve basın yayın umum müdürü erkaniyle Türk, İngiliz, Amerikan, ve 
Fransız gazeteciler ve İngiliz, Amerikan büyük elçilik erkanı hazır bulunmuşlardır.
Çok samimi bir hava içinde geçen toplantıda riyaseti-cumhur hususi kalem 
müdürü Süreyya Anderiman da bulunmuştur.” 
(“Last Night Mr. Damon Held a Cocktail”:  “Mr. Damon, from the American 
intelligence bureau, last night held a cocktail in honor of intelligence bureau chief Mr. 
George Britt and lend-lease head Mr. H. Fedler, both of whom are going to America.
The meeting was attended by press representatives, Press and Publishing 
general manager Nedim Veysel İlkin, Anatolian Agency general manager Faik Hozar, 
and French and Czech political representatives.  Joining the Anatolian Agency and 
Press and Publishing heads were Turkish, British, American, and French journalists 
and representatives from the British and American embassies.  
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event, and relationships that sprang from it, may have contributed to the coordination between
U.S. “information” sources and the articles that began to appear almost exactly two months
later in Ulus.
Naturally, full answers to these questions will only come from government archives.
5.2.  Conclusions
Thus, by August 1945,  Ulus, a newspaper which was always pro-U.S. but which published
essentially  no  information  directly  from  U.S.  sources,  began  to  freely  publish  articles
translated from U.S. sources.  A source from a U.S. publication directly translated, published,
and credited to that source in Ulus was extremely rare from January 1939 until January 1945,
when a virtual explosion of U.S.-sourced materials appeared in Ulus' pages.388  Even though
the amount of U.S.-sourced information decreased after April 1945, comparatively more U.S.-
sourced information still appeared on a monthly basis than in the months and years preceding
1945.389
The  comparative  randomness  with  which  “informational”  articles  were  chosen  from U.S.
sources  also  contrasts  to  the  heavy pro-U.S.  content  of  the  articles  in  early  1947.   For
example, the 3 April 1945  Life article on a California cemetery would almost certainly not
have appeared in early 1947.390  A possible reason for the difference in the content of the U.S.
The manager of the President of the Republic's Secreteriat, Süreyya 
Anderiman, also joined the gathering, which took place in a very warm and friendly 
atmosphere.”)
 
388  There was a tiny handful of instances during that time frame of articles that were probably
translated directly from a U.S. source, but which were not attributed to a source, an author, or
even a translator.  For examples, see the 15 May 1939 and 15 September, 1 November 1941
editions of Ulus.  
 
389  Compare, for example, October 1944 with July 1945, both of which are presented in the
article statistics listed above in Section 5.1.7.
390  Also, Ulus seemed to have a more organized publishing pattern by early 1947.  In January
1947, 57 U.S.-sourced articles were published.  Of those, 37 were a series of excerpts from a
book by Sumner Welles and a book on Eisenhower's war years; series of articles or stories
appeared in Ulus throughout the war, but the source was never American.  Three Reader's
Digest and one Life article appeared in January 1947, but all of those Reader's Digest and Life
86
“informational” articles published in Ulus could be that the first months of 1945 were a period
of new and closer cooperation between Ulus' staff and the U.S. officials who were providing
“informational” articles to them (if such cooperation did actually exist). 
 
Previous to January 1945, if an article in Ulus pertained to the U.S., it was usually from the
AA, and thus compiled or summarized from foreign press services or information that was
written by Ulus staff; especially Falih Rıfkı Atay and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer wrote numerous
columns, often concerning the U.S., that had definite “educational” or “informational” aims.  I
assume that the reason for this was that the effort to inform Turkish readers about the U.S.
was one-sided, i.e. the Turkish side wanted to  provide some information about the U.S. to its
readers, but did not have much material from actual U.S. sources, possibly because of a lack
of coordination or help from the U.S. side, but also possibly because of German pressure to
not publish blatantly pro-U.S. materials.  Consequently, Ulus had to create its own materials
on its own terms and with its own methods.  The diaries of travels around the U.S., first from
Neşet Halil Atay, then from Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, were a notable result of this situation.
Apparently,  near  the  end  of  1944,  the  cooperation  became  better  and  the  articles  both
submitted by U.S. officials and chosen by Ulus staff, with time, became more uniform.  The
more consistent nature of the “informational” articles in 1947 would be a logical result of both
sides  gaining experience  with  providing  and  choosing  the  information  they wanted  Ulus'
readers to see.  After all, the U.S. was also in the beginning stages of developing its overseas
espionage and informational efforts at that time.
The  change  in  the  intensity  of  U.S.-sourced  informational  features,  beginning  from
approximately the middle of April 1945, must be attributed to a variety of factors, probably all
working together:  FDR's death and the accession of a new President, the chaos of the war's
end in Europe, and the departure and replacement of a long-standing U.S. Ambassador to
Turkey.  After the early June 1945 arrival of Edwin Wilson in Ankara, no change is apparent
in  the  amount  of   U.S.-sourced  informational  articles  in  Ulus;  however,  several  events
accompanied  his  arrival  and  Ulus'  front-page focus  on the U.S.  role  in  events  seemed to
intensify. 
articles were published in Sunday editions, which had expanded to more than ten pages by
that time.  Five of the January 1947 U.S.-themed articles had no source.  
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Thus, over the course of WWII, Ulus experienced a change in its content but, according to my
analysis,  it  did not experience a dramatic change in  its  ideological  position since even in
January  1939  it  was  pro-American  and  showed  evident  sympathy  for  the  “Western”
democratic powers.  Ulus'  sympathy for the Western democracies can even be inferred from
its coverage of the Spanish Civil War.  In the issues from early 1939 that I scanned, Ulus was
sympathetic to the Republicans until the victory of the Frankist forces was certain, at which
point the newspaper became more neutral.   This sympathy for the Republicans caught my
attention;  I  expected  more  positive  references  to  the  Spanish  fascists  since  the  Kemalist
regime, even if it saw an enemy in Mussolini, utilized ideology that had some similarities to
that of the fascists.
Sometime between the end of August 1945 and the last months of 1946, the amount of U.S.-
sourced information once again increased.  There are number of possible reasons for this:  1)
the establishment of cooperation between U.S. information services with Turkish journalists
after  Edwin  Wilson  arrived  as  Ambassador;  2)  the  increasing  Soviet  threat  to  Turkish
sovereignty391;  3)  the  increasing U.S.  government  realization  that  the  USSR constituted  a
threat to Turkey's sovereignty; and 4) an increasing anti-Soviet stance on the part of U.S.
publications.392
One 1945 event can summarize the changes in Ulus' wartime publishing practices in regard to
the U.S.  On 4 July 1945 the Turkish Foreign Ministry's General Secretary Ambassador Cevat
Açıkalın gave a radio address to Turkey; the aim of this address was to explain the U.S.' 4 July
celebrations to Turkish citizens.  The text of Açıkalım's speech was subsequently published in
full, on Ulus' front page, the following day.  The Turkish government then, as if to emphasize
the point,  had the Turkish Ambassador  to  the U.S.,  Ragıp Baydur,  speak on the radio to
391  The Soviet threat was noted long before the end of the war, however, so evidence
supporting exactly why this threat was not countered by American propaganda more strongly
in the waning months of WWII needs to be identified.  The most likely reason is that the U.S.
government had not understood exactly how the struggle with the USSR was going to be
carried out.  Only in the middle of 1945 did U.S. intelligence capacities, which were in their
infant stages, begin to identify the “informational” and “ideological” nature of the coming
conflict; see:  Saunders, op. cit., p. 17.  
 
392  Reader's Digest, as mentioned above in section 4.0, did not become truly anti-Soviet until
after WWII's conclusion.
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Turkish citizens concerning the U.S.' 4 July celebrations; Baydur's address was reported on
page one of Ulus' 6 July 1945 edition.  In 1939, there was only one small article concerning
the U.S.' Independence Day celebrations,393 and on 4 July 1939 the only notice given to the
U.S. holiday was an announcement concerning the publishing of Turkish-American stamps
commemorating the U.S.' 150 years of independence.394  
These radio addresses give closure to the period in which I examined Ulus' pages because the
first  event that came to my mind, while reading about Açıkalım's radio speech, was İsmet
İnönü's February 1939 radio address to American citizens.  In other words,  more than six
years later, radio events involving America were still page one news, so the importance of the
event to Ulus' publishing practices had not changed.  The difference in this event was that a
Turkish  official  used  the  occasion  of  an  American  holiday to  present  information  about
America directly to the Turkish people.  Thus, the radio address must be understood as an
effort by the Turkish government to influence and control what Turkish citizens understood
concerning the U.S., and an already pro-U.S. publication became overtly, blatantly pro-U.S. as
the war progressed to its conclusion.
393  5 July 1939, page 3.
394  Detailed above in Section 5.1.1.
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6.0  CONCLUSIONS
In summary,  Ulus Gazetesi followed extremely pro-U.S.  publishing patterns from January
1939 until the end of August 1945.  In the early part of this period, very little information that
was  identifiable  as  coming  from  U.S.  sources  was  published,  but  beginning  in  1943
information that can be identified as sourced in U.S. publications, especially Reader's Digest,
became more prominent.  The importance of this information lies in the facts that  Ulus was
the mouthpiece of İsmet İnönü's CHP government, that  Reader's Digest was a purveyor of
conservative American culture, and that these Reader's Digest articles may be understood as
an increasingly pro-American stance on the part of the Turkish state.
The essential issue that emerges from this study is that Turkish media has been given only
superficial  treatment  by  scholars  of  Turkish-American  relations.   This  lack  of  attention,
however, must be remedied if we are to more fully trace how Turkish and American public
perceptions  of  “the  other  side”  have  developed  since  WWI,  and  how  elites  and  special
interests on both sides have tried to mold public perception of Turkish-American relations,
and connected issues, to their own tastes and concerns.  Currently, pundits on both sides opine
freely on the role of  both countries'  media  in  shaping perceptions of this  issue,  but  little
concrete research has actually been done. 
Furthermore, the search for the roots of Turkish and American perceptions of each other must
be  pursued  in  a  wider  variety  of  fields  than  just  politics  if  we  are  to  gain  a  more
comprehensive understanding of why Turkish-U.S. relations have traveled a  “rocky” road
since the late 1950s.  Consequently, a main question that remains to be answered is, if Ulus
was already pro-U.S. by the beginning of 1939, can we quantify in definite terms when and
why this pro-American tone began?  Can we trace the development of pro- and anti-American
feelings in Turkish society to the interwar, the WWI, and/or the Ottoman eras?
Another vital problem that remains to be explained is exactly why the U.S. government was
so reluctant  to commit  aid to Turkey after WWII.  Some researchers have ventured,  even
stated,  answers to this question, but none so far has been truly satisfactory.  Given the post-
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WWII  world  geopolitical  situation,  simply  that  Turkey had  not  joined  the  Allies  in  an
expedient manner, or that the U.S. did not want to get involved in what they saw as Britain's
sphere of influence, does not offer fully convincing or logically consistent reasoning for the
U.S. government's actions. 
For example, the U.S. govenrment should have been aware that Ulus had been steadfastly pro-
U.S. throughout the war, as illustrated by this study.  The U.S. government should have been
aware that the Turkish government had, when possible, provided covert aid to Allied forces in
Turkey's coastal waters. The U.S government should have been aware of the poor condition of
the Turkish military and economy.  If the problem of “Turkish democracy” was the issue, a
raft of articles extolling the virtues of the Turkish government and its democratic aims, and
written before, during, and after the war, were easily obtainable.395  
Thus,  as  a  first  step  to  a  more  comprehensive  and  convincing  explanation  for  the  U.S.
government's behavior towards Turkey after WWII, this researcher would suggest that at least
two currents, pro- and anti-Turkey, existed in the U.S. administration both during and after the
war.  Exactly who these camps may have consisted of has yet to be determined, but at least
one probable anti-Turkey member, Henry A. Wallace can be identified, and at least one pro-
Turkey member, Joseph Grew, can be assumed.396
395  See, for example:  Acikalin, Cevat.  “Turkey's International Relations.”  International
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-).  Vol. 23, No. 4, October 1947.  pp.
477-491.  Ellis, Ellen Deborah.  "The Evolution of Turkish Political Institutions."  Current
History.  Vol. 13, No. 76, December 1947.  pp. 347-351.  Gülek, op. cit.  Osten, Necmi
(Neçmi).  "The Administrative Organization of Turkey."  Asiatic Review.  1942.  pp. 407-413.
Robinson, Richard D.  "The Lesson of Turkey."  Middle East Journal.  Vol. 5, 1951.  pp. 424-
438.  Smogorzewski, K. M.  "Turkey Turns Towards Democracy."  Contemporary Review.
July-December 1949, No. 176.  pp. 213-220.  Wright, W. L.  “Truths About Turkey.”
Foreign Affairs.  Vol. 26, No. 2, Januay 1948.  p. 349-359.  Wyatt S.C.  “Turkey:  The
Economic Situation and the Five-Year Plan.”  International Affairs.  Vol. 13, No. 6,
November 1934.  pp. 826-844.  Such articles were written by Americans, Turkish researchers
or politicians, and writers of other nationalities.  Other articles, which provided less positive
interpretations of Turkey's political system, were also published and may have served as the
counter-interpretation to the positive articles.  For an example of a negative article, see:
Kohn, Hans.  “Ten Years of the Turkish Republic.”  Foreign Affairs.  Vol. 12, No. 1, October
1933.  p. 141-155.    
396  Wright, op. cit., p.359, attributes the following quote to Wallace, “[m]any Allied divisions
were immobilized thoroughout the war because we never knew on whose side this [Turkish]
army was preparing to fight,” and then states emphatically that Wallace's words had “not the
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A less directly relevant issue that overshadows the discussion in this thesis is whether İsmet
İnönü decided to allow a second party (and thus real democracy) almost immediately after
WWII as a result of international developments following the war, as a result of pressure from
the victorious  allied governments,  or  because he had already wanted to open the Turkish
political system but was forced to wait for the war to run its course. 
This  researcher,  while  reading  Ulus day-by-day  for  the  length  of  the  war,  received  the
impression that the CHP government was, if not in actuality, at least ideally pro-democratic.
The amount of pro-American and pro-British information that  appeared in  Ulus might be
justified by the fact that Nazi Germany posed a direct threat to Turkish sovereignty, but the
degree of pro-American information, especially the extremely positive portrayals of FDR, is
hard to justify with that reasoning.  Ulus was already publishing extremely positive coverage
of the U.S. well before the initial hostilities of WWII, when the U.S. was a rising power but
was not yet at the point to which it rose during and following WWII.  Ulus' coverage of the
Spanish Civil War, recounted above, can even be cited as supporting evidence.  Consequently,
this author finds it difficult to believe that such positive reflections of the U.S. in the pages of
Ulus had merely strategic roots.  
Then there is also the extremely interesting note published by Ulus after İsmet İnönü's still-
controversial  6  March  1939 Istanbul  University speech.   Not  only some later  researchers
interpreted  İnönü's  speech  as  hinting  about  democracy  --  the  Nazi  foreign  office  also
interpreted it  that  way.  A note from a German newspaper,  essentially condemning İsmet
İnönü's supposed reference to democracy, was published in Ulus on 10 March 1939.397  Murat
Esat  Bozkurt  shortly thereafter  defended İnönü's apparent  reference to democracy in  a  20
March 1939 column, saying that Turkey's democracy was unique.398  Therefore, less than two
smallest grain of truth.”  Wallace was U.S. Vice President from 1941-1945.  Grew, after
serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, went on to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to Japan
until the U.S. and Japan went to war.  In late 1944 Grew became Undersecretary of State (his
second stint in that position) during Edward Stettinius' tenure.  I intend to pursue the question
of possible pro- and anti-Turkish U.S. government officials in further research work.
   
397  The column appeared on page three.
398  The column appeared on the front page.
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weeks had elapsed after President İnönü's speech and observers were already bickering over
its interpretation!
This author would also like to make a suggestion that may not have been put forth anywhere
else:  if İsmet İnönü did seem to hint at democracy in his  Demokrasi Müjdesi speech, is it
possible that he was still feeling the positive reverberations of his 26 February 1939 radio
address to the U.S.?  The coverage of President İnönü's U.S. speech was effusive, to say the
least, and the Istanbul University speech took place only ten days after the radio address.  He
also seems to have been well-greeted in his trip to Istanbul and was making a speech in front
of university students.  Is it possible that he got caught up in the moment and maybe hinted at
something that he did not totally intend?
A point which should be added is, if the debate around President İnönü's speech concerns
whether he hinted at  democracy or not,  we need to define more clearly what is meant by
“democracy.”  Cemil Koçak suggests that İnönu's speech was actually more of a sign that
internal changes in the  CHP were in order.399  Here we should try to detail  which kind of
democracy  is  being  discussed  because,  if  by  “democracy”  President  İnönü  meant  more
tolerance for opposition in the one-party system, the reforms President İnönü suggested, and
which are defined by Cemil Koçak, could be interpreted as “more democracy.”  The Müstakil
Group400 was  allowed  to  emerge  at  the  CHP's  5.  Kurultayı in  May 1939,  shortly  after
President İnönü's Istanbul University Speech.  Whether the group was truly oppositional or
whether it was totally composed of  CHP members is not important; the vital point is that a
group that, in some way, provided opposition to the policies and ideology of the CHP ruling
party was allowed to exist.  This is a step, no matter how minute, towards democracy.401
399  Koçak, op. cit., pp. 26-30.
400  Koçak, op. cit., pp. 72-82, 89-90.  See also:  Aydemir, op. cit., p. 117.
401  I agree with the evaluation of the Müstakil Grup expressed in:  Loğoğlu, Dr. O. Faruk.
İsmet İnönü and the Making of Modern Turkey.  Ankara:  İnönü Vakfı, 199?.  p. 118.
Loğoğlu mentions, on pp. 118-119, other small steps towards democracy taken for the 1939
and 1943 elections.
93
Later, after the result of WWII was no longer in doubt and the Turkish government needed to
move closer to the soon-to-be victorious Allied Powers,  President İnönü would return to the
“democracy”  topic.   For  example,  Milli  Şef İnönü  emphasized  Turkey's  democratic
parliamentary system in a speech given to open the TBMM in 1944;402 in a May 1944 address,
he used similar themes and was apparently trying to convince other CHP leaders of the need
for a more democratic system.403  On 9 July 1945, in a speech given at Dolmabahçe Palace,
President İnönü specifically mentioned U.S. democracy, but stated that Turkish democracy
would not resemble American democracy (or the others that he mentioned) because, “[h]er
memleket, kendi bünyesine göre tedbirlerini alır, demokrasi yapar.”404  However, President
İnönü quickly added that Turkey was not yet ready for democracy and that Turkey's passage to
democracy would take some time.405 
6.1  The Literature
The debate around Turkey's transition to democracy is a relevant topic with which to begin
determining where this study fits in the literature on Turkish Republican history and Turkish-
American  relations.   The  area  most  immediately  germane  is,  of  course,  the  studies
surrounding  the  foundation  of  Turkish-American  relations.   This  thesis  provides  new
information concerning the official Turkish government perspective on the U.S. during the
Milli Şef era.  Furthermore, this study makes apparent the need for far more work on the pre-
WWII and wartime sources of the Turkish-U.S. alliance that emerged after WWII.  Turkish
government documents are difficult to access, but possibly U.S. official documents that have
not  been  sufficiently  scoured  exist.   Media  in  both  countries  also  need  to  be  more
comprehensively examined  in  order  to  ascertain  more  definitively Turkish  and  American
official and public attitudes toward each other in the pre-WWII and wartime periods.  This
402  Koçak, op. cit., pp. 361-362.  Zürcher, op. cit., p. 219.
403  Koçak, op. cit., pp. 553-554.  Zürcher, op. cit., p. 219.
404  “Every land does what is best for its own needs and conditions while moving towards
democracy.”  Turan, op. cit., p. 43.
405  Ibid.  Another discussion of this issue can be found in Heper, op. cit., pp. 116-147, 168-
171.
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study also provides some new information on Turkey's transition to democracy, and on İsmet
İnönü's attitude towards that transition.
Academic study of Turkish media is a nearly non-existent field, despite its power and the role
that the Turkish media play in every day Turkish life.  This study provides some insight into
why the Turkish media need to be examined in more detail, and from different perspectives.
As an illustration, this author was surprised to learn that studies on WWII-era Ulus editions,
despite the fact that it was the semi-official CHP newspaper, can be numbered on one hand.
Much new information about Turkish politics and society awaits researchers who create new
ways of analyzing and reading Turkish media. 
This  study also  has  a place in  the burgeoning literature surrounding the  construction  and
content of Turkish nationalism.  Sharp states that the U.S. is considered the foremost example
of an “imagined community,” where “. . .  national identity. . .  has been organized around the
impetus of the 'articulation of danger, the specification of difference and the figuration oıf
Otherness.'”406  This  sentence  struck  me  because  the  “constructed”  nature  of  the  Turkish
nation has, especially in the last decade, steadily gained understanding in Turkish academia
and, more slowly, in Turkish society.  In the context of WWII, the death of the national father,
the re-emergence of the Russian threat, and the struggle to build an industrialized nation-state,
did information from  Reader's  Digest,  as well  as from other U.S.  publications,  provide a
solidly  constructed  worldview  that  was  useful  to  the  Turkish  authorities  and  to  the
formulation of Turkish national identity?  Consequently, this thesis also has a place in the
expanding research around Turkish national identity and its formation, specifically, the role or
roles that U.S. “information” may have played in influencing, aiding, or even solidifying that
identity.
Finally, because of  the  content  of the study, this  study also  may prove useful  to  general
Turkish cultural studies.  In general, multidisciplinary academic analysis of Turkish culture
still  does  not  receive  sufficient  attention,  although  more  and  more  Turkish  and  foreign
researchers are taking up the topic.  This author hopes that this study can show the usefulness
of studying Turkish culture, history, media, literature, and politics in a cross-disciplinary way,
while staying rooted in one discipline.
406  Op. cit. p. xi.
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6.2  The Ankara Cowboys
An appropriate conclusion to this study is provided by a curious series of crimes, reported in
May 1945, committed by three young, dreamy Ankara youths.  According to the details in
Ulus, the three delikanlı (“crazy kids”) had decided that they wanted to go to Texas, buy land,
and then become cowboys as a way to achieve Hollywood stardom.  In order to get money for
the travel expenses and land in Texas, they committed a string of robberies.407  The source of
these ideas  must  be obvious:   these three  young men had watched Hollywood films and
wanted  the  same  starry life  depicted  in  those  films.   In  other  words,  they had  been  so
influenced by the U.S. films that they went  so far as to make detailed plans and commit
crimes in order to fulfill their “dreams.”  
This situation, of course, illustrates the power that media has to influence the thoughts and
emotions of those who consume it.  Apparently, by 1945,  U.S. media, in this case motion
pictures, had already begun to affect Turkish society strongly enough that young people were
being influenced to criminal acts in pursuit of the images they saw on the silver screen.408
Consequently, that U.S. media had begun to affect Turkish society is not hard to prove; the
challenge to is to quantify more exactly through what channels the influences came, the extent
of the effect experienced by Turkish society and culture, and the reactions and/or oppositions
developed by Turkish people to that influence.
407  Ulus, 8 Mayıs, 1945, p. 3.
408  This does not ignore the acrimonious debate concerning exactly how much power the
media has to influence.  This author thinks it is safe to say that, if those youths had not seen
Hollywood films, they most likely would not have been committing crimes with the sole
intention of going to the U.S.  That does not mean, however, that they would not have
committed crimes for some other reason.
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APPENDIX
A)  List of January 1939 – August 1945 Ulus issues missing from the bound volumes in the 
Bayazıt Milli Kütüphanesi:409
1939:  8 May, 3 December
1940:  29 December
1941:  1 March, 19, 26 April, 26, 31 May, 30 June, 12, 27, 29 August, 13 September
1942:  8 March, 20 July, 3, 18, 19 August, 20, 27, 28, 29, 30 November
1943:  30 March, 7 April, 18, 25, 26, 28 May, 26 June, 17, 29, 31 July, 1, 31 August, 
10, 19, 23, 25 September 
1944:  17, 28 January, 21 February, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 March, 23 July, 30 
September, 26, 27 November
1945:  21, 29 January, 24 March 
 
409  The bound volumes containing three or four months each are not the only source for Ulus
at the library in Bayazıt:  there are also single-month volumes bound in brown paper which
must be requested.
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